State v. Jones, CR–13–0292–PR.

• Decision Date: 03 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. CR–13–0292–PR.,CR–13–0292–PR.
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Shawnte Shuree JONES, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

235 Ariz. 501
334 P.3d 191
695 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.
Shawnte Shuree JONES, Appellant.

No. CR–13–0292–PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Sept. 3, 2014.

Opinion of the Court of Appeals vacated; trial court's judgment affirmed.

[334 P.3d 192]

Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General, Robert L. Ellman, Solicitor General, Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section, Alice Jones (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, for State of Arizona.

Theresa M. Armendarez (argued), Manteo, NC, for Shawntee Shuree Jones.

Justice BRUTINEL authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice BALES, Vice Chief Justice PELANDER, Justice BERCH, and Justice TIMMER joined. Justice BRUTINEL, opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 A.R.S. § 13–116 requires that concurrent sentences be imposed on a defendant whose convictions stem from a single act. Conversely, A.R.S. § 13–705(M) requires that sentences imposed on a defendant convicted of certain dangerous crimes against children run consecutively even when the underlying convictions arise from a single act. Resolving the conflict between these statutes, we hold that the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences pursuant to § 13–705(M).

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Shawnte Jones called 911 to report that her daughter had accidentally fallen and was not breathing. Paramedics rushed the child to the hospital, but she died a few days later. The medical examiner noted seven recent head contusions and determined that the child's death was caused by “blunt force head trauma.” Finding that the child's injuries were inconsistent with Jones' claim that her daughter accidentally fell, the medical examiner instead classified the child's death as a homicide.

¶ 3 Jones was charged with child abuse for failing to provide nourishment and/or medical attention to her daughter (“Count 1”), child abuse for inflicting the head injuries (“Count 2”), and first degree murder (“Count 3”). After Jones waived her right to a jury trial, the trial court convicted her on Count 1 of the lesser-included offense of reckless child abuse and on the other offenses as charged. The court sentenced her to 3.5 years in prison on Count 1, to be served concurrently with a sentence of life with the possibility of release after 25 years on Count 3, and to a consecutive term of 17 years in prison on Count 2.

¶ 4 Jones timely appealed. The court of appeals affirmed Jones' convictions but modified her sentence to make Count 2 concurrent, rather than consecutive, to the other sentences. State v. Jones, 232 Ariz. 448, 451 ¶ 14, 306 P.3d 105, 108 (App.2013).

¶ 5 We granted review to resolve the conflict between §§ 13–116 and 13–705(M), a legal issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.

II. ANALYSIS

¶ 6 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289 ¶ 6, 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007). In interpreting statutes, we seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature that enacted them. Baker v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare, 231 Ariz. 379, 383 ¶ 8, 296 P.3d 42, 46 (2013). When two statutes conflict, we adopt a construction that reconciles them whenever possible, giving force and meaning to each. UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, 200 Ariz. 327, 333 ¶ 28, 26 P.3d 510, 516 (2001).

¶ 7 Sections 13–116 and 13–705(M) both potentially apply to sentences for dangerous crimes against children arising from a single act or omission. Section 13–116 mandates that “an act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent.” Conversely, § 13–705(M) requires consecutive sentences for certain dangerous crimes against children, including child abuse as charged in Count 2 as well as

[334 P.3d 193]

“child molestation and sexual abuse of the same victim.” ¹ See A.R.S. §§ 13–705(M); 13–705(P)(1)(h); 13–3623 (A)(1).

¶ 8 Thus, by their terms, § 13–116...