State v. Kenner
Decision Date | 16 January 1997 |
Docket Number | Nos. 960071,s. 960071 |
Citation | 559 N.W.2d 538,1997 ND 1 |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Lanny James KENNER, Defendant and Appellee. STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Shawn DESETH, Defendant and Appellee. Criminalto 960073. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
¶1 The State of North Dakota appeals from an order of dismissal and of suppression of evidence found as a result of a search of Shawn Deseth's car. The State questions the trial court's decision that the investigatory stop was not based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion. We remand to the trial court for further findings.
¶2 On September 8, 1995, Sergeant Ted Rainesalo and Officer James Frank of the Devils Lake Police Department were on patrol in downtown Devils Lake in separate patrol cars. At approximately 10:20 p.m., the following radio traffic was recorded:
Moments later, the following conversation took place between Rainesalo and Officer Frank:
1: There's a grey Cutlass--westbound on 4th Street, just going in front of the old Penney's there--I believe Shawn is driving that car--I can't get around on it.
2: What--the one with all the rust on it?
1: It's grey--kind of a primer colored--just went past 5th--5th Avenue going west.
2: What--5th Avenue going west?
1: No--it's on 4th Street, but just went by 5th Avenue.
2: I think I've got it here--you're talking about a full size with sun roof--correct?
1: Yeah--10-4.
2: I'm on him. David-Tom-Boy 966. David-Tom-Boy 966. Uh, we're right out in front of Chautauqua right now. I'm going to let him get out of here a little bit before I take him. Is that him?
1: I can't say for sure that that's him driving that car, but I would say that it's his car--probably him.
2: Well, I guess we'll find out here in just a second.
¶3 After this exchange, Frank stopped the car which he believed was the car Rainesalo had identified as possibly driven by Shawn Deseth.
¶4 When Frank stopped the car, Shawn Deseth was identified as the driver. There were two passengers in the car. Frank spotted several beer bottles in the car, and arrested Deseth for minor in possession and driving under suspension. The passengers, also both under 21, were cited and released, and Deseth and the car were transported to the police station. Frank impounded the car and asked Deseth for the key to "get the beer out of the trunk". When Deseth told Frank that the trunk key was lost, Frank had the lock broken and the trunk forcibly opened. Inside the trunk, Frank found several items which he believed were taken during a recent burglary of the Sweetheart bakery. Based upon this finding, Frank obtained a search warrant for Deseth's home and the home and vehicle of one of the passengers, Lanny Kenner.
¶5 Both Deseth and Kenner brought motions to suppress any evidence found in the search of the trunk, and the trial court granted the motions on the grounds that the initial stop of Deseth's car was not based on any reasonable and articulable suspicion held by the police officers.
¶6 The issue on appeal is whether the initial stop of the vehicle driven by Shawn Deseth was based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion.
¶7 Under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(5), the State is authorized to bring an appeal from an order granting suppression. "We affirm a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress unless, after resolving conflicting evidence in favor of affirmance, we conclude there is insufficient competent evidence to support the decision, or unless we conclude the decision goes against the manifest weight of the evidence." State v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390, 392 (N.D.1995). "Th[is] standard of review recognizes the importance of the trial court's opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility, and we 'accord great deference to its decision in suppression matters'." State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315, 317 (N.D.1995) (quoting State v. Brown, 509 N.W.2d 69, 71 (N.D.1993)). "While we defer to the trial court's findings of fact, questions of law are fully reviewable." Hawley at 392. "[T]he 'ultimate conclusion' of whether the facts support a reasonable and articulable suspicion is fully reviewable on appeal." Hawley Id. (quoting Salter v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 505 N.W.2d 111, 112 (N.D.1993)).
¶8 The law governing the investigative stops of vehicles is clear. An officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has violated or is violating the law in order to legally stop a vehicle. State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638 (N.D.1994). "Although we have recognized that the concept of reasonable suspicion is not readily reduced to a neat set of legal rules, it does require more than a 'mere hunch'." Salter v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 505 N.W.2d 111, 114 (N.D.1993). "The standard is an objective one, and we take into account inferences and deductions that an investigating officer would make that may elude a layperson." State v. Smith, 452 N.W.2d 86, 88 (N.D.1990). "The question is whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity." Id.
¶9 In the present case, the illegal activity suspected by the officer was that Deseth was driving while his license was under suspension. The trial court based its decision that the officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop on the basis that driving under suspension is committed by a person, not a vehicle, and the officers had not identified the person driving the car. We remand to the trial court and base our decision on the following analysis.
¶10 We have upheld motions to suppress evidence because of an invalid stop. These cases have mainly involved vehicle stops based on mere "hunch". See State v. Brown, 509 N.W.2d 69 (N.D.1993) [ ]; Salter v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 505 N.W.2d 111 (N.D.1993) ; State v. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284 (N.D.1992) ; State v. Goehring, 374 N.W.2d 882 (N.D.1985) [ ].
¶11 "Where one officer relays a directive or request for action to another officer without relaying the underlying facts and circumstances, the directing officer's knowledge is imputed to the acting officer." State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 643 (N.D.1994); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); see also State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d 726, 729 n. 2 (N.D.1990). Miller Id. The question then becomes whether the directing officer had probable cause. Id.; United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). [Emphasis ours] The same analysis applies in the reasonable-suspicion context. Miller Id.; see Hensley, supra.
¶12 Investigatory stops of vehicles have also been upheld where the stopping officer has received tips from other police officers or informants, which were then corroborated by the stopping officer's observations. See State v. Glaesman, 545 N.W.2d 178 (N.D.1996) [ ]; City of Wahpeton v. Roles, 524 N.W.2d 598 (N.D.1994) [ ]; State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638 (N.D.1994) [ ]; State v. Nelson, 488 N.W.2d 600 (N.D.1992) [ ]; North Dakota Dept. of Transp. v. DuPaul, 487 N.W.2d 593 (N.D.1992) [ ]; State v. Guthmiller, 499 N.W.2d 590 (N.D.1993) [ ]; State v. Bryl, 477 N.W.2d 814 (N.D.1991) [ ]; State v. Hornaday, 477 N.W.2d 245 (N.D.1991) [ ]; State v. Thordarson, 440 N.W.2d 510 (N.D.1989) [ ]; Wibben v. N.D. State Highway Com'r, 413 N.W.2d 329 (N.D.1987) [ ].
¶13 Other cases have involved the stopping officers' own observations of illegal activity. See State v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390 (N.D.1995) [ ]; State v. Graven, 530 N.W.2d 328 (N.D.1995) [ ]; Wolf v. N.D. Dept. of Transp., 523 N.W.2d 545 (N.D.1994) [ ]; State v. Smith, 452 N.W.2d 86 (N.D.1990) [ ]; State v. Placek, 386 N.W.2d 36 (N.D.1986) [ ].
¶14 In the present case, we have neither information from another officer nor the arresting officer's own observations or information which provide...
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