State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 04 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2007-2310.,No. 2007-2311.,2007-2310.,2007-2311.
• Citation: 902 N.E.2d 464,2009 Ohio 316,121 Ohio St.3d 103
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. JONES, Appellee. The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Skropits, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

902 N.E.2d 464

121 Ohio St.3d 103

2009-Ohio-316

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. JONES, Appellee.

The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Skropits, Appellee.

No. 2007-2310.

No. 2007-2311.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted October 14, 2008.

Decided February 4, 2009.

John D. Ferrero, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald Mark Caldwell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Tammi R. Johnson, Stark County Public Defender, and Steven A. Reisch, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee Adam David Jones.

George Urban, Canton, for appellee Shawn Michael Skropits.

Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin Mizer, Solicitor General, and Todd Nist, Assistant Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Attorney General of Ohio.

O'CONNOR, J.

{¶ 1} Today we determine whether an officer's extraterritorial traffic stop in contravention of R.C. 2935.03 also violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, when the officer has probable cause to initiate the stop because he personally observed a traffic violation. For the reasons that follow, we hold that it does not.

Relevant Background

{¶ 2} On the night of September 27, 2006, Sergeant Mitchell Hershberger of the East Canton Police Department responded to an accident at 113 East Nassau Street in East Canton. A witness told Sergeant Hershberger that a red Ford Ranger had collided with a full-size van. The drivers had exchanged words and afterwards left the scene, with the Ford heading west on Nassau Street.

{¶ 3} Sergeant Hershberger noticed some debris left behind from the Ford. Approximately ten minutes later he received another dispatch advising him that the Ford was hiding in the area of the former Coyote Restaurant, located about a half mile from East Canton. Hershberger went to the restaurant but did not find the Ford. Believing that the vehicle could be headed towards Canton, Sergeant Hershberger next drove out to Trump Road, about another half mile away.

{¶ 4} When Sergeant Hershberger arrived at Trump Road, he began heading back east, checking various businesses for the Ford. While he was checking a car wash, a motorist told Sergeant Hershberger that a vehicle heading west without any headlights almost hit him.

{¶ 5} Sergeant Hershberger got back on the road, continuing to go east towards East Canton, and eventually saw the Ford. Upon finding the truck, he observed that its front end was smashed and its headlights were not on. Sergeant Hershberger stopped the Ford, which appellee Adam Jones was driving, because the vehicle did not have its headlights on.

{¶ 6} After he had pulled over the vehicle, Sergeant Hershberger asked Jones and his passenger, appellee Shawn Skropits, whether they had any weapons in the truck, and appellees said that they did. In addition, Jones told Sergeant Hershberger that he did not have a driver's license, which was why he had left the accident scene.

{¶ 7} Sergeant Hershberger arrested appellees and charged each of them with one count of carrying a concealed weapon and one count of unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance. Appellees moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, arguing that because the stop violated R.C. 2935.03, which governs the territorial jurisdiction in which a police officer may make an arrest, it also violated the Fourth Amendment. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied appellees' requests.

{¶ 8} Following the denial of their motions to suppress, appellees pleaded no contest to the charges, were found guilty by the trial court, and were sentenced to community control.

{¶ 9} Appellees appealed the trial court's judgment to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. The court of appeals reversed in a divided opinion, holding that there was neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to support Sergeant Hershberger's stop. The dissent, however, would have affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress based on State v. Weideman (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 501, 764 N.E.2d 997.

{¶ 10} The state appealed the reversals, and we exercised jurisdiction and consolidated the cases. State v. Skropits, 117 Ohio St.3d 1450, 2008-Ohio-1427, 883 N.E.2d 1075 (cause consolidated); State v. Jones, 117 Ohio St.3d 1438, 2008-Ohio-1279, 883 N.E.2d 456 (appeal accepted and cause consolidated); State v. Skropits, 117 Ohio St.3d 1423, 2008-Ohio-969, 882 N.E.2d 444 (appeal accepted).

