State v. Ketchie
Decision Date | 31 January 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 79,79 |
Citation | 286 N.C. 387,211 S.E.2d 207 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. James Michael KETCHIE. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
James H. Carson, Jr., Atty. Gen., Ralf F. Haskell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State of North Carolina.
White & Crumpler by Fred G. Crumpