State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 30 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 26289.,26289.
• Citation: 43 N.E.3d 833
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Jarod JONES, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

43 N.E.3d 833

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Jarod JONES, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 26289.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Montgomery County.

Sept. 30, 2015.

Mathias H. Heck, Jr., by Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor's Office, Dayton, OH, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Brock A. Schoenlein, Dayton, OH, for Defendant–Appellant.

OPINION

WELBAUM

, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jarod Jones, appeals from his conviction in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas after a jury found him guilty of multiple counts of rape and gross sexual imposition of a minor. For the reasons outlined below, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} On April 29, 2013, Jones was indicted on two counts of raping a minor under ten years of age and one count of raping a minor under thirteen years of age, both in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b)

. Jones was also indicted on two counts of gross sexual imposition of a minor under thirteen years of age in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). Jones pled not guilty to all the charges.

{¶ 3} The victim, K.D., is the niece of Jones's former fiancé. Between August 2011 and early 2012, Jones lived next door to K.D. and her mother in an apartment on “R.” Drive in Dayton, Ohio. In November 2012, after Jones had left Dayton for a period of time and had returned in September 2012, Jones moved to K.D.'s grandmother's house on “S.” Road. On occasion, Jones would babysit K.D. at his apartment on R. Drive and at the S. Road address.

{¶ 4} On April 18, 2013, K.D. disclosed to her principal and school counselor that Jones had been sexually abusing her. After the school notified K.D.'s mother of the accusations, K.D.'s mother took K.D. to the emergency room where she was referred to CARE House, Montgomery County's advocacy center for victims of child abuse. The next day, Detective Jerome Dix of the Dayton Police Department's Special Victims Unit interviewed K.D. at CARE House. Following his interview with K.D., Detective Dix arrested Jones and interviewed him regarding the alleged sexual abuse.

{¶ 5} During the recorded interview, Jones admitted to engaging in sexual acts with K.D. at his apartment on R. Drive and at K.D.'s grandmother's house on S. Road. Specifically, Jones admitted to inappropriately touching K.D.'s bare buttocks and to K.D. touching his penis with her hand while he was aroused. Jones also admitted that K.D. had her mouth on his penis on two occasions while at her grandmother's house. Jones, however, denied engaging in vaginal intercourse with K.D. He blamed his conduct on inebriation and K.D. being aggressive and dancing provocatively. After his admissions, Jones got down on his knees and prayed for forgiveness once Detective Dix left the interview room.

{¶ 6} Approximately a week after Jones's interview with Detective Dix, on April 25, 2013, Dr. Lori Vavul–Roediger examined K.D. and found no abnormalities or injuries to K.D.'s genital or anal regions. Nevertheless, Dr. Vavul–Roediger concluded that K.D.'s exam neither confirmed nor ruled out her claims of sexual abuse.

{¶ 7} On July 17, 2013, Jones filed a motion to suppress the statements he made during the recorded interview with Detective Dix on grounds that his statements were coerced and involuntarily made. After holding a hearing on the matter, the trial court overruled Jones's motion to suppress in its entirety on September 10, 2013.

{¶ 8} The case then proceeded to a four-day jury trial. Prior to trial, however, the trial court held a Boggs hearing due to K.D. informing Detective Dix that she had also been sexually abused by her cousin and her mother's ex-boyfriend. At the hearing, the trial court questioned K.D. about those accusations using a questionnaire agreed to by both parties. In response to the court's questions, K.D. testified that she had told the truth when she accused her cousin of touching her “private parts” and making her touch his “private parts.” Hearing Trans. (May 21, 2014), p. 23. K.D. also testified that she had told the truth when she accused her mother's ex-boyfriend of “doing sexual things to [her].” Id. at 23–24.

