State v. Sakamoto
| Decision Date | 30 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 25321.,25321. |
| Citation | 101 Haw. 409,70 P.3d 635 |
| Parties | STATE of Hawai'i, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Karl K. SAKAMOTO, Judge, Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawai'i, Respondent, and Shawn Reilly, Real Party in Interest, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Alexa D.M. Fujise, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, for petitioner.
Linda C.R. Jameson, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, for defendant-appellee in opposition.
LEVINSON, J., and Circuit Judge NAKAMURA, assigned by reason of vacancy, and ACOBA, J., concurring separately, and MOON, C.J., dissenting, with whom NAKAYAMA, J., joins.
Opinion by LEVINSON, J., with whom Circuit Judge NAKAMURA joins, announcing the judgment of the Court.
In this original proceeding, the petitioner State of Hawai'i (the prosecution) petitions this court to issue a writ directing the respondent Judge Karl K. Sakamoto (the respondent judge), Judge of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, to vacate his order granting the defendant-respondent Shawn Reilly's motion for deferred acceptance of no contest (DANC) plea in State v. Reilly, Cr. No. 01-1-0062. The prosecution contends that the respondent judge exceeded his lawful authority and contravened the plain language of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 853-4(2) (Supp.2002).
Based upon the following, we hold that the respondent judge did not exceed his legal authority when he granted Reilly's motion for a DANC plea. Accordingly, the prosecution's petition for a writ directed to a judge is denied.
On May 31, 2000, Reilly argued with Scott Brannan and punched him in the nose, causing a laceration and bone fracture. At first, Brannan informed the police that he did not wish to pursue any charges against Reilly. He later changed his mind, and, on January 10, 2001, the prosecution obtained a grand jury indictment against Reilly charging the offense of assault in the second degree. The indictment alleged:
On or about the 31st day of May, 2000, in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawai'i, SHAWN REILLY did intentionally or knowingly cause substantial bodily injury to Scott Brannan, thereby committing the offense of Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of Section 707-711(1)(a) of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes.
On March 4, 2002, Reilly entered a no contest plea to the charge and moved the respondent judge for a DANC plea. In the course of a hearing conducted on May 14, 2002, the prosecution conceded that Reilly had no prior criminal convictions, but argued that the offense was "serious," being a class C felony, and that, in the interest of justice, deferral of the plea was not warranted. On the same day, the respondent judge entered an order granting the deferred acceptance, having earlier expressed his reasons from the bench as follows:
On June 6, 2002, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration of the respondent judge's May 14, 2002 order, arguing that HRS § 853-4 (Supp.2002) did not allow the court to grant a DANC plea in connection with the offense of assault in the second degree. The prosecution acknowledged that, on its face, HRS § 853-4 did not appear to prohibit Reilly's DANC plea. The prosecution argued, however, that allowing the plea would lead to an absurd result because, according to the prosecution, the legislative history reflected that the legislature had intended to render DANC pleas unavailable in cases involving assaults that inflicted substantial bodily injury, inasmuch as assaults, both felony and misdemeanor, that inflicted bodily injury and serious bodily injury were expressly excluded by statute.1 Reilly argued in opposition that the language of HRS § 853-4 is plain on its face, providing that deferrals shall not be granted with respect to offenses involving intentional, knowing, or reckless "bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury" of another person. Accordingly, Reilly maintained that the statute does not prohibit deferrals with respect to offenses involving "substantial bodily injury." Reilly therefore contended that he was eligible for a DANC plea and that the court had not erred by granting his motion for a deferral.
The respondent judge denied the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, stating as follows:
The language [of HRS § 853-4] is very clear in what it seeks to exclude, and there were other opportunities for the legislature to exclude even more, and they have, except they have not excluded on this charge, a substantial bodily injury. So based on that, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
On July 12, 2002, the prosecution filed a second motion for reconsideration on grounds that are not material to the present petition. The respondent judge denied the prosecution's second motion.
The prosecution subsequently filed the present petition, requesting that this court issue a writ directing that the respondent judge vacate the order granting Reilly's motion for a DANC plea. The petition resurrects only the issues raised in the prosecution's first motion for reconsideration.
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action. State v. Hamili, 87 Hawai'i 102, 104, 952 P.2d 390, 392 (1998) (citing Straub Clinic & Hospital v. Kochi, 81 Hawai'i 410, 414, 917 P.2d 1284, 1288 (1996)). Such writs are not meant to supersede the legal discretionary authority of the lower court, nor are they meant to serve as legal remedies in lieu of normal appellate procedures. Id. Where the lower court has discretion to act, mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of that discretion, even when the court has acted erroneously, unless the judge has exceeded his or her jurisdiction, has committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of discretion, or has refused to act on a matter that is properly before the court under circumstances in which it has a legal duty to act. Id. In State v. Oshiro, 69 Haw. 438, 746 P.2d 568 (1987), this court held that HRS § 641-13 does not permit the prosecution to appeal the grant of a deferred acceptance of guilty (DAG) or a DANC plea. Because there is no statutory basis upon which the prosecution can appeal such pleas, a petition for a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition, pursuant to HRS § 602-5(4), is the appropriate method for the prosecution to seek review of a DANC plea when it believes that the trial court has acted without statutory authority to accept such a plea. Oshiro, 69 Haw. at 443, 746 P.2d at 571; Hamili, 87 Hawai'i at 104, 952 P.2d at 392. See also State v. Dannenberg, 74 Haw. 75, 837 P.2d 776 (1992).
The sole issue in this proceeding is whether the charged offense with respect to which Reilly entered a no contest plea is excluded from the possibility of deferral by virtue of the provisions of HRS chapter 853 (Supp.2002). When construing a statute, the court's foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. City and County of Honolulu v. Ing, 100 Hawai'i 182, 189, 58 P.3d 1229, 1236 (2002); State v. Kamal, 88 Hawai'i 292, 294, 966 P.2d 604, 606 (1998) (citations omitted). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, the court's sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning. State v. Harada, 98 Hawai'i 18, 41, 41 P.3d 174, 197 (2002); State v. Kalama, 94 Hawai'i 60, 64, 8 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2000) (citations omitted).
HRS chapter 853 governs the circumstances under which a court may defer final adjudication of a criminal case when (1) a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty or no contest prior to the commencement of trial and (2) the court concludes (a) that the defendant is not likely to engage in a criminal course of conduct and (b) that the ends of justice and welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law. HRS § 853-1(a) (Supp.2002). Such deferrals are constrained by HRS § 853-4, which sets out the circumstances under which chapter 853 "shall not apply." HRS § 853-4(2) provides:
(2) The offense charged is a felony that involves the intentional, knowing, or reckless bodily injury or serious bodily injury of another person, or is a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor that carries a mandatory minimum sentence and that involves the intentional, knowing, or reckless bodily injury or serious bodily injury of another person.
(emphasis added). HRS § 707-700 (1993) defines three types of bodily injury. "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the...
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