State v. Keesee

• Decision Date: 03 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 2707,2707
• Citation: 490 S.E.2d 626,327 S.C. 627
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Robert KEESEE, Appellant. . Heard

Page 626

490 S.E.2d 626

327 S.C. 627

The STATE, Respondent, v. Robert KEESEE, Appellant.

No. 2707.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard June 3, 1997.

Decided July 28, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 25, 1997.

Robert Marshall Jones, Rock Hill; and Jay Bender, and S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.

Attorney General Charles Molony Condon, Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Caroline C. Tiffin, Columbia; and Solicitor John R. Justice, Chester, for respondent.

GOOLSBY, Judge.

Robert Keesee was convicted and fined for hunting in a wildlife management area without the required permit. We affirm.

While patrolling Wildlife Management Area (WMA) land in Fairfield County in December 1995, a Department of Natural Resources (DNR) officer happened upon Keesee and a companion hunting on the land. Keesee produced a Catawba Indian's hunting license, which was a "combination type license, hunting and fishing." The officer asked Keesee where his WMA permit was. Keesee told the officer he did not need a WMA license in light of his Catawba combination license. The officer cited Keesee for hunting on WMA land without a WMA permit.

At a bench trial in January 1996, Keesee was convicted in magistrate's court and ordered to pay a fine of $376.00. The circuit court affirmed.

Now on appeal, Keesee renews the same argument he made below: by virtue of the hunting license provision in the Catawba Indians Claims Settlement Act, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 27-16-10 through -140 (Supp.1996) ("Claims Act"), his Catawba combination license satisfies the WMA permit requirement. Additionally, Keesee argues his due process rights were violated because he did not receive fair notice that his conduct would be criminal.

I.

Since Keesee was cited in December 1995, the General Assembly has made significant changes to the Hunting, Fishing, and Trapping Licenses code. ¹ Nonetheless, we hold under the hunting code in place at the relevant time, there was no error below in finding that Keesee violated the WMA permit requirements.

Preliminarily, we note our primary concern in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Singletary v. South Carolina Dep't of Educ., 316 S.C. 153, 447 S.E.2d 231 (Ct.App.1994). If a statute's language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing rules of statutory interpretation and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning. City of Columbia v. ACLU of S.C., Inc., 323 S.C. 384, 475 S.E.2d 747 (1996). Where a statute is complete, plain, and unambiguous, legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991). Words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Adkins v. Comcar Indus., 323 S.C. 409, 475 S.E.2d 762 (1996). We should consider, however, not merely the language of the particular clause being construed, but the word and its meaning in conjunction with the purpose of the whole statute and the policy of the law. South Carolina Coastal Council v. South Carolina State Ethics Comm'n, 306 S.C. 41, 410 S.E.2d 245 (1991). Statutory provisions should be given a reasonable construction consistent with the purpose of the statute, and statutes that are part of the same act must be read together. Jackson v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., 316 S.C. 177, 447 S.E.2d 859 (1994); Burns v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 520, 377 S.E.2d 569 (1989).

Under the former code provisions, the General Assembly provided for graduations of hunting licenses. A resident could obtain a hunting license, a big game permit in addition to a hunting license, or a combination license which included the hunting license, big game permit, and a fishing license. See S.C.Code Ann. § 50-9-120 (1992 & Supp.1996) (hunting license); § 50-9-135 (1992 & Supp.1996) (big game permit); § 50-9-10 (1992 & Supp.1996) (combination fishing, hunting, and big game license).

In addition to the three licenses mentioned, the General Assembly imposed an added requirement for persons hunting on WMA land. Section 50-9-150 provided that the "South Carolina Wildlife and Marine Resources Department shall promulgate regulations requiring persons sixteen and above who hunt on wildlife management areas to purchase a permit." S.C.Code Ann. § 50-9-150 (1992 & Supp.1996). Like the distinct hunting license and big game permit, a person could obtain the WMA permit separately. Alternatively, just as a person can obtain a combination fishing, hunting, and big game license, a resident can obtain a resident sportsman license. The sportsman license provision provided in pertinent part that:

A resident of this State may obtain, in the same manner as other fishing and hunting licenses and the resident big game permit are obtained, a sportsman license in lieu of separate licenses for statewide fishing, statewide hunting for big game, and hunting on wildlife management areas.

