State v. Kearstan
| Decision Date | 20 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-5867-17T3 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KENNETH KEARSTAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 18-006.
Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer PA, attorneys for appellant (John Edmund Hogan, Jr., of counsel and on the brief).
Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Paula Cristina Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
Defendant Kenneth Kearstan appeals from his conviction for driving while intoxicated, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. He entered a conditional guilty plea in the Washington Township municipal court specifically preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress the alleged unconstitutional entry into his home by the police and his subsequent incriminating statements made without the benefit of Miranda1 warnings. R. 7:6-2(c). The Law Division affirmed the municipal court's suppression determinations on de novo review and this appeal followed. We affirm.
The following facts elicited at the suppression hearing are substantially not in dispute. At the time of the events at issue, defendant and his wife were in the midst of divorce proceedings and had been separated for nine months. On April 18, 2017, at approximately 5:00 p.m., defendant arrived at the marital home with damage to his car, including a missing mirror. Defendant's wife called 911, and while on the phone with the operator she learned that defendant had used a key to unlock the door to the house and entered the basement. She reported that defendant had an alcohol issue and believed he was intoxicated, as he was slurring his words and "smell[ed] a little too."
Washington Township Patrolman Michael Thompson was dispatched to the residence to conduct a welfare check. Defendant's wife met Thompson at the front door and invited him into the home. Thompson testified that prior to entering the home he too noticed the damage to defendant's vehicle. He also stated that he had previously been at the residence on an alarm call and met defendant's wife, who had shown him the security system. Thompson's testified that defendant's wife was upset when he arrived and noted that the parties' young children were present.
As soon as Thompson entered the home, defendant's wife advised him that defendant was in the basement. She believed defendant had taken medication and was intoxicated. She repeatedly stated her concern for defendant's well-being but was upset regarding defendant's presence in the home, as she had previously informed defendant that he was not permitted in the home when inebriated.
Thompson testified that he stood at the top of the stairs and called down to defendant to come up from the basement. When defendant entered the stairway he was off balance, staggering, and his pants were falling down. Thompson testified that defendant had difficulty pulling up his pants and he detected an odor of alcohol emanating from defendant. He stated it was clearthat defendant was "extremely intoxicated" and he needed assistance simply to stand up. Thompson told defendant he wanted to speak with him outside, away from the children.
Throughout Thompson's encounter with defendant, he expressed concern for defendant's well-being, which he described as his "top priority." He also advised defendant that his wife was worried about his drinking and prescription drug use, as well as the circumstances surrounding the damage to his car.
Thompson testified that he asked defendant to exit the home so they could speak outside in order to avoid an altercation between defendant and his wife and so defendant's children would not witness their interaction. While on the porch, Thompson began questioning defendant and observed that defendant's eyes were bloodshot and his speech was slurred. Thompson testified that he again smelled alcohol emanating from defendant.
Defendant told Thompson that he had no memory of being involved in an accident. After initially denying drinking that day, defendant eventually admitted to consuming three small airplane-sized bottles of alcohol. Defendant also admitted to engaging in an argument with his wife earlier in the week regarding paying their taxes and stated he came to the home to finish a basement construction project.
In light of his observations and defendant's statements, Thompson attempted to administer Standard Field Sobriety Tests. After defendant stated he was unable to complete the walk-and-turn test, Thompson decided to cease administrating the remainder of the field sobriety tests out of concern that defendant's condition would cause him to fall and injure himself.
Defendant was placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Thompson and another officer requested that a first aid squad meet them at police headquarters, as Thompson was concerned defendant was exhibiting signs of an overdose. Defendant was subsequently transported to Hackettstown Hospital where a blood draw revealed defendant had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.29%, well above the legal limit.
Before the municipal court, defendant moved to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test and the incriminating statements he made to Thompson claiming the police violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and corresponding rights under the New Jersey Constitution. Specifically, defendant maintained that Thompson improperly entered his home without consent and failed to administer Miranda warnings.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing in which Thompson was the only testifying witness, the municipal court judge denied defendant's motions,concluding that defendant's wife knowingly and willingly invited Thompson into the family home. The judge also concluded that the warrantless entry was justified under the community-caretaker and emergency-aid doctrines. Finally, the judge determined that the subsequent questioning of defendant did not constitute a custodial interrogation warranting Miranda warnings. Instead, the judge characterized Thompson's questioning as similar to the preliminary, roadside investigation of an individual suspected of drunk driving.
Because this was defendant's second DWI conviction, he was assessed the appropriate mandatory fines and penalties, his driving privileges were revoked for a period of two years, and the court sentenced defendant to a forty-eight hour minimum treatment in the Intoxicated Driver's Resource Center. Defendant was also required to install an ignition interlock device on his vehicle for one year upon restoration of his driving privileges. Finally, the court stayed defendant's sentence pending appeal.2
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Law Division. On de novo review, the Law Division affirmed the municipal court's suppression ruling and similarly concluded the police did not violate defendant's Fourth or FifthAmendment rights. Specifically, the court determined Thompson had a lawful right to be in the home based on valid consent obtained from defendant's wife, and appropriately questioned defendant without the need for Miranda warnings. The court imposed the same sentence as the municipal court, similarly stayed the sentence, but ordered that defendant abstain from using alcohol and appear periodically in court for compliance monitoring.
On appeal, defendant raises the following issues for our consideration:
We disagree with both of defendant's arguments. Thompson lawfully entered defendant's home as a result of the informed and voluntary consent granted to him by defendant's wife. Defendant's subsequent incriminating responses and BAC results were the consequence of a proper investigatory interrogation similar to that occurring on a roadside and to which Mirandawarnings are not required. Consequently, we discern no violation of defendant's federal or state constitutional rights and, accordingly, affirm.
When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, we defer to the factual findings of the trial court if they are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015) (citing State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)). Further, our review of the Law Division order here "is limited to determining whether there is sufficient credible evidence present in the record to support the findings of the Law Division judge, not the municipal court." State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 (1964)). Finally, we review the Law Division's legal determinations or conclusions based upon the facts on a de novo basis. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures performed without a warrant issued based on probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, § 7. A warrantless search orseizure is presumptively invalid under both the federal and state constitutions. State v. Piniero, 181 N.J. 13, 19 (2004) (citing State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 7 (1980)). Further, we have long...
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