{¶ 9} At trial, the State presented testimony from K.D., K.D.'s mother, Detective Dix, and Dr. Vavul–Roediger. Prior to Detective Dix's testimony, Jones filed a motion in limine arguing that his confession during his interview with Detective Dix was not admissible under the corpus delicti rule because there was no evidence indicating that any abuse occurred when K.D. was under the age of ten. The trial court disagreed and overruled the motion, thereby permitting the State to play Jones's recorded interview with Detective Dix. After the State rested, Jones chose not to present any testimony in his defense, but moved the trial court for acquittal under Crim.R. 29

, which the court denied.

{¶ 10} After deliberation, the jury found Jones guilty of all five charges against him. The trial court then sentenced Jones to a mandatory prison term of fifteen years to life for each of the two counts of raping a minor under the age of ten. For the single count of raping a minor under the age of thirteen, Jones received a mandatory prison term of ten years. Jones also received a five year prison term for each of the two gross sexual imposition counts. The gross sexual imposition counts were ordered to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to all other counts. The remaining counts were ordered to run consecutively for a total aggregate term of 45 years to life in prison. The trial court also designated Jones a Tier III sex offender for the rape convictions and a Tier II sex offender for the gross sexual imposition convictions.

{¶ 11} Jones now appeals from his convictions, raising twelve assignments of error for review.

Motion to Suppress

{¶ 12} Under his First Assignment of Error, Jones contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements he made during his April 19, 2013 interview with Detective Dix, claiming those statements were involuntary as a product of coercive police conduct. Specifically, Jones claims that in order to obtain his confession, Detective Dix threatened him with increased penalties, made promises of leniency, engaged in bullying, misrepresented certain facts as exonerative, misrepresented the strength of the State's case against him, and used his family, faith, and other circumstances as leverage. We disagree with Jones's claims.

{¶ 13} “In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court ‘assumes the role of the trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.’ ” State v. Knisley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22897, 2010-Ohio-116, 2010 WL 169438, ¶ 30

, quoting State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 639 N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994). “Accordingly, when we review suppression decisions, we must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” (Citation omitted.) Id. “ ‘Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard.’ ” Id., quoting Retherford at 592, 639 N.E.2d 498. Whether an accused's confession was voluntary presents a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Beckett, 2d Dist. Clark No. 00CA0049, 2001 WL 1018224, *2 (Sept. 7, 2001).

{¶ 14} “Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In order to ensure that this right is protected, statements resulting from custodial interrogations are admissible only after a showing that the procedural safeguards described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)

, have been followed.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Western, 2015-Ohio-627, 29 N.E.3d 245, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 15} “[T]he State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's confession was voluntarily given.” Western at ¶ 16, citing State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 381 N.E.2d 195 (1978)

. “ ‘If all of the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession was coerced or compelled, it cannot be used to convict the defendant.’ ” State v. Strickland, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25545, 2013-Ohio-2768, 2013 WL 3356565, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Jackson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 02CA0001, 2002-Ohio-4680, 2002 WL 31002619, ¶ 22.

{¶ 16} “Whether a statement was made voluntarily and whether an individual knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his or her Miranda rights are distinct issues.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Lovato, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25683, 2014-Ohio-2311, 2014 WL 2475593, ¶ 30

. Therefore, “[r]egardless of whether Miranda warnings were required and given, a defendant's statement may have been given involuntarily and thus be subject to exclusion.” Id., citing State v. Kelly, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2004–CA–20, 2005-Ohio-305, 2005 WL 182900, ¶ 11.

{¶ 17} “A defendant's statements to police after a knowing, intelligent, and voluntar[y] waiver of the individual's Miranda rights are presumed to be voluntary.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 31. However, “ ‘[t]he Miranda presumption applies to the conditions inherent in custodial interrogation that compel the suspect to confess. It does not extend to any actual coercion police might engage in, and the Due Process Clause continues to require an inquiry separate from custody considerations and compliance with Miranda regarding whether a suspect's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding his confession.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Porter, 178 Ohio App.3d 304, 2008-Ohio-4627, 897 N.E.2d 1149, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.)

. (Other citation omitted.)

{¶ 18} “In determining whether a pretrial statement is involuntary, a court ‘should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the...