S.C.Code Ann. § 50-9-15 (1992 & Supp.1996).

The former hunting code's provisions were straightforward: a resident could obtain the basic hunting license, plus a big game permit, or a combination of the two plus a fishing license. Additionally, to hunt on WMA land a person is required to purchase a permit. ² The WMA permit can be purchased separately, or, the resident can obtain a resident sportsman license, which was no more than an upgraded combination fishing, hunting, and big game license, with the WMA permit included. Accordingly, under the code provisions then applicable, Keesee having been found hunting on WMA land, was required to have: (1) a valid hunting license (§ 50-9-120), or a big game permit (§ 50-9-135), or the combination license (§ 50-9-10); and (2) a WMA permit, whether obtained separately (§ 50-9-150), or obtained as part of the all-inclusive resident sportsman license (§ 50-9-15). Cf. 27 S.C.Code Ann.Regs. 123-40(2.4) (1992) ("It is unlawful for anyone to hunt or take wildlife on WMA land unless an individual is in possession of a valid South Carolina license; a valid WMA permit; and other applicable federal or state permits, stamps, or licenses."). Here, Keesee satisfied only the hunting license requirement, but not the WMA permit requirement. Thus, like the two courts before us, we conclude that Keesee was properly cited for failing to have the required permit to hunt on WMA land.

We fail to see how the title "Catawba Combination License" should alter our conclusion. The hunting and licensing section of the Claims Act provides in pertinent part that:

Hunting and fishing, on or off the Reservation, must be conducted in compliance with the laws and regulations of South Carolina. Members of the Tribe are subject to all state and local regulations governing hunting and fishing on and off the Reservation. However, for ninety-nine years following the effective date of this chapter, members of the Tribe are entitled to personal state hunting and fishing licenses without payment of fees.

S.C.Code Ann. § 27-16-120(E) (Supp.1996). The plain meaning of the statute waives licensing fees, but more importantly for our purposes, it explicitly states that members are "subject to all state and local regulations governing hunting and fishing on and off the Reservation." Id. (emphasis added). Other than the fee provisions, the statute clearly provides that Catawba Indians will be treated no differently than other residents of the state. Moreover, this provision of the Claims Act draws no distinction between the several types of hunting licenses that are found in the hunting code. Thus, by referencing the hunting and fishing licenses in only a general sense, and by applying "all state and local regulations," the General Assembly plainly intended that the hunting code, including its variants of hunting licenses and WMA requirement, shall apply with full force to tribe members as any other state resident. The word "Catawba" on Keesee's combination license in no way converted his section 50-9-10 combination license into a section 50-9-15 resident sportsman license.

Keesee argues because the terms "license" and "permit" are used synonymously under the resident sportsman license provision (§ 50-9-15), then the Claims Act provision (§ 27-16-120(E)) necessarily includes a license to hunt on WMA land. Assuming the terms are used synonymously, we disagree with Keesee's interpretation in tying together the two separate statutes. Indeed, under Keesee's logic, section 27-16-120(E)'s license language could easily encompass a basic hunting license, or a big game permit, as equally as it could encompass the WMA permit. Keesee reads the licensing language of the Claims Act provision too broadly and puts meaning into the words that is neither plain nor reasonable. Simply put, section 27-16-120(E) describes hunting licenses in a generic sense while the hunting code provides explicit guidance on the different types of licenses.

Keesee also contends if license and permit have meanings that are not synonymous under the hunting code, then sections 27-16-120(E) and 50-9-150 contain ambiguities. This argument creates ambiguities where none exist. A WMA permit is required to hunt on WMA land in addition to the other hunting licensing provisions--the permit can be obtained separately, or, as part of the all--inclusive resident sportsman license. Similarly, the big game permit can be obtained separately once a person already has a hunting license, or, the big game permit can be obtained as part of the combination fishing and hunting license. Regardless of how these two terms are used, however, the General Assembly has...