State v. Jones, A14–1399.
| Decision Date | 26 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. A14–1399.,A14–1399. |
| Citation | 869 N.W.2d 24 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Miranda Lynn JONES, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney, Crookston, MN, for appellant.
Mark D. Nyvold, Special Assistant State Public Defender, Fridley, MN, for respondent.
Shortly after being placed on probation, appellant Miranda Lynn Jones was cited for consumption of alcohol by a minor and disorderly conduct. Her conduct violated the terms of Jones's probation and the State moved to have it revoked. In addition, the State cited Jones for misdemeanor contempt of court under Minn. Stat. § 588.20, subd. 2(4) (2014).
The probationer moved to dismiss the criminal contempt charge, arguing that the statute charged does not cover violations of probationary terms. The district court granted the motion and the State appealed. In the meantime, Jones's probation was revoked and the sentence was executed. The court of appeals affirmed dismissal of the contempt charge.
Interpreting both the contempt and probation statutes, we hold that a willful violation of a “term” of probation prescribed at sentencing does not itself constitute the crime of violation of a “mandate of a court” under the criminal contempt statute. Therefore, we affirm.
In December 2013 Jones was convicted of a controlled-substance crime. The district court stayed imposition of the sentence and placed Jones on supervised probation with terms that included refraining from using alcohol and remaining law-abiding.
Five months later, Jones was cited for consumption of alcohol by a minor, disorderly conduct, and criminal contempt of court. The State moved quickly (and successfully) to revoke her probation.
Jones then moved the district court to dismiss the criminal contempt charge, brought under Minn. Stat. § 588.20, subd. 2(4) (2014), which states that “[e]very person who commits ... willful disobedience to the lawful process or other mandate of a court” is guilty of a misdemeanor. Jones asserted that she could not be charged by the State with criminal contempt merely for violating a term of probation. Jones first argued that the power to issue a contempt charge stems from the inherent power of the judiciary, and that the power does not allow police to issue citations. Jones also argued that a probation term is an agreement, not a court mandate, and is thus outside the authority of the criminal contempt statute. The State opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that the plain language of section 588.20, subdivision 2(4), authorizes the prosecution of a criminal contempt charge against a probationer for violation of a probationary term.
The district court granted Jones's motion to dismiss. The court distinguished orders—those directing an individual to do or refrain from doing a specific act—from conditional orders—those setting forth specific consequences for a violation. The court concluded that probationary terms were conditional orders, not “mandates” of the court.
The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. See State v. Jones, 857 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn.App.2014). Unlike the district court, the court acknowledged that a probation violation may violate a “mandate” of the court. Id. at 557. Nonetheless, the court reasoned that “probation violations do not fit within the overall purpose of section 588.20 to punish deliberate disruptions of court proceedings and intentional acts of disrespect to the legal process.” Id. The court further reasoned that the contempt power is “inherently a judicial function,” and that the power is an “extraordinary remedy intended to enforce the authority of the court and preserve the legal process.” Id. The court criticized “the prosecution's practice of routinely bringing contempt-of-court charges for alleged probation violations,” characterizing it as not “necessary to vindicate the judiciary's authority or to preserve the legal process.” Id. The court concluded that section 588.20 does not give to prosecutors “the necessary statutory authorization to charge probation violators with contempt.” Id. at 558.
This case requires us to determine and clarify the relationship between the statutes governing the imposition and revocation of probation, Minn.Stat. §§ 609.135, 609.14 (2014), and one of Minnesota's two criminal contempt statutes, Minn. Stat. § 588.20 (2014). The resolution of the issue presented requires statutory interpretation, a question of law subject to de novo review. Barrow v. State, 862 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn.2015).
Our probation statutes create an alternative to confinement following a criminal conviction. Probation, which is defined in Minn.Stat. § 609.02, subd. 15 (2014), is a “court-ordered sanction ... imposed as an alternative to confinement or in conjunction with confinement or intermediate sanctions.” Id. Probation is imposed in connection with a stay of imposition or execution of the sentence “on the terms the court prescribes.”
Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1. If a probationer violates the terms of probation, section 609.14 provides that “the court may without notice revoke the stay and direct that the defendant be taken into immediate custody.” Minn.Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1(a). If grounds are found for revocation, subject to the limitations of State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn.1980), the court may do any of the following: continue the stay on the same or further terms, impose intermediate sanctions, or revoke the stay and impose or order the execution of the sentence. Minn.Stat. § 609.135 ; see also Minn. R.Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3 (). If revocation is not ordered, “the defendant shall be restored to liberty under the previous order of the court.” Minn.Stat. § 609.14, subd. 4.
Chapter 588 contains Minnesota's contempt statutes. There are two kinds of criminal contempt in chapter 588: one encompassed by sections 588.01–.15 that is punishable at the discretion of the judiciary, and the other in section 588.20 that is “prosecutable by the state like any other crime.” State v. Tatum, 556 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Minn.1996). In this case, the probationer was charged with violating the latter—specifically section 588.20, subdivision 2(4), a misdemeanor, which prohibits “willful disobedience to the lawful process or other mandate of a court.” The question of first impression presented in this case is whether a “term” of probation, standing alone, is an “other mandate of a court,” the willful violation of which constitutes a new crime of criminal contempt prosecutable by the State.
In interpreting both the probation and contempt statutes, our object is “to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2014). “When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity,” we apply the letter of the law. Id. But “[w]hen the words of a law are not explicit,” we apply the canons of construction. See id.
We start with “mandate,” a rare word in Minnesota law, at least in the context of a court proceeding.1 “Mandate” is not defined in chapter 588, chapter 609, or elsewhere in the Minnesota Statutes. In the context of judicial proceedings, “mandate” has several different definitions. It may be an order from an appellate court to a lower court. See Mandate, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004). Or it may be a command to an officer of the court to enforce a court order. See id. Or it may be a synonym for a court order directing a person to do or not do something. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1066 (5th ed.2011) (defining “mandate”); id. at 420 (defining “court order”); see also State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624, 627 (Minn.1978) ().
In this case, we need not decide the scope of the word “mandate.” For the purpose of this decision, it is enough to assume, arguendo, that as used in section 588.20, the word includes a court order commanding compliance with a direction of the court. We then turn to the more specific question: whether willful violation of a “term” of probation itself constitutes willful disobedience of a court order commanding compliance, thereby giving prosecutors the authority not only to seek revocation of the probation, but to bring a new charge: criminal contempt.
On whether a probation “term” itself constitutes a “mandate,” the violation of which is punishable as a criminal contempt, the words of the relevant statutes are not explicit. There are two reasonable interpretations of whether a “term” of probation, as used in the probation statutes, is a “mandate,” as used in the criminal contempt statute.
The State's interpretation, that a “term” of probation is part of a court order and thus the violation of such a term is a violation of the order, is reasonable. In felony and gross misdemeanor cases (such as Jones's controlled substance conviction) a sentence is imposed by a “Sentencing Order” that must include the “precise terms of sentence.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 27.03, subds. 4(A), 7. A sentencing order's “precise terms” include “whether the defendant is placed on probation and if so, the terms and conditions of probation.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 7(3)(a)(iii). A term of probation, therefore, is necessarily found within a court order.
Moreover, as a matter of common usage, we recognize that our district courts often use the word “order” when prescribing terms of probation, such as: “While you are on probation, the court orders that you remain sober and...
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