State v. Kelley
| Decision Date | 10 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 42680.,42680. |
| Citation | 159 Idaho 417,361 P.3d 1280 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Thomas Campbell KELLEY, Defendant–Appellant. |
Bublitz Law, P.C., Jessica B. Bublitz, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Thomas Campbell Kelley appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in marijuana. Specifically, Kelley argues that the search of his vehicle was invalid and the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Oregon State Police informed the Idaho State Police that Kelley had been stopped in Oregon. The Oregon officer advised that his encounter with Kelley aroused suspicion of drug activity, but no drug dog was available for a search. Kelley did not consent to a search of the vehicle and was allowed to continue on his way. An Idaho officer observed and stopped Kelley after he changed lanes on Interstate 84 (I–84) without signaling for at least five continuous seconds in violation of I.C. § 49–808(2).
During the stop, Kelley provided a driver's license and car registration from different states. The car was owned by a third party and Kelley was unable to provide proof of insurance. The officer conducted follow-up inquiries about the car's owner, the insurance, and Kelley's trip plans. During this discussion, Kelley provided false information about his encounter with Oregon police and details about his trip from the Lake Tahoe area to Jackson Hole, Wyoming. These topics were revisited throughout the encounter. The officer noted Kelley's bloodshot eyes and conducted a test, which revealed that Kelley had eyelid tremors consistent with recent marijuana use. Approximately eight minutes into the stop, a drug dog performed a perimeter sniff of Kelley's vehicle and alerted to the front driver and passenger doors and open windows. Once inside the vehicle, the dog promptly entered the backseat, which was partially folded down and open to the trunk compartment. The dog alerted to areas between and under the backseat cushions toward the rear of the vehicle. In a subsequent search of the trunk, three vacuum-sealed containers of marijuana were found.
Kelley was charged with trafficking in marijuana. I.C. § 37–2732B(a)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle. Specifically, Kelley argued that the stop was invalid because I.C. § 49–808(2) is void for vagueness and because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the traffic stop. Additionally, Kelley argued that the officers did not have probable cause to search the vehicle's trunk area. The district court denied the motion. Kelley entered a conditional guilty plea to trafficking in marijuana, preserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. Kelley appeals.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez–Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).
Kelley argues that I.C. § 49–808(2) is void for vagueness as applied to his conduct. Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we review the lower court's decision de novo. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998) ; State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34, 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct.App.2009). The party attacking a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of proof and must overcome a strong presumption of validity. State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 261, 335 P.3d 597, 601 (Ct.App.2014) ; State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261, 262, 192 P.3d 1085, 1086 (Ct.App.2008). Appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. Freitas, 157 Idaho at 261, 335 P.3d at 601 ; Martin, 148 Idaho at 34, 218 P.3d at 13.
Due process requires that all be informed as to what the state commands or forbids and that persons of ordinary intelligence not be forced to guess at the meaning of the law. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 197, 969 P.2d at 246. No one may be required at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. Freitas, 157 Idaho at 261, 335 P.3d at 601. A void for vagueness challenge is more favorably acknowledged and a more stringent vagueness test will be applied where a statute imposes a criminal penalty. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 198, 969 P.2d at 247. As a result, criminal statutes must plainly and unmistakably provide fair notice of what is prohibited and what is allowed in language persons of ordinary intelligence will understand. State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 486, 80 P.3d 1083, 1087 (2003). Additionally, a statute is void for vagueness if it invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Freitas, 157 Idaho at 261, 335 P.3d at 601. A statute avoids problems with arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by identifying a core of circumstances to which the statute or ordinance unquestionably could be constitutionally applied. Id. A statute should not be held void for uncertainty if it can be given any practical interpretation. Id. at 262, 335 P.3d at 602.
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a defendant's conduct. Freitas, 157 Idaho at 262, 335 P.3d at 602 ; Martin, 148 Idaho at 35, 218 P.3d at 14. Here, Kelley does not make a facial challenge, but contends only that the statute is impermissibly vague as applied to him. To succeed on an as-applied vagueness challenge, a defendant must show that the statute failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's conduct was prohibited or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest the defendant. State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 915, 265 P.3d 519, 528 (Ct.App.2011).
In this case, the officer stopped Kelley for failing to signal his lane change for at least five continuous seconds on a controlled access highway in violation of I.C. § 49–808(2). Idaho Code Section 49–808 governs the use of turn signals on Idaho roadways and provides, in pertinent part:
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
(Emphasis added.)
Kelley argues that I.C. § 49–808(2) fails to provide fair notice of the signaling requirements when traveling along I–84. Under his interpretation of the statute, it is unconstitutionally vague as applied here because the nature of I–84 invokes both the "controlled-access highway" and the "in all other instances" signal requirements. Specifically, he argues that I–84 qualifies as a controlled-access highway subjecting him to the five-second signaling rule and also as a "through highway" falling under the all other instances requirement to signal for not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. Under this construction, Kelley contends that a person of ordinary intelligence would be unable to distinguish between the two types of highways and consequently renders the person unable to discern what is required under the statute.
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct.App.2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999) ; State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct.App.2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67.
This Court recently interpreted the plain meaning of I.C. § 49–808(2) in State v. Brooks, 157 Idaho 890, 341 P.3d 1259 (Ct.App.2014). There, we held that, because Brooks was traveling on a controlled-access highway, he was required to signal for at least five continuous seconds prior to moving out of his lane into another. Id. at 892, 894, 341 P.3d at 1261, 1263. Because Brooks had failed to signal for five continuous seconds before changing lanes, he violated I.C. § 49–808(2) and provided the officer reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Id. at 894, 341 P.3d at 1263. In interpreting the statute, this Court held that I.C. § 49–808(2) requires that a vehicle signal for at least five continuous seconds when traveling on a controlled-access highway and when turning from a parked position (regardless of the type of roadway on which the vehicle is parked). Brooks, 157 Idaho at 894, 341 P.3d at 1263. We held that in all other circumstances, a vehicle must signal for at least the last 100 feet traveled before turning. Id.
Under the plain language of the statute, when a highway meets the definition of a controlled-access highway under I.C. § 49–109(5)(b), a driver is required to abide by...
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