State v. Kelekolio

• Decision Date: 29 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 22289.,22289.
• Citation: 14 P.3d 364,94 Haw. 354
• Parties: STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Guy K. KELEKOLIO, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Court of Appeals

14 P.3d 364

94 Haw. 354

STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Guy K. KELEKOLIO, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22289.

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai`i.

November 29, 2000.

Bryant Zane, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, County of Kauai, on the briefs, for plaintiff-appellant.

Cody Minatodani, Deputy Public Defender, State of Hawai`i, on the briefs, for defendant-appellee.

BURNS, C.J., WATANABE, and LIM, JJ.

Opinion of the Court by WATANABE, J.

The primary issue¹ in this appeal is whether the District Court of the Fifth Circuit (the district court) correctly ruled that Defendant Appellee Guy K. Kelekolio (Kelekolio) could not be convicted of operating a vehicle without a license, in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 286-102 (1993 & Supp.1998), because he was operating the vehicle in the parking lot of a private hotel, rather than on a public highway. We conclude that the district court was wrong in its ruling. Accordingly, we vacate the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal entered by the district court on January 20, 1999 (the January 20, 1999 Order) and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

On September 25, 1998, at 12:40 p.m., Kelekolio was cited by a Kauai police officer for operating a motor vehicle around the parking lot of the Kauai Lagoons Hotel without a valid motor vehicle driver's license, in violation of HRS § 286-102. The citing officer observed in his written report of the incident that Kelekolio "only had a drivers [sic] permit and did not have another person in the vehicle with him."

At a "stipulated facts" trial held on December 18, 1998, the parties did not dispute that the Kauai Lagoons Hotel parking lot is private property and that Kelekolio did not have a driver's license when he was cited for operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license. In light of these undisputed facts, however, Kelekolio argued that he should be acquitted because HRS § 286-102 was not applicable to the operation of motor vehicles on private property. The district court agreed with Kelekolio's argument and ordered that the case against Kelekolio be dismissed.

Subsequently, the district court entered the January 20, 1999 Order from which the State now appeals, dismissing the charge against Kelekolio on the basis that "HRS § 286-102 does not apply to the operation of a motor vehicle on private property[.]" In so ruling, the district court entered the following conclusions of law:

1. [HRS c]hapter 286 relates to "Highway Safety" and generally deals with highway safety as it relate[d] to the regulation of motor vehicles and those who operate them.

2. HRS § 286-2 defines "Highway" as follows:

"Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.

3. HRS § 286-2 defines "Motor Vehicle" as follows:

"Motor vehicle" means every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power but which is not operated upon rails, but excludes a moped.

4. HRS § 286-2 defines "Vehicle" as follows:

"Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, but excludes devices moved by human power or devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks and mopeds.

5. If HRS § 286-102 applied to the operation of motor vehicles upon private premises every self-propelled lawn mower, golf cart and other similar appliance would be subject to licensing and other requirements, i.e., safety inspections and registrations. It does not appear that such broad, sweeping application was intended.

6. The intent of the licensing provision which states that "no person.. . . .shall operate any category of motor vehicles" without being first examined and licensed must be gleaned from the nature of the chapter and the definition of motor vehicle.

7. The intent of Chapter 286 is to foster highway safety by regulating the machines that operate upon the highway and by licensing the drivers of those machines upon the highway. The following sections of Chapter 286 should be read in para [sic] materia:

(a) HRS § 286-110(c) provides for persons to receive an instruction permit "to drive upon the highways" for 90 days.

(b) HRS § 286-121 provides that the "privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the highway of this State" given to a nonresident is subject to suspension or revocation the same as a driver's license issued under Chapter 286.

(c) HRS § 286-132 imposes a penalty upon any person who "drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this State" while his license is suspended or revoked.

(d) HRS § 286-133 prohibits permitting unlicensed persons to drive "upon any highway"[.]

(e) HRS § 286-151 provides that persons operating motor vehicles "on the public highways of this State" are deemed to have given consent to be tested for intoxication.

8. In State v. French, 77 Hawai`i 222 (1994) the defendant was convicted of driving without a license in violation of HRS § 286-102. He claimed to be a member of the Kingdom of Hawaii and therefore not subjected to Hawaii's traffic laws. Rejecting his claim the Hawaii Supreme Court declared:

"The state's requirements that all persons who operate motor vehicles on state highways possess a valid driver's license [and] safety inspection tags ... are valid exercises of the state's police power [and] are rationally related to the state's purpose in safeguarding the health and safety of its citizens, and the means employed by the state are rationally related to the purpose of the statutes." (Page 232 , emphasis added.)

9. State v. Figel, 80 Hawai`i 47 (1995) held:

A parking lot is not a "highway" under a statute that prohibits driving a motor vehicle upon highways of the state after a license has been suspended or revoked.

10. Although HRS § 286-102 does not contain the word "highway", there are numerous references to driving upon the highway in Chapter 286, "HIGHWAY SAFETY".

11. State v. Watson, 71 Haw. 258 [787 P.2d 691 (1990)] is not dispositive because that case dealt with a Chapter 291 violation (DUI). Chapter 291 relates to "Traffic Violations". The Supreme Court found nothing in HRS § 291-4 which required that driving while intoxicated must be done on a public highway to be punishable. It further declared that ".....the strong public policy against the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is sufficient to extend the prohibition of the statute....." There is no such strong public policy involving the operation of vehicles upon private property.

(Ellipses and emphases in original.) This appeal by Plaintiff Appellant State of Hawai`i (the State) asks us to review the correctness of the district court's construction of HRS § 286-102.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai`i 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86,

reconsideration denied (1999). Similarly, a trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable de novo under the right/wrong standard. State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai`i 433, 440, 896 P.2d 889, 896 (1995). Under the de novo standard, this court must examine the facts and answer the pertinent question of law without being required to give any weight or deference to the trial court's answer to the question. Id. In other words, we are free to review a trial court's conclusion of law for its correctness. Id.

DISCUSSION

In interpreting HRS § 286-102, we are guided by several basic principles of statutory construction:

First, the fundamental starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Second, where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of statutory construction is our foremost obligation to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists. And fifth, in construing an ambiguous statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining the legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.

Peterson v. Hawaii Elec. Light Co., Inc., 85 Hawai`i 322, 327-28, 944 P.2d 1265, 1270-71 (1997) (block quote formatting, brackets, citations, and quotation marks omitted).

Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that the district court was wrong when it limited the applicability of HRS § 286-102 to persons operating motor vehicles on public highways.

A.

Since the starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself, we begin our analysis by examining the language of the applicable statutes.

HRS § 286-102, the statute at issue in this case, states, in relevant part, as follows:

Licensing. (a) No person, except one exempted under section 286-105, one who holds an instruction permit under section 286-110, one who holds a commercial driver's license issued under section 286-239, or a commercial driver's license instruction permit issued under section 286-236, shall operate any category of motor vehicles listed in this section without first being appropriately examined and duly licensed as a qualified driver of that category of motor vehicles.

(b) A person operating the following category or combination of categories of motor vehicles shall be examined as provided in section 286-108² and duly licensed by the examiner of drivers:

....

(3) Passenger cars of any gross vehicle weight rating ... [.]

(...