State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 08 November 2017
• Docket Number: No. 4D16–3390,4D16–3390
• Citation: 230 So.3d 22
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Franklin JONES, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

230 So.3d 22

STATE of Florida, Appellant,

v.Franklin JONES, Appellee.

No. 4D16–3390

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[November 8, 2017]

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melanie Dale Surber, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and J. Woodson Isom, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Ciklin, J.

After an inmate at a correctional facility was disciplined for violating the inmate code of conduct by attacking a corrections officer, the state charged him with battery on a law enforcement officer. The inmate moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the criminal charge was precluded by double jeopardy principles. The trial court granted the motion and the state appeals. Because we find that the Double Jeopardy Clause was never meant to impinge on remedial institutional discipline, we reverse the trial court's order of dismissal.

In his motion to dismiss, the appellant, Franklin Jones, argued that the prosecution was barred because the Broward Sheriff's Office imposed what amounted to a criminal sanction for his bad behavior. During the hearing, he introduced into evidence the Broward Sheriff's Office Department of Detention and Community Control Inmate Handbook ("the handbook"), which contains a code of conduct for inmates. The code of conduct provides that the commission of specified Category A offenses could result in "thirty ... days of disciplinary segregation, up to thirty ... days of room restriction, and/or loss of partial or all earned gain time ...." Jones also introduced a "Disciplinary Committee Action Sheet" ("the disciplinary report"), which reflects that Jones was found guilty of assault, fighting, and disruptive conduct, all Category A infractions. The disciplinary report also reflects that Jones received thirty days of "Disciplinary Detention," but that he did not lose any gain time.

Jones argued that the potential sanctions provided for in the code of conduct amounted to criminal penalties. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss based on a finding that the potential of revocation of gain time had no purpose other than punishment and was thus a criminal penalty and a violation of double jeopardy.

The parties do not dispute the facts underlying this purely legal issue. Thus, our review is de novo. Binns v. State, 979 So.2d 439, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). "The federal and Florida constitutions prohibit being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense." Hall v. State, 823 So.2d 757, 761 (Fla. 2002), abrogation on other grounds recognized in State v. Johnson, 122 So.3d 856, 862 (Fla. 2013) ; see also Amend. V, U.S. Const.; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. This constitutional protection encompasses "multiple punishments for the same offense." U.S. v. Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). "The scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the same in both the federal constitution and the Florida Constitution." Hall, 823 So.2d at 761.

The United States Supreme Court has elaborated on the process of determining whether double jeopardy is implicated by the imposition of both judicial and administrative penalties:

We have long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition of all additional sanctions that could, " ‘in common parlance,’ " be described as punishment. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549, 63 S.Ct. 379, 387, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 14 How. 13, 19, 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852) ). The Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense, Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938) ; see also Hess, supra, at 548–549, 63 S.Ct. at 386–387 ("Only" "criminal punishment" "subject[s] the defendant to ‘jeopardy’ within the constitutional mean-ing"); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1785, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) ("In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution"), and then only when such occurs in successive proceedings, see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983).

Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction. Helvering, supra, at 399, 58 S.Ct. at 633. A court must first ask whether the legislature, "in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other." Ward, 448 U.S. at 248, 100 S.Ct. at 2641. Even in those cases where the legislature "has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect," id., at 248–249, 100 S.Ct. at 2641, as to "transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty," Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154, 76 S.Ct. 219, 222, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956).

In making this latter determination, the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567–568, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), provide useful guideposts, including: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter"; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it"; and (7) "whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned." It is important to note, however, that "these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face," id., at 169, 83 S.Ct. at 568, and "only the clearest proof" will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty, Ward, supra, at 249, 100 S.Ct. at 2641–2642 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98–100, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (alterations in original).

Prior to the issuance of the Hudson opinion, two of our sister courts held that double jeopardy protections did not apply to a judicial proceeding following an administrative proceeding. See Larkin v. State, 558 So.2d 486, 487 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) ; Sadler v. State, 333 So.2d 69, 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Larkin contained no analysis and merely relied on Sadler. 558 So.2d at 487. Sadler relied on federal circuit court opinions. 333 So.2d at 69.

Only one of our sister courts has written post- Hudson on the issue presented here. See State v. Converse, 78 So.3d 78, 79–81 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). The court did not, however, reach the merits and apply the Hudson analysis to the facts before it, instead finding that the motion to dismiss was insufficient as the defendant did not submit to the court the statute or regulation under which she was administratively sanctioned. Id. at 81.

Federal and other state appellate courts have applied the Hudson analysis and their opinions provide guidance. We turn first to the thoroughly-reasoned opinion of the Eleventh Circuit in Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215. That case involved appellants who had received prison disciplinary sanctions (transfers to maximum security prisons; disciplinary segregation for sixty days; disallowance of a portion of accrued good conduct time; temporary losses of telephone, commissary, and/or recreational privileges; and losses of visitation privileges for up to one year) for their involvement in a prison riot, and who were ultimately charged with offenses for the same underlying conduct. Id. at 1217. The appellants moved to "dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the prior prison disciplinary sanctions precluded the subsequent criminal prosecutions for the same conduct." Id. Their motion was denied. Id. at 1217–18.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the pre- Hudson general rule among the circuit courts was that "prison disciplinary sanctions do not bar subsequent criminal prosecutions on double jeopardy grounds." Id. at 1220. The court acknowledged that a United States Supreme Court opinion, United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), had caused the circuit courts to consider "whether prison disciplinary sanctions might ever be considered sufficiently excessive to constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes," but that the courts addressing the issue distinguished Halper and declined to recognize an exception to the general rule.¹ Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1220. The court then explained that in Hudson, the Supreme Court "disavow[ed]" the Halper analysis and recognized that such an analysis "elevated a single Kennedy factor—whether the sanction appeared excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purposes—to dispositive status." Id. at 1221 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96, 101, 118 S.Ct. 488 ). The Eleventh Circuit recognized that "[u]nder Hudson, the decisions in Ward and Kennedy exemplify the double jeopardy standards." Id. at 1222. The court then looked to decisions of its predecessor circuit in the wake of Kennedy :

After receiving the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance in Kennedy, our predecessor circuit rendered opinions in several cases applying double jeopardy principles within the context of prison disciplinary sanctions. See United States v. Bryant, 563 F.2d 1227, 1230 (5th Cir. 1977) (administrative revocation of good conduct time after participation in prison riot did not bar subsequent criminal prosecution for same conduct), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 972, 98 S.Ct. 1616, 56 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) ; United States v. Lepiscopo, 429 F.2d 258, 261 (5th Cir.) (administrative forfeiture of accumulated good time

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