State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 29 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. A14–1399.,A14–1399. |
| Citation | 857 N.W.2d 550 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Miranda Lynn JONES, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Gregory A. Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Luke T. Godzala, Assistant County Attorney, Crookston, MN, for appellant.
Mark D. Nyvold, Assistant State Public Defender, Fridley, MN, for respondent.
Considered and decided by STAUBER, Presiding Judge; CHUTICH, Judge; and REILLY, Judge.
In this pretrial appeal, appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court's dismissal of a contempt-of-court charge. The state argues that the plain language of Minn.Stat. § 588.20, subd. 2(4) (2012), gives the prosecutor authority to charge a defendant with contempt after the defendant violates a condition of probation contained in the sentencing order. We affirm.
In December 2013, the Polk County district court convicted and sentenced respondent Miranda Jones on a fourth-degree controlled substance charge. The district court stayed Jones's sentence and placed her on supervised probation for a ten-year period. Conditions of Jones's supervised probation require that she refrain from using alcohol and remain law-abiding.
During the early hours of May 31, 2014, a Polk County deputy responded to a report that an intoxicated female was running down the street, screaming, and refusing to return to her house.1 The deputy identified the female as Jones. Jones was arrested and charged by citation with consumption of alcohol by a minor in violation of Minn.Stat. § 340A.503(1)(a)(2) (2012), disorderly conduct in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.72(1)(3) (2012), and contempt of court in violation of Minn.Stat. § 588.20, subd. 2(4). The deputy transported Jones to a local hospital for monitoring. A chemical test revealed that Jones's alcohol concentration was .19.
On June 4, 2014, Jones moved to dismiss the contempt charge, arguing that (1) a contempt charge is inappropriate because other remedies are prescribed to address probation violations; (2) other jurisdictions do not allow this practice; and (3) a probation agreement is not a court order.2
Counsel for Jones supplied statistics to the district court showing that in the years 2010–12, Polk County brought over 400 contempt-of-court charges under Minn.Stat. § 588.20, subd. 2(4).
In an August 5, 2014 order, the district court dismissed the contempt-of-court charge. In addressing this issue of first impression, the district court's well-reasoned analysis considered authority from other jurisdictions and the appropriateness of allowing contempt of court as a sanction for probation violations. Ultimately, the district court concluded that criminal contempt is not a proper consequence for alleged probation violations and using the contempt penalty in this manner would be inconsistent with the purposes of contempt. The district court dismissed the contempt charge and the state appealed.
Did the district court err in granting Jones's motion to dismiss the contempt-of-court charge?
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.04 allows the state to appeal pretrial orders, subject to some restrictions. A pretrial order dismissing a charge for lack of probable cause is appealable if the order is based on a legal determination. State v. Ciurleo, 471 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Minn.App.1991) ; see also Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(1) ().
To prevail in a pretrial appeal, the state must “demonstrate [ ] clearly and unequivocally that the trial court has erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 681 (Minn.2009). Because the district court in its pretrial order dismissed the contempt charge, it clearly had a critical impact on the outcome of the case. See State v. Gerard, 832 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Minn.App.2013) (), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
The state contends that the sentencing order issued in Jones's felony case is a “mandate of the court,” thus subjecting a violator of a probation condition listed in the sentencing order to a contempt-of-court charge under Minn.Stat. § 588.20, subd. 2(4). We review the district court's conclusion that criminal contempt is not a consequence for a probation violation de novo. See State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn.2013) (); State v. Legarde, 479 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn.App.1992) (). We note that this case arrived under a unique procedural posture and circumstances: a Polk County deputy sheriff tab-charged Jones with contempt of court, and the district court dismissed the charge, implicitly finding a lack of probable cause. Due to the irregular nature and posture of this case, background information concerning the purposes of both contempt and probation aids our analysis.
Finding an individual in contempt of court is a power traditionally reserved for and residing with the courts. See State v. Tatum, 556 N.W.2d 541, 547 (Minn.1996) ( ). “Contempt historically has been regarded as part of the court's inherent power to punish summarily offenses committed in its presence.” In re Welfare of R.L. W., 309 Minn. 489, 491, 245 N.W.2d 204, 205 (1976).
Reviewing caselaw addressing contempt illuminates how a contempt charge initiated by the state for a probation violation does not fit the purpose of the court's contempt power. In Tatum, the supreme court described the fundamental differences in the categorization of the character of contempt orders. 556 N.W.2d at 544. The character of contempt orders distinguishes between the purpose and the nature of an order. Id. at 544–45. When contemplating the penalty of contempt, the supreme court directs courts to “determine at their earliest convenience whether the purpose of the contempt proceeding is remedial or punitive, and whether the nature of the contemptuous conduct at issue is direct or constructive.” Id. at 545. Since this case involves the use of criminal contempt, we turn next to the purpose and nature of criminal contempt.
In Minnesota, the purpose of criminal/punitive contempt orders is generally to punish offensive conduct directed against the dignity and authority of the court, Minn. State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Assistance Ass'n, Inc., 311 Minn. 276, 285, 248 N.W.2d 733, 741 (1976), and to “preserve the authority of the court by punishing past misconduct.” In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Minn.App.1987) (citing Peterson v. Peterson, 278 Minn. 275, 153 N.W.2d 825 (1967) ). See Tatum, 556 N.W.2d at 544 n. 2 (). “The sanction is inflicted primarily as punishment for the past disrespectful or contumacious conduct and in vindication of public authority.” Minn. State Bar Ass'n, 311 Minn. at 285, 248 N.W.2d at 741. This punishment is not intended for the benefit of either party, but to vindicate the authority of the court. State v. Willis, 61 Minn. 120, 122, 63 N.W. 169, 170 (1895). When, however, the court's purpose in imposing sanctions is to “coerce [an individual's] future compliance, we have traditionally regarded the contempt as civil contempt.” State v. Martin, 555 N.W.2d 899, 900 (Minn.1996). The imposition of civil/remedial contempt is used to vindicate the opposing party's rights. Minn. State Bar Ass'n, 311 Minn. at 285, 248 N.W.2d at 741.
Contempt can be either direct or constructive. Minn. Stat. § 588.01, subd. 1 (2012). Direct contempt occurs in the immediate presence of the court. Id., subd. 3. In contrast, constructive contempt occurs outside the immediate presence of the court. Id., subd. 3. Here it is clear that Jones was not in the immediate presence of the court on the night in question and so any possible criminal contempt of court would have been constructive, not direct.
A court may summarily punish direct contempt, Minn.Stat. § 588.03 (2012), while punishment of constructive contempt requires additional procedural safeguards, see Tatum, 556 N.W.2d at 545 n. 3. “Constructive contempt proceedings for punitive purposes entitle the accused to procedural safeguards including prosecution by the state, trial by jury, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Constructive punitive contempt orders require a “written complaint which is a signed statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” In re Welfare of A.W., 399 N.W.2d at 225. In addition, “an affidavit of the facts constituting the contempt shall be presented to the court or officer,” who may either (1) “issue a warrant of arrest to bring the person charged to answer,” or (2) upon an order to show cause, “may commit the person to jail, impose a fine, or both.” Minn.Stat. § 588.04 (2012).
The Minnesota legislature has defined which acts are punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony. The legislature has identified that the following acts may constitute misdemeanor criminal contempt:
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State v. Jones, A14–1399.
...terms were conditional orders, not “mandates” of the court.The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. See State v. Jones, 857 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn.App.2014). Unlike the district court, the court acknowledged that a probation violation may violate a “mandate” of the court. Id. a......