State v. Jorjorian

• Decision Date: 13 August 1954
• Docket Number: No. 630,630
• Citation: 107 A.2d 468,82 R.I. 334
• Parties: STATE v. JORJORIAN. C. Q.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 468

107 A.2d 468

82 R.I. 334

STATE v. JORJORIAN.

C. Q. No. 630

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Aug. 13, 1954.

William E. Powers, Atty. Gen., Alfred E. Motta, Sp. Counsel, Providence, for the State.

Walter V. Moriarty, Sarkis K. Boyajian, Providence, for defendant.

FLYNN, Chief Justice.

This indictment charges the defendant with committing the crime of larceny by obtaining money by false pretenses in violation of the statute in such case made and provided. General Laws 1938, chapter 608, § 15. After a hearing in the superior court on the defendant's amended demurrer and before decision thereon, three questions of law of doubt and importance and another concerning the constitutionality of a certain statute were certified to this court for our determination in accordance with G.L.1938, chap. 545, § 6, as amended by Public Laws 1940, chap. 941, sec. 2.

The indictment in question was duly returned by the grand jury on March 5, 1951 and charged that the defendant Margaret Jorjorian, alias Marquis Jorjorian, 'on divers dates between, to wit, the first day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty, and to wit, the fifteenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty, with force and arms, at Providence, in the aforesaid County of Providence, did, by means of certain false pretenses with intent to cheat and defraud, then and there unlawfully, knowingly and designedly obtain and steal from one Veronica Hagopian seventeen thousand six hundred and four dollars in lawful money of the United States, and of the value of seventeen thousand six hundred and four dollars, whereby and by force of the statute in such case made and provided the said Margaret Jorjorian, alias Marquis Jorjorian, alias Jane Doe, is deemed guilty of larceny. Against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state.'

The first three questions as certified relate substantially to an alleged insufficiency of the indictment and the fourth concerns the constitutionality of a clause in G.L.1938, chap. 625, the short form of indictment statute. These questions may be stated as follows:

1. Is the indictment containing the above-quoted allegations valid where it does not specify what the said certain false pretenses are or of what they consist?

2. Does said indictment, without specifying the alleged certain false pretenses, sufficiently inform the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against her within the meaning of sec. 10 of article I of the constitution of Rhode Island?

3. Does G.L.1938, chap. 625, § 3, clause 4(a) authorize an indictment for obtaining money under false pretenses in the above-quoted form where the indictment does not specify said alleged certain false pretenses or of what they consist?

4. Is G.L.1938, chap. 625, § 3, clause 4(a) invalid on the ground that it is repugnant to the provision of sec. 10 of article I of the constitution of Rhode Island?

While four questions were certified, the parties have argued them under two points, and in our judgment the answer to the second question will govern in principle the answers to all. In other words, if the indictment conforms to the requirement of article I, sec. 10, of the constitution, the first three questions should be answered in the affirmative and the fourth in the negative.

The defendant contends in substance and effect that it is not sufficient to charge in the indictment the commission of the specified crime in the language of the statute, G.L.1938, chap. 608, § 15; that it is necessary to set forth in accordance with 'the general common law principles of criminal pleading' all material facts constituting the offense, including the particular means by which the false pretenses were perpetrated; and that the instant indictment fails to notify the defendant of 'the nature and cause of the accusation' as required by the provision of article I, sec. 10, of the constitution. She claims that such allegations are necessary in the indictment so that (1) she may be certain with what crime she is charged; (2) be able to prepare her defense and plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of any other prosecution for the same offense; and (3) to enable the court to decide whether the alleged facts would sustain a conviction and prevent the defendant from being indicted by the grand jury for one offense and tried before a petit jury on another.

In support of these general principles defendant cites and quotes from certain cases and texts, including United States v Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588; Hinshaw v. State of Indiana, 188 Ind. 147, 122 N.E. 418; People v. McKenna, 81 Cal. 158, 22 P. 488; United States Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 8 S.Ct. 571, 31 L.Ed. 516; Joyce on Indictments (2d ed.), § 281; 35 C.J.S., False Pretenses, § 42, p. 686; 11 R.C.L., False Pretenses, § 39, p. 857; 1 Wharton's Criminal Procedure (10th ed.), §§ 634, 635.

