State v. Joyce
| Docket Number | 2021-L-006 |
| Decision Date | 26 September 2022 |
| Citation | 197 N.E.3d 612 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael S. JOYCE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Rick L. Ferrara, 2077 East 4th Street, 2nd Floor, Cleveland, OH 44115 (For Defendant-Appellant).
{¶1} Appellant, Michael S. Joyce, appeals the trial court's May 11, 2020 sentencing entry. On remand from the Supreme Court of Ohio, we affirm.
{¶2} Appellant pled guilty to five offenses: Count One, attempted murder, a first-degree felony; Count Six, grand theft of a motor vehicle, a fourth-degree felony; Count Seven, aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony; Counts Eleven and Twelve, tampering with evidence, third-degree felonies. The trial court sentenced appellant as follows: an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum term of 11 years and a maximum prison term of 16.5 years on Count One; 17 months in prison on Count Six; 9 years in prison on Count Seven; 30 months in prison on Count Eleven; and 30 months in prison on Count Twelve. Counts One and Seven are to be served consecutive to each other, while all other terms are to be served concurrently, resulting in a stated aggregate minimum term of 20 years and an aggregate maximum term of 25.5 years in prison.
{¶3} Appellant advances one assignment of error:
The sentencing under Ohio law violated the separation of powers doctrine of the Constitutions of the State of Ohio and United States, due process of law, are void for vagueness, and conflict internally with other Ohio law.
{¶4} Appellant argues that the sentencing scheme under which he was sentenced, identified under R.C. 2901.011 as the Reagan Tokes Law, is unconstitutional on its face because it violates the separation of powers doctrine and infringes upon his due process rights.
{¶5} Initially, we note that the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law has been addressed by other Ohio appellate courts, each of which has declared that the sentencing scheme does not facially violate an inmate's constitutional rights. See, e.g., State v. Barnes , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28613, 2020-Ohio-4150, 2020 WL 4919780 ; State v. Hacker , 2020-Ohio-5048, 161 N.E.3d 112 (3d Dist.) ; State v. Bontrager , 2022-Ohio-1367, 188 N.E.3d 607 (4th Dist.) ; State v. Ratliff , 5th Dist., 2022-Ohio-1372, 190 N.E.3d 684 ; State v. Maddox , 2022-Ohio-1350, 188 N.E.3d 682 (6th Dist.) ; State v. Delvallie , 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.) (en banc); State v. Guyton , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-203, 2020-Ohio-3837, 2020 WL 4279793. The issue is currently pending before the Supreme Court of Ohio. See, e.g., State v. Hacker , Sup. Ct. Case No. 2020-1496, and State v. Simmons , Sup. Ct. Case No. 2021-0532, 2021-Ohio-2270, 169 N.E.3d 1273.
{¶6} We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo, i.e., independently and without deference to the trial court's decision. State v. Jenson , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-L-193, 2006-Ohio-5169, 2006 WL 2796284, ¶ 5. "An enactment of the General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional, and before a court may declare it unconstitutional it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible." State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher , 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Romage , 138 Ohio St.3d 390, 2014-Ohio-783, 7 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 7 (). "This means that courts must avoid an unconstitutional construction where it is reasonably possible to do so." Jenson at ¶ 5, citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Porterfield , 28 Ohio St.2d 97, 100, 276 N.E.2d 629 (1971). "Further, the party challenging the statute bears the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt." Woods v. Telb , 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 511, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000), citing State v. Thompkins , 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 560, 664 N.E.2d 926 (1996).
{¶7} A party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of facts or, as here, on its face. Harrold v. Collier , 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37. Id. , citing United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).
{¶8} The Reagan Tokes Law, effective as of March 22, 2019, implemented a system of indefinite sentencing for non-life felonies of the first and second degree committed on or after the effective date. Pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, a sentencing court imposing a prison term under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) is required to order a minimum prison term under that provision and a maximum prison term as determined by R.C. 2929.144(B).
{¶9} "Of the many changes to Ohio's criminal sentencing scheme that were brought about by the Reagan Tokes Law, the change that is most pertinent to our present discussion centers around R.C. 2967.271(B) - (F), which permits prison authorities within the executive branch to hold defendants in confinement during the indefinite portion of their sentence for conduct that violates prison rules and regulations." State v. Eaton , 6th Dist., 2022-Ohio-2432, 192 N.E.3d 1236, ¶ 13.
{¶10} R.C. 2967.271(B) sets forth a "presumption that the person shall be released from service of the sentence on the expiration of the offender's minimum prison term or on the offender's presumptive earned early release date, whichever is earlier." R.C. 2967.271(C) provides that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC") may rebut the presumption for release if it holds a hearing and determines that any of the three enumerated factors, discussed below, are applicable. If the ODRC rebuts the presumption for release, R.C. 2967.271(D)(1) provides that the ODRC may "maintain" the offender in confinement for a "reasonable period," which "shall not exceed the offender's maximum prison term." R.C. 2967.271(E) provides that the ODRC "shall provide notices of hearings to be conducted under division (C) or (D) of this section in the same manner, and to the same persons" as it provides for the possible release of inmates on parole. Finally, R.C. 2967.271(F) permits the director of the ODRC to recommend a reduction in the offender's minimum prison term (except for sexually oriented offense convictions), which creates a presumption in favor of the reduction that may be rebutted by the prosecutor at a hearing before the sentencing court.
{¶11} Although indefinite sentencing has previously been utilized as the law in Ohio for first- and second-degree felonies, the presumptive release date is novel to the Reagan Tokes Law. See State v. Wolfe , 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020CA00021, 2020-Ohio-5501, 2020 WL 7054428, ¶ 56 (Gwin, J., dissenting), citing State v. Davis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 13092, 1987 WL 25743 (Nov. 25, 1987), citing former R.C. 2929.11, and State v. Jenks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 10264, 1987 WL 20267 (Nov. 16, 1987), citing former R.C. 2929.1.
{¶12} The first question before us is whether the Reagan Tokes Law violates due process by failing to provide adequate protections for inmates during the process by which the ODRC determines whether it should maintain an inmate in confinement after the expiration of the minimum prison term. Appellant's due process arguments can be summarized as follows: (1) the law is vague with respect to the conduct that would permit the ODRC to continue imprisonment after expiration of the minimum term; (2) the law fails to provide adequate procedural safeguards to be used by the ODRC in conducting the hearing and exercising its discretion; and (3) the law fails to provide a court hearing prior to imposing prison time beyond the minimum term. These are facial challenges to the constitutionality of the enactment, thereby placing the burden on appellant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no set of circumstances under which the Reagan Tokes Law would be constitutional.
{¶13} "The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government." (Citation omitted.) Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
{¶14} The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No State shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * * *." The Due Course of Law Clause in Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay." The two clauses are coextensive and provide equivalent due process protections. State v. Aalim , 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, ¶ 15 ; State v. Anderson , 148 Ohio St.3d 74, 2016-Ohio-5791, 68 N.E.3d 790, ¶ 21. We can therefore rely on decisions of both the United States Supreme Court and the Ohio Supreme Court. Anderson at ¶ 23.
{¶15} The standard analysis of due process proceeds in two steps: "We first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient." Swarthout...
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