State v. Rhoads
| Decision Date | 23 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. A10–1568.,A10–1568. |
| Citation | 813 N.W.2d 880 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Denon Anthony RHOADS, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. Generally, a defendant who has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel need not renew his waiver-of-counsel at subsequent proceedings.
2. When the State files an amended charge that doubles the maximum possible punishment after a hearing at which the defendant waived his right to counsel, a defendant must renew his waiver of his right to counsel in a manner that demonstrates an understanding of the increased maximum possible punishment.
3. When considering the validity of a renewed waiver of the right to counsel following an amended charge that doubles the maximum possible punishment, a court should use the analysis articulated in State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270 (Minn.1998), to determine whether the defendant understood the increased maximum possible punishment.
4. Defendant's renewed waiver of his right to counsel, following the filing of an amended charge that doubled the maximum possible punishment, was not knowing and intelligent because the particular facts and circumstances of defendant's case do not support a conclusion that defendant understood that the maximum possible punishment had doubled.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.
The issue presented is whether appellant Denon Anthony Rhoads knowingly and intelligently renewed his waiver-of-counsel after the State filed an amended charge that doubled the maximum possible punishment. Rhoads was initially charged with a single count of second-degree burglary. At a pretrial hearing, Rhoads asserted his right to self-representation and signed a written waiver-of-counsel.1 The State later amended the complaint to include a count of first-degree burglary that roughly doubled the maximum possible punishment. On the day of trial, Rhoads renewed his waiver-of-counsel. As part of the renewed waiver-of-counsel, the district court did not conduct an on-the-record inquiry of Rhoads's understanding of the maximum punishment that might be imposed if he were convicted of first-degree burglary. Because the record does not support an inference that when Rhoads renewed his waiver-of-counsel he understood the maximum possible punishment he faced had doubled, we conclude that the renewed waiver-of-counsel was not knowing and intelligent. We therefore reverse Rhoads's first-degree burglary conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2
Rhoads was initially charged with second-degree burglary in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(1) (2010). The complaint alleged that Rhoads entered the victim's apartment without consent, hit the victim on the head, and then threatened to kill him. The complaint also informed Rhoads that he faced a maximum sentence of 10 years or a $20,000 fine, or both.
At Rhoads's first court appearance, a public defender was appointed to represent him. Two weeks later, at an October 26, 2009, pretrial hearing, Rhoads told the district court that he wanted to discharge his public defender and represent himself. In accordance with Minn. R.Crim. P. 5.04, Rhoads completed and signed a written petition to proceed as pro se counsel, and the court engaged in an extensive colloquy with Rhoads regarding the contents of the petition and his desire to represent himself. During the colloquy, Rhoads indicated, among other things, that he understood that he faced felony-level “offenses,” the maximum penalty for which was a sentence of 10 years or a $20,000 fine, or both.3 Based on the waiver-of-counsel, the court granted Rhoads's request for self-representation.
At a December 2009 pretrial hearing, the prosecutor offered to settle the matter, explaining that if Rhoads pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary, the State would recommend a sentence at the low end of the presumptive sentencing range. The prosecutor notified Rhoads that if he rejected the settlement offer, the State intended to amend the complaint to include a charge of first-degree burglary.
At a pretrial hearing a month later, the prosecutor informed the district court that on December 29, 2009, the State had filed an amended complaint adding a second count that alleged first-degree burglary, Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2010). The fact that the maximum sentence for first-degree burglary was 20 years or a $35,000 fine, or both, was never discussed on the record. The district court did not arraign Rhoads on the new charge, nor did Rhoads formally acknowledge receipt of the amended complaint. In addition to asserting his desire for an immediate resolution of his case, Rhoads stated, and Without confirming that Rhoads had received and understood the amended complaint, the district court denied the request for immediate resolution of his case and ordered Rhoads to appear for trial on April 8, 2010.
On the day of trial, Rhoads signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial. After accepting the jury trial waiver, the court confirmed that on October 26, 2009, Rhoads discharged his lawyer and signed a petition to proceed as pro se counsel. The court also held the following colloquy with Rhoads:
The district court, however, did not conduct an on-the-record inquiry regarding Rhoads's understanding of the punishment that might be imposed if he were convicted of first-degree burglary.
At trial, the State presented evidence consistent with the facts alleged in the complaint. The court found Rhoads guilty of first- and second-degree burglary, and entered judgments of conviction on both charges and imposed sentence on the first-degree burglary conviction.4
Rhoads appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support conviction on first-degree burglary, (2) he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel as to the first-degree burglary charge, (3) his right to a speedy trial had been violated, and (4) he was improperly adjudicated guilty of both first- and second-degree burglary. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction for first-degree burglary and vacated the conviction for second-degree burglary. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict on first-degree burglary, Rhoads's right to a speedy trial was not violated, and his waiver-of-counsel was knowing and intelligent. Rhoads subsequently petitioned for review of the speedy trial and waiver-of-counsel issues, and we granted review on the waiver-of-counsel issue.
Rhoads does not contest the validity of the waiver-of-counsel he executed on October 26, 2009. Instead, Rhoads contends that the amended complaint constituted a “significant change of circumstances” that required a renewed waiver of his right to counsel and that his renewed waiver on the day of trial was unknowing and unintelligent because he did not understand that the maximum possible punishment had doubled.5 The State counters that Rhoads's initial waiver-of-counsel remained valid throughout the entirety of the proceedings, and that the district court had no obligation to obtain a renewed waiver.
Whether a waiver of a constitutional right was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 275–76 (Minn.1998). The clearly erroneous standard controls our review of a district court's finding that a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn.2009); Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 276. A finding is clearly erroneous when there is no reasonable evidence to support the finding or when an appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred. State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 870 (Minn.2008). When the facts are undisputed, however, the question of whether a waiver-of-counsel was knowing and intelligent is a constitutional one that is reviewed de novo. See State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn.1990).
Before addressing Rhoads's claim that his renewed waiver-of-counsel on the day of trial was unknowing and unintelligent, we must address three questions of first impression. We will address each question in turn.
Initially, we must determine whether, as a general rule, a defendant who has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel must renew the waiver-of-counsel at each subsequent hearing. Although this issue is one of first impression in Minnesota, the renewed waiver-of-counsel issue has been addressed by courts in other jurisdictions. Our analysis is informed by a discussion of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and to self-representation, the controlling waiver-of-counsel case law, and the reasoning adopted by other courts that have considered the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Little
...depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn.2012). Moreover, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require that a defendant personally waive the right to a jury trial, ei......
-
State v. Phan
...in Arrendondo. For all of these reasons, we do not find Jensen to be an authoritative decision.¶27 Phan also points us to State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. 2012). In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that when the State doubles the maximum possible punishment by filing new ch......
-
Dereje v. State, A11–1147.
...mistaken premise that the waiver was required because he was pursuing a stipulated-facts trial under subdivision 3. See State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 888 (Minn.2012) (“To establish a knowing and intelligent waiver ... the record must demonstrate among other things that the defendant's wa......
-
State v. Maddox
...circumstances, and any other facts relevant to the defendant's understanding of the consequences of the waiver.” State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 885–86 (Minn.2012) (quotations omitted). The denial of the right to counsel “is a structural error,” Bonga v. State, 765 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn.20......