State v. Joos

• Decision Date: 01 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 14683,14683
• Citation: 735 S.W.2d 776
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert N. JOOS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 776

735 S.W.2d 776

STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Robert N. JOOS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14683.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

Sept. 1, 1987.

Robert Joos, pro se.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., and Timothy W. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.

HOGAN, Judge.

A jury has found defendant Robert N. Joos guilty of simulating legal process, as defined and denounced by § 575.130.1(2), RSMo 1978. His punishment has been assessed at confinement in the county jail for six (6) months; he has also been ordered to pay a fine of $400. He appeals.

The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment of conviction. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must accept as true all evidence and inferences that tend to support the verdict and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. The question is whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to support the verdict. State v. Brown, 660 S.W.2d 694, 698-99 (Mo. banc 1983); State v. Story, 646 S.W.2d 68, 72 (Mo. banc 1983). So viewed, the evidence was that on February 24, 1985, the defendant went to the residence of one George Bone and asked Bone to accompany him the following day to witness the service of some documents. The defendant told Bone that he, the defendant, "would be up most of the night doing some legal work" and that he wanted to serve the documents, or "papers," as soon as possible. Bone declined to act as a witness to service of the documents. Two or three days later, the defendant told Bone's wife that he had "beat [the prosecuting attorney] in court."

On February 26, 1985, the defendant entered the McDonald County Sheriff's office carrying some papers. He left the papers in the sheriff's office, stating that he wanted the papers served on Trooper M.L. Graham, a member of the Missouri State Highway Patrol. At the time, Graham was attempting to execute a warrant for the arrest of one Taren Wood. Wood had been convicted of a crime in Newton County and had subsequently "jumped bond."

The documents which the defendant wanted "served" on Trooper Graham bore the correct style, caption and docket number of a civil suit which Taren Wood had instituted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Southwestern Division. The first document purports to be an order of the District Court. Omitting formal parts, it reads:

"That pursuant to errors of record, arrest of judgement/stay of execution is ordered, effective immediately; and dismissal of said judgement is in order. This judgement is under permanent arrest for the so stated errors of record."

This paper is dated February 25, 1985. It is signed by "Taren Wood, In Propria Persona," and was received in evidence as State's Exhibit 1.

Another writing which the defendant had delivered to Trooper Graham is a Summons, bearing the correct style and docket number of the case Taren Wood had filed in the United States District Court. The summons is in proper form to be issued and served pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. It bears a signature purporting to be that of a deputy clerk. The summons is directed to Trooper Graham and was received in evidence as State's Exhibit 2.

Trooper Graham testified that on February 27, 1985, he was advised by Pat Attlesey, a McDonald County deputy sheriff, that Attlesey had papers for "service" on him. Exhibits 1 and 2--and other exhibits not before the court--were delivered to Graham. Graham doubted their authenticity, but decided to contact the prosecuting attorney and the Attorney General's office. It is inferable from Graham's testimony that these documents were called to the attention of the United States District Court in Kansas City. In addition, the State introduced a certified copy of an order of that court dated March 14, 1985, wherein the District Court found that the "arrest of judgement-stay of execution" order--here State's Exhibit 1--"sufficiently masquerades as a bona fide order of this court that it shall be stricken...." The tenor of this order, aside from the quoted sentence, is that State's Exhibit 1 is a fabrication. Trooper Graham's description of the proceeding in district court was "that was all threw out of court in Kansas City, ... it [the 'stay order'] didn't amount to the paper it was written on, they said."

I

Because the defendant has insisted on representing himself in this court, we have given the sufficiency point careful attention. This is the defendant's appeal of right, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 615-17, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2446-47, 41 L.Ed.2d 341, 353-55 (1974), and, as in any criminal prosecution, the defendant was entitled to have the State present evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979).

The crime of simulating legal process was created when The Criminal Code was enacted in 1977. Laws of Mo. 1977, S.B. 60. Section 575.130, which defines and denounces that offense reads in material part as follows:

"A person commits the crime of simulating legal process if, with purpose to mislead the recipient and cause him to take action in reliance thereon, he delivers or causes to be delivered:

* * *

(2) Any purported summons, subpoena or other legal process knowing that the process was not issued or authorized by any court." (Emphasis ours.)

In this case, the elements of the State's case were and the prosecution was obliged to show that: 1) with purpose to mislead the recipient and cause him to act thereon, 2) defendant caused to be delivered; 3) a purported summons, subpoena or other legal process knowing that the process was not issued or authorized by any court. The New Missouri Criminal Code--A Manual for Court Related Personnel § 20.13, p. 20-12 (1978). ¹

We must first consider what is included in the word "process." The term "process" is not limited to "summons"; as we construe § 575.130, the word "process" is used as a general term and denotes the means whereby a court compels a compliance with its demands. ² The purported order styled "Arrest of Judgement-Stay of Execution" is phrased as a command of the United States District Court, ordering those to whose attention it is brought to refrain from enforcing a judgment in any manner. The document is well within the meaning and import of the words "legal process" as used in § 575.130.

It is also to be noted that the first sentence of the statute does not refer to "service" of the simulated process, nor indicate that "service" in a manner prescribed by statute or rule is required. All the statute requires is delivery. The ordinary meaning of the verb "deliver" is simply to hand over or surrender possession to another. Ballentine's Law Dictionary, p. 329 (3d ed. 1969).

Was there, then, proof of a purpose to mislead or cause the recipient to take action in reliance upon the instrument entitled "Arrest of Judgement-Stay of Execution"? The natural and probable tendency of the instrument to influence action by the authorities must be judged by the content of the document itself rather than the special knowledge of the authorities. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 530 F.2d 52, 55 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S.Ct. 96, 50 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976). The tenor of the order is imperative and immediate. It reads something like a species of injunction. On its face it is attributable to the United States District Court and it was delivered with other documents purportedly issued by that court. The content of the document is such that a jury could have found it had a natural and probable tendency to mislead the recipient and cause him to act in reliance upon it.

It stands undenied that the defendant delivered the "Arrest of Judgement-Stay of Execution" to a deputy sheriff with instructions to "serve" the paper on Trooper Graham.

This brings us to a consideration whether there is substantial evidence of the third element of the crime, which is whether the document the defendant caused to be delivered was a "purported" document, which defendant knew was not issued or authorized by any court. To show that the instrument or order was false, the State asked the trial court to take judicial notice of an order of the District Court declaring, as we have noted, that the "Arrest of Judgement-Stay of Execution" "sufficiently masquerades as a bona fide order ... that it shall be stricken" and further holding that service of the order might constitute obstruction of the administration of justice. This order of the District Court was received in evidence.

When the justice of the case requires, courts can, and do, take notice of the record in other cases, and it is said that there are cases so clearly interdependent as to invoke a rule of judicial notice in one suit of the proceedings in another. State v. Hawkins, 582 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Mo.App.1979). We perceive no unfairness in taking judicial notice of the District Court's finding in this case. The authenticity of the process in issue was a matter which required adjudication by the District Court; the two cases were interdependent and the ends of justice required that the genuineness of the order be established as expeditiously as possible. Of course, judicial notice is merely a rule of evidence, and the defendant was at liberty to rebut the facts judicially noticed, Mince v. Mince, 481 S.W.2d 610, 615 (Mo.App.1972), but the order of the District Court declaring the process to be false was properly received, and constituted substantial evidence that the process delivered to Trooper Graham was simulated.

A final question is whether there is substantial evidence that the defendant caused the simulated process to be delivered "knowing" that the process was not issued nor authorized by any co...