State v. Keahi, 8500

Decision Date25 April 1983
Docket NumberNo. 8500,8500
Citation662 P.2d 212,66 Haw. 364
PartiesSTATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Percy KEAHI, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. The trial court has inherent power to grant or deny a motion for deferred acceptance of a nolo contendere plea.

2. Section 853-1, HRS, as amended in 1979, does not prevent the trial court from exercising its inherent power to grant or deny a motion for acceptance of a nolo contendere plea even though that plea was entered after trial had commenced.

Lawrence A. Goya, Deputy Pros. Atty., Wailuku, on briefs for plaintiff-appellant.

Arthur K. Trask, Jr., Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu, on brief for defendant-appellee.

Before LUM, Acting C.J., NAKAMURA, PADGETT and HAYASHI, JJ., and CHANG, Circuit Judge, assigned by reason of vacancy.

PADGETT, Justice.

This is an appeal by the State from an order of the circuit court granting a motion for the deferred acceptance of guilty plea. We remand.

In this case, appellee was charged with the offense of burglary in the first degree. After the trial had commenced and two witnesses had testified for the State, appellee, on September 10, 1981, entered a plea of nolo contendere.

At the hearing on appellee's sentencing on November 12, 1981, appellee moved for a deferred acceptance of his plea and, over the State's objection, the trial court granted his motion for a deferred acceptance of guilty plea for five years. From the granting of that motion, the State appeals.

The State points out that § 853-1, HRS, provides that under certain enumerated circumstances the circuit court may defer further proceedings in a criminal case where a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty prior to commencement of trial. The State further points to the fact that the phrase "prior to commencement of trial" was added to the statute by Act 147 of the Session Laws of 1979 and that the legislative history indicates that it was the intention of the Legislature to require that guilty pleas be made prior to trial if the device of a deferred acceptance of the plea were to be utilized.

However, in this case, the appellee pleaded nolo contendere after the trial had commenced. Under Rule 11(b), Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure, the circuit court clearly had the power to accept such a plea. The question presented in this case, therefore, is that of whether the circuit court having accepted a plea of nolo contendere during trial, had the power at the time of sentencing to enter the order here appealed from.

In State v. Brown, 1 Haw.App. 602, 623 P.2d 892 (1981), the Intermediate Court of Appeals held that the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • State v. Sakamoto
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • May 30, 2003
    ...court's inherent power to grant or deny a motion for DAG plea or DANC plea is applicable as to HRS § 853-4(2). See State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that "the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo conten......
  • State v. Oshiro
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • November 24, 1987
    ...See State v. Bikle, 60 Haw. 576, 592 P.2d 832 (1979); see also State v. Miura, 6 Haw.App. 501, 730 P.2d 917 (1986). In State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 662 P.2d 212 (1983), and State v. Brown, 1 Haw.App. 602, 623 P.2d 892 (1981) (per curiam), State appealed from a deferred acceptance of guilty ......
  • State v. Fogel
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • May 25, 2001
    ...comply with such agreement shall be grounds for withdrawal of the plea." 9. The prosecution argues that this court, "in State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 662 P.2d 212 (1983), held that a trial court could grant or deny a motion for acceptance of a nolo contendere plea even though the plea was en......
  • 79 Hawai'i 32, State v. Gomes, 16476
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1995
    ...Although the difference between these two pleas "is one of form rather than substance" for sentencing purposes, see State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 366, 662 P.2d 212, 214 (1983), they are not the same for purposes of an HRPP Rule 32(d) motion. See supra note 3 (defining nolo contendere ).13 Se......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT