State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 14 July 1966
• Docket Number: No. 52227,52227
• Citation: 259 Iowa 375,144 N.W.2d 120
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert Taylor JONES, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 120

144 N.W.2d 120

259 Iowa 375

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert Taylor JONES, Appellant.

No. 52227.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 14, 1966.

Duffield, Pinegar & Tapscott, Des Moines, for appellant.

Lawrence F. Scalise, Atty. Gen., Don R. Bennett, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ray Fenton, County Atty., Des Moines, for appellee.

MOORE, Justice.

March 17, 1966, defendant, Robert Taylor Jones, was charged by an information filed in Des Moines Municipal Court with the crime of failing to leave his name and address at the scene of a motor vehicle accident in violation of section 321.264, Code 1962, to which he entered a plea of not guilty. On trial to the court April 7 he was found guilty and fined $100 or 30 days in jail. From this judgment and sentence defendant appeals.

Defendant's only assigned error is the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. With this contention we agree.

Richard Heathcote testified he parked his white 1965 Buick on East 23rd Street just west of his residence at 2301 East Walnut Street in Des Moines about 10:00 p.m. March 15, 1966; he heard no collision with his car that night; at about 10:00 a.m. the next morning he discovered his left car door and fender had been mashed in, the door handle ruined and the left door window completely broken out and there was no evidence of the name or address of the person who struck his car. He had never talked to defendant.

Richard Tesdell, a Des Moines police officer, testified he was sent to the accident scene about 1:30 p.m. March 16; he observed damage to Heathcote's car along the entire left side; he checked for debris or parts of vehicles and found none but did find light green paint chips on the Buick. He further testified he observed faint tracks in the snow alongside Heathcote's car and opined the car which struck it was traveling south on East 23rd probably after making a right turn off Walnut Street. He had never talked to defendant.

Albert Knight, Des Moines Police Department detective, testified he went to the accident scene March 5, 1966 and made a follow-up investigation. When asked if it wasn't on the 16th he repeated his statement it was on the 5th. The difference in dates is unexplained in the record.

Knight stated he found debris left by the 'hit and run car'; around 15 to 20 feet south of Heathcote's he found a badly damaged headlight door which he later determined was a standard type part of 1958 Mercury automobiles; he observed light green paint chips left on the white Buick and on March 16 he talked with defendant.

Knight stated defendant drives a 1958 Mercury registered to Harold and Beverly Jones, defendant's brother and wife, and referred to the Mercury as defendant's car. The record discloses defendant's wife also drives this vehicle.

Knight further testified he observed damage to the left front of this Mercury; some of its light green paint was missing; a small amount of white paint in the area of the front bumper; recently another headlight rim had been installed but he was unable to determine whether the damaged headlight door belonged to this particular Mercury and stated the two vehicle colors were factory colors.

When questioned by Knight defendant stated he had no knowledge of the accident involved or how or when the Mercury became damaged. He further stated he first discovered its damaged condition on Friday or Sunday which he called to his wife's attention and later he replaced the damaged headlight rim.

Taking the state's evidence in its most favorable light we believe this a fair summary of the evidence. Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence was overruled. Defendant elected to stand on his motion and offered no evidence. The trial court then found him guilty as charged and pronounced sentence and entered judgment accordingly. The penalty is the maximum under the general penalty clause for violation of any of the provisions of chapter 321 if the penalty is not otherwise specifically fixed. Section 321.482.

Section 321.264 which the information charged defendant violated on March 5, 1966 provides: 'Striking unattended vehicle. The driver of any vehicle which collides with any vehicle which is unattended shall immediately stop and shall then and there either locate and notify the operator or owner of such vehicle of the name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or shall leave in a conspicuous place in the vehicle struck a written notice giving the name and address of the driver and of the owner of the vehicle doing the striking and a statement of the circumstances thereof.'

It is clear before an accused may be convicted of violation of this section it must appear by substantial evidence he was driving a vehicle which collided with an unattended vehicle. While pointing out the date confusion defendant relies primarily on his contention there is a complete lack of proof he drove the vehicle which damaged Heathcote's parked automobile. The state takes the position that if we find substantial evidence of such driving we should affirm.

The sole question therefore is factual. The legal principles applicable seem well established.

We cannot permit a conviction to stand where there is absence of proof of any of the essential elements of the crime charged. State v. Poffenbarger, 247 Iowa 552, 554, 74 N.W.2d 585, 586; State v. Myers, 253 Iowa 271, 274, 111 N.W.2d 660, 662.

In State v. Burns, 181 Iowa 1098, 1101, 1102, 165 N.W. 346, 348, we say: 'All our crimes are statutory. Therefore one called to answer as for a violation of the statute in a criminal way is entitled to call upon the state to make proof of all facts essential to constitute the crime charged. Until the proof is forthcoming from the state to establish all the essential elements of the crime charged against the citizen, the presumption of innocence stands between him and conviction. It is fundamental that every man is presumed to be innocent when placed on trial until proved to be guilty. To make out his guilt by proof, the proof must affirm the existence of every element essential to constitute the crime. No verdict of a jury can stand in this court where there is absence of proof of any of the elements essential to constitute a crime against which the statute is lodged.'

Of course a question for the trier of fact may be generated solely by circumstantial evidence. State v. Hiatt, 231 Iowa 499, 507, 1 N.W.2d 664, 668 and citations. But any evidence, circumstantial or direct must be sufficient to raise a fair inference of guilt. State v. Hooper, 222 Iowa 481, 484, 485, 269 N.W. 431, 433 and citations.

In State v. Myers, supra, 253 Iowa 271, 275, 111 N.W.2d 660, 663, we quote this from State v. Vandewater, 176 N.W. 883, 884, not reported in Iowa Reports: 'The most that can be said for the testimony of the state is that it creates a suspicion of the guilt of the defendant, and it goes without saying that mere suspicion is not sufficient. ...