Analysis

{¶ 11} Our decision in Weideman and the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Virginia v. Moore (2008), ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559, are dispositive of this matter. Read together, Weideman and Moore stand for the principle that a law-enforcement officer who personally observes a traffic violation while outside the officer's statutory territorial jurisdiction has probable cause to make a traffic stop; the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Moore, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559; Weideman, 94 Ohio St.3d 501, 764 N.E.2d 997, syllabus.

{¶ 12} We held in Weideman that "[w]here a law enforcement officer, acting outside the officer's statutory territorial jurisdiction, stops and detains a motorist for an offense committed and observed outside the officer's jurisdiction, the seizure of the motorist by the officer is not unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment." 94 Ohio St.3d 501, 764 N.E.2d 997, syllabus.

{¶ 13} The facts of Weideman closely mirror those of the present case. In Weideman, a police officer outside of his jurisdiction stopped a vehicle that he had observed traveling left of center. Id. at 502, 764 N.E.2d 997. The trial court denied Weideman's motion to suppress, but the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that because the officer had been outside of his jurisdiction, the arrest was unlawful under R.C. 2935.03(A)(1) and per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 503, 764 N.E.2d 997.

{¶ 14} We reversed the appellate court's judgment. Specifically, we held that "[t]he state's interest in protecting the public from a person who drives an automobile in a manner that endangers other drivers outweighs [the defendant's] right to drive unhindered." Weideman, 94 Ohio St.3d at 506, 764 N.E.2d 997. But because the stop was not per se unreasonable, it follows that a court could find that an extraterritorial stop is unreasonable based on the unique facts and circumstances of a particular case.¹

{¶ 15} The United States Supreme Court's decision in Moore, however, removed any room for finding that a violation of a state statute, such as R.C. 2935.03, in and of itself, could give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation and result in the suppression of evidence.² Officers stopped and arrested Moore for driving on a suspended license. Moore, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559. Under Virginia law, the officers should have issued Moore a summons rather than arresting him because driving on a suspended license was generally not an arrestable offense. Id. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1602, 170 L.Ed.2d 559. Following Moore's arrest, the officers found 16 grams of crack cocaine and $516 on his person. Id. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1601, 170 L.Ed.2d 559.

{¶ 16} Moore moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Id. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1602, 170 L.Ed.2d 559. The trial court denied the motion but the Supreme Court of Virginia ultimately reversed the ruling. Id. The United States Supreme Court then reversed that judgment, reinstating the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. Id. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1608, 170 L.Ed.2d 559

{¶ 17} Moore explained that "when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable." (Emphasis added.) Id. at ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1604, 170 L.Ed.2d 559. The court further acknowledged that although states could legislate a higher standard on searches and seizures, those laws do not alter the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id.

{¶ 18} Applying Virginia's law to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court observed that although the statute provided a greater degree of protection than that afforded under the Fourth Amendment, it did not provide a remedy of suppression for a violation. Moore, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1606, 170 L.Ed.2d 559. Thus, because of the need for consistency and bright-line standards when applying the Fourth Amendment, the Court concluded that "it is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law." Id. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1608, 170 L.Ed.2d 559.

{¶ 19} In the case before us, it is undisputed that there was a violation of R.C. 2935.03(A)(1). However, the majority of the appellate court did not sufficiently appreciate the importance of the fact that Sergeant Hershberger personally observed Jones driving without headlights in the dark in clear contravention of several Ohio statutes.³ This conduct constituted a traffic violation, thereby giving Sergeant Hershberger probable cause to initiate the stop because he had personally observed the violation. Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12, 665 N.E.2d 1091 ("where an officer has * * * probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid").⁴

{¶ 20} The appellate court's focus on the fact that Sergeant Hershberger was outside his jurisdiction and on his reasons for being there is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis. The sole focus of the inquiry should have been on the stop itself because the violation of R.C. 2935.03 does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation for the reasons expressed in Moore. See also Rose v. Mulberry, Arkansas (C.A.8, 2008), 533 F.3d 678, 679-680 ("the determinative issue is whether an arrest by a city police officer outside of his jurisdiction but...