State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 03 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16-0747 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Desmond Lamart Jones, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed
Stearns County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Stan Keillor, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree arson, arguing that (1) the district court violated his right of self-representation and erroneously admitted relationship evidence, (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
In June of 2015, appellant Desmond Lamart Jones frequently stayed at the St. Cloud townhome of his girlfriend, V.W., who resided with her four children; her adult brother, S.W.; and an uncle of V.W. and S.W. About June 22, V.W. ended her relationship with Jones. Jones left V.W.'s townhome at her request but frequently called and texted V.W., telling her that he did not want to end the relationship, asking her to return his belongings, and seeking a place to stay temporarily. V.W. drove Jones to a storage garage in which to put his belongings. During the drive, Jones snatched the ignition key, jumped out of the vehicle, and ran away (the key incident). The next morning, S.W. found a Snickers candy bar stuffed into the fuel-filler neck of V.W.'s vehicle (the Snickers-bar incident). As a result of these incidents, V.W. took her children to stay at her mother's house on the evening of June 24.
V.W. had a male guest in her townhome the evening of June 24, 2015, until shortly after midnight and then went to her mother's house. Around that time, Jones called and texted V.W., implying with hostility that she was having sex with her house guest. About 1:36 a.m. on June 25, S.W. was awoken by a "whoosh" sound, looked out a window, and discovered that the exterior of the townhome was aflame. S.W. exited the townhome and saw a person, whom he believed to be Jones, running away from the townhome. The fire damaged the townhome's siding and back door, and police determined that the fire had been caused by arson. They arrested Jones later that day.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Jones with first-degree arson (dwelling). On June 29, 2015, at a combined first appearance on the arson charge and a violation-of-release-conditions hearing in connection with an unrelated pending criminal case, Jones stated that he wanted to fire his public defender and represent himself. The district court told Jones, "I'm not going to allow you to do that here today," and Jones continued to be represented by a public defender at all relevant times.
In November 2015, the state noticed its intent to introduce unspecified "evidence of the relationship of [V.W.] and [Jones]," claiming admissibility under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2014), or "any other exception to the general exclusionary rule." The state subsequently supplemented its notice to include the introduction of "evidence of the relationship of [V.W.] and [Jones]," specifically, that "approximately a little over a month prior to the [arson], [Jones] held a knife to V.W. because her brothers called him a b-tch" (the knife incident). On December 15, before the start of Jones's jury trial, the district court ruled that "some" evidence "to get the context of the relationship" was admissible but prohibited the state from introducing evidence of the knife incident.
During a three-day trial, the jury heard testimony from 11 prosecution witnesses and considered more than 20 exhibits, including surveillance video of Jones purchasing an accelerant just before the fire occurred, audio recordings of Jones's voicemail messages to V.W., a covert recording of a call by V.W. to Jones, and a recording of V.W.'s 911 call. In some of the exhibits, V.W. referenced the key incident, the Snickers-bar incident, and the knife incident. V.W. also testified about the key incident, the Snickers-bar incident, and, despite the district court's ruling, the knife incident; twice mentioned Jones's priorincarceration; and three times expressed her personal belief that Jones had committed the arson. S.W. testified and identified Jones as the person whom he saw running away from the scene of the fire and briefly mentioned the key incident. The prosecutor referenced the key incident in her opening statement. Jones did not request, and the court did not give, any cautionary instruction on relationship evidence.
The jury found Jones guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced him to 132 months' imprisonment. This appeal follows.
Jones first argues that the district court violated his right to represent himself when it denied his June 29, 2015 request to discharge his public defender and represent himself. We read this argument to include Jones's claim that the district court violated his right to represent himself at his first appearance and at every subsequent stage of the criminal process, including trial. A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself in state court. State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 2012) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2533 (1975)). The defendant's first appearance is a critical stage in the criminal process. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 212-13, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2591-92 (2008). We assume without deciding that the defendant's right of self-representation applies at all critical stages of the criminal process. See Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013) ; United States v. Conklin, 835 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2016)(describing right of self-representation as "alternative" to right to counsel); State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 170 (Minn. 1997) ().
The right of self-representation is not absolute; a district court may refuse a request for self-representation under some circumstances. State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 613 (Minn. 2004). "When a criminal defendant asks to represent himself, the court must determine (1) whether the request is clear, unequivocal, and timely, and (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel." Id. (quotation omitted). The court bears "the responsibility to clarify and address a defendant's request to discharge counsel." State v. Paige, 765 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. App. 2009). And the court cannot deny a request for self-representation solely because the defendant is unable to be an effective legal advocate. See State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264-65 (Minn. 1990) (). We review a refusal of a self-representation request for clear error, and a clearly erroneous refusal is a violation of the right of self-representation. Blom, 682 N.W.2d at 613.
Denial of a defendant's right to represent himself at trial is a structural error that results in automatic reversal. Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 2015) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 944, 950 n.8 (1984)). But denial of the defendant's right to represent himself at another stage of the criminal process is not a structural error unless it undermines the fairness of the criminal proceeding as a whole. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991) ().
Here, at Jones's first appearance on June 29, 2015, the district court confirmed that Jones had read and understood the "Felony/Gross Misdemeanor First Appearance Statement of Rights" and noted that Jones had applied for a public defender and that the public defender standing next to him was his attorney. The prosecutor requested a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO) in connection with the arson charge and alleged that Jones had violated his conditions of release in the unrelated pending criminal case by drinking alcohol at a bar on the night of the fire. Jones then interjected, asking about the prosecutor's statements regarding a DANCO and why he was "being charged with an OFP" when he "did not have an OFP." The prosecutor clarified that the state was not charging Jones with a DANCO violation, and Jones again interjected with a question, told the district court that he did not understand what his public defender was doing, and said, "He's just standing here." The following colloquy between the court and Jones then occurred:
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