State v. Jones
| Citation | 900 N.W.2d 757,297 Neb. 557 |
| Decision Date | 18 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. S-16-1001,S-16-1001 |
| Parties | STATE of Nebraska, appellee, v. Daniel Lee JONES, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Julie E. Bear, of Reinsch, Slattery, Bear & Minahan, P.C., L.L.O., Plattsmouth, for appellant.
Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Melissa R. Vincent, Lincoln, for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller–Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Kelch, and Funke, JJ.
Daniel Lee Jones pled no contest to first degree murder in 1999 and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Jones was 16 years old at the time of the murder, and therefore, his life sentence was vacated in 2015 pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and he was granted a resentencing. After a hearing, the district court for Sarpy County resentenced Jones to imprisonment for 80 years to life. Jones appeals his resentencing. We affirm.
Jones was charged with first degree murder and use of a weapon to commit a felony in connection with the stabbing death of Scott Catenacci. Jones' birth date is November 7, 1981. The killing occurred on or about September 29, 1998. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jones pled no contest to first degree murder and the State dismissed the use of a weapon charge. The factual basis presented by the State at the plea hearing indicated that Jones, in concert with other defendants, had attacked Catenacci and stabbed him to death. The attack on Catenacci, having been discussed several days beforehand, was premeditated, deliberate, and malicious. Jones stabbed Catenacci several times, and Catenacci died as a result of the wounds
. Jones was convicted, and on June 28, 1999, the district court sentenced him to imprisonment for life.
Jones' first direct appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the statutory docket fee, but Jones obtained a new direct appeal as postconviction relief. Jones' conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court in the new direct appeal. State v. Jones, 274 Neb. 271, 739 N.W.2d 193 (2007).
On June 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Miller, supra , that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ " 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Although the Court in Miller concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a mandatory life sentence without parole, the Court allowed the possibility that a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could be sentenced to life in prison, but only after "consideration of the juvenile's special circumstances in light of the principles and purposes of juvenile sentencing." See Montgomery v. Louisiana, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 725, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). In response to Miller , the Nebraska Legislature enacted Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105.02 (Reissue 2016), which, inter alia, sets forth mitigating factors that a court must consider when sentencing a juvenile convicted of a Class IA felony. In State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320, 842 N.W.2d 716 (2014), we held that the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), applied retroactively to a case on collateral review. See, also, Montgomery, supra.
On June 21, 2013, Jones, who was 16 years old at the time of the murder, filed a motion for postconviction relief based on Miller . After this court's holding in Mantich and after an evidentiary hearing, the district court on July 9, 2015, sustained Jones' motion and, as postconviction relief, vacated his sentence and set the matter for resentencing.
In August 2016, the court held a mitigation hearing as part of the resentencing. At the mitigation hearing, Jones presented evidence including the deposition testimony of a certified child and adult psychologist regarding adolescent brain development and the significant differences between juveniles and adults. Jones presented live testimony of witnesses including Jones' sister, who testified regarding Jones' childhood experiences and his home and family life while growing up. She generally testified that the family moved frequently during Jones' childhood and mostly lived in areas of poor socioeconomic status that were prone to crime and gang violence, that Jones never knew or was involved with his father when growing up, that their mother had a succession of boyfriends who were abusive, and that Jones had very little supervision and ended up going "along with the [wrong] crowd." Jones also presented testimony by a unit manager in the prison where Jones was incarcerated that Jones was quiet, followed the rules, and was not a problem inmate. Jones also presented testimony by a clinical psychologist who had performed a comprehensive mental health evaluation of Jones for purposes of the mitigation hearing. He testified regarding various findings with respect to Jones' mental and psychological functioning and his neuropsychological development. He further testified, inter alia, that Jones had matured over time and had supports in place for employability and residence in the community. He opined in a report that Jones was at a low risk for future violence.
and "the factors set forth in [§] 28-105.02(2)." The court also noted that the crime committed by Jones "was an extremely heinous crime" involving a "brutal, brutal murder" and that Jones had "participated both in planning and the execution of the crime." The court concluded that "a sentence of some severity is required but not such severity that [Jones] would never have hope of being released from prison." The court resentenced Jones to imprisonment for 80 years to life with credit for time served and statutory parole eligibility at age 56.
Jones appeals the district court's resentencing.
Jones claims, restated and summarized, that his sentence of 80 years' to life imprisonment with parole eligibility at age 56 is excessive and, in particular, that the court (1) abused its discretion by imposing a de facto life sentence which violated constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment and denied him a meaningful opportunity for release based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, (2) violated his constitutional due process rights when it failed to make specific findings to demonstrate that it adequately considered his age-related characteristics, and (3) violated his constitutional rights against cruel and unusual punishment by imposing a sentence which was not proportional.
An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Jackson, 297 Neb. 22, 899 N.W.2d 215 (2017) ; State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320, 842 N.W.2d 716 (2014). A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted for disposition. Id.
Whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment presents a question of law.
State v. Nollen, 296 Neb. 94, 892 N.W.2d 81 2017). When reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court's ruling. Id.
In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment forbids a state sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender convicted of homicide. Miller did not "categorically bar" the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, but, instead, "held that a [sentencing court] must consider specific, individualized factors before handing down a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a juvenile" convicted of a homicide. Mantich, 287 Neb. at 339-40, 842 N.W.2d at 730. We have previously held, in Mantich , that Miller applied retroactively and that therefore, any juvenile sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without parole could have his or her sentence vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing.
In response to Miller , the Nebraska Legislature amended the sentencing laws for juveniles convicted of first degree murder.
Section 28-105.02, which applies to this case, provides as follows:
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