We do not agree with the first contention that the state may not charge a crime in the language of the statute. Ordinarily it is permissible to plead in accordance with the terms of a statute, at least where the language is not so general as to embrace within its terms possible offenses obviously not intended to come within its meaning. State v. McMahon, 14 R.I. 285. Such conclusion follows naturally from the principle that, subject to constitutional limitations, the legislature alone has the power to declare what acts constitute a crime, to prescribe punishment therefor, and to set forth the form of the indictment or complaint by which an accused may be brought to trial. In the exercise of such power the general assembly has expressly declared that an indictment in this jurisdiction is valid and sufficient if it charges the offense 'By using the name given to the offense by the common law or by a statute.' G.L.1938, chap. 625, § 3, clause 4(a).

The substantial limitations on such power, however, are: (1) that the legislature may not put a defendant to trial without an indictment or complaint, because such right is guaranteed to an accused in a criminal case under article I, sec. 7, of the constitution of this state; and (2) that the indictment or complaint must contain sufficient allegations to reasonably notify an accused of 'the nature and cause of the accusation' as required by the provisions of article I, sec. 10, of said constitution. If these requirements are satisfied the legislative power is validly exercised.

Nor do we agree with the second contention that in order to be sufficient under the constitution a pleading in an indictment must conform to the 'general common law principles of criminal pleading.' Even before the passage of G.L.1938, chap. 625, the short form of indictment statute, it was not only permissible to plead substantially in the language of a statute but it also was held by this court: 'Our Constitution requires no greater certainty in criminal pleading than the common law, and perhaps less.' State v. Davis, 39 R.I. 276, 281, 97 A. 818, 820. Further in State v. Murphy, 15 R.I. 543, 546, 10 A. 585, 587, in passing on the constitutional sufficiency and certainty of an indictment which was alleged substantially in the terms of a statute the court held: 'The technical precision of the common-law rule is not exacted.' See also State v. Smith, 56 R.I. 168, 184 A. 494, where a short form of indictment was before this court and these principles were cited with approval.

Indeed the purpose and effect of the short form of indictment statute was to permit the state to omit much of the technical and extensive requirements of criminal pleading in accordance with principles of the common law. It is a general rule that courts now require only a statement of the essential elements of the offense charged. 27 Am.Jur., Indictments and Informations, §§ 51-53, and cases cited. In the present practice in this state an indictment is sufficient, whether under common-law pleading or under the statute, if it conforms to the pertinent provisions of article I, sec. 10, of our constitution, which reads: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation * * *.' The controlling question therefore is whether the instant indictment, considered in the light of existing statutes and criminal practice thereunder, meets the requirements of the above-mentioned section of the constitution.

It should be noted that the allegations of this indictment are not as meager as the short forms of indictment which the statute permits and which in other cases have been approved. State v. Smith, supra, (conspiracy to steal); State v. Domanski, 57 R.I. 500, 190 A. 854 (robbery); State v. Cairo, 74 R.I. 377, 60 A.2d 841 (breaking and entering); and State v. Ephraim, 80 R.I. 321, 96 A.2d 641 (possession of obscene literature). In other words, the indictment here does not charge merely that defendant stole money from Veronica Hagopian or committed larceny of the latter's money or property. If that had been the case defendant's argument would have some force, because there are now several statutory types or species of larceny and she would not know therefrom which type had been charged by the grand jury.

But apparently heeding the caution stated in State v. Smith and State v. Domanski, supra, the state has followed substantially the express language by which the present crime is described and made punishable by the legislature, thereby including all the essential elements as therein set forth. Therefore it was not necessary to allege all the means or evidentiary facts by which the false pretenses were accomplished. A particular statement thereof, if found necessary to aid defendant in preparation of her defense, can be obtained by a bill of particulars. G.L.1938, chap. 625, § 3, clause 7. Such pleading in indictments comes within the statement of this...