State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 08 December 1915 |
| Docket Number | No. 19280.,19280. |
| Citation | 181 S.W. 50 |
| Parties | STATE ex inf. CARNAHAN, Pros. Atty., ex rel. WEBB et al. v. JONES et al. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Application by the State, on the information of J. M. Carnahan, Prosecuting Attorney, at the relation of Frank P. Webb and others, for writ of quo warranto against M. W. Jones and others. From a judgment issuing the writ, respondents appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions to quash the writ and dismiss the information.
J. B. Daniel, of Piedmont, for appellants. Stuart L. Clark, of Van Buren, and John H. Raney, of Greenville, for respondents.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Carter county in favor of informant in a proceeding in quo warranto, instituted by the prosecuting attorney to oust appellants from office as directors of consolidated school district No. 2 in that county. By the pleadings and admissions in open court the only questions for solution by the trial court were: (1) Whether, when it is proposed to establish a consolidated school district under the act of March 14, 1913, the petition to the county superintendent must be signed by qualified voters of every district to be affected; (2) whether parts of existing districts not mentioned in the petition, though included in the notice, can be included in the consolidated district; and (3) whether the certificate or report made under section 3 of the act was, in this case, sufficient as a matter of law. The act in question (Laws 1913, p. 721 et seq.) is set out in full in State ex rel. v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 631, 170 S. W. 892 1. Respecting the qualifications of the signers of the petition whereby proceedings for the organization of consolidated districts are initiated, the sole provision of the act of March 14, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 722, § 3), is as follows:
"When the resident citizens of any community desire to form a consolidated district, a petition signed by at least twenty-five qualified voters of said community shall be filed with the county superintendent of public schools."
In the instant case the petition was signed by the requisite number of qualified voters of the community, but none of them resided in district No. 22, which it was proposed in the petition to include in the consolidated district. The trial court held this was fatal to the proceedings, invalidating the organization. With this conclusion we are unable to agree. The act does not require that every district proposed to be affected shall be represented among the signers of the petition; in fact, it does not require that every district which shall be affected shall be mentioned in the petition. The act does not deal with the matter at all upon the basis of districts already organized. It requires merely that the signers of the petition shall be qualified voters of the "community," the resident citizens of which desire to form a consolidated district. The word "community" in this act is not employed in any technical or strictly legal sense, but is a synonym of "neighborhood" or "vicinity" (Berkson v. Railway, 144 Mo. loc. cit. 220, 221, 45 S. W. 1119), or may be said to mean the people who reside in a locality in more or less proximity. Keech v. Joplin, 157 Cal. loc. cit. 11, 106 Pac. 222. So defined, a community may include several districts and parts of districts. There is no requirement that the petitioners shall reside here or there in the community. That they are resident citizens of it is enough.
2. The trial court held that the organization was void because the county superintendent included within the boundaries of the proposed district parts of districts not named in the petition, though adjacent to those specified therein. The applicable provision of the statute (Laws 1913, p. 722, § 3) is:
From this provision it clearly appears that it is not intended that the petition shall fix absolutely the boundaries of the proposed district; in fact, it appears that the chief function of the petition is to call the attention of the county superintendent to a community 25 of whose resident citizens desire to organize a consolidated district. It is the duty of the superintendent to determine (subject to limitations not affecting the question being considered) the exact boundaries of the district the organization of which is to be submitted to the voters therein. Besides the absence of positive restrictions founded upon boundary lines of existing districts, the very fact that the superintendent is admonished to have "due regard also to the welfare of the adjoining districts" is a clear intimation that such districts are not excluded from at least partial inclusion in the district as he shall lay it out. Provision is also made (section 3, Laws 1913, p. 723) for the annexation to other districts of remaining portions of districts parts of which have been included in the new district. There is no infringement of any constitutional right of a district part of which is taken. This is true despite the fact that the voters resident in that part not included in the new district do not vote upon the question of organization. The Legislature is empowered to provide the methods of forming new districts and changing boundary lines of old ones (State ex rel. v. Andrae, 216 Mo. loc. cit. 630, 116 S. W. 561) and of dividing existing districts (R. S. 1909, § 10842), and there is perceived no constitutional objection to the method of consolidation provided by the act of 1913, interpreted as above stated. Cities can constitutionally be authorized to extend their limits without a submission of the question of extension to others than citizens of the city involved (Hislop v. Joplin, 250 Mo. 588, 157 S. W. 625, and cases cited), and no constitutional provision is pointed out which forbids the taking of parts of several school districts into a consolidated district upon the affirmative vote of the qualified voters residing in the whole territory proposed to be organized into a consolidated district, including the parts of districts so proposed to be incorporated.
Notice according to the statutory requirements was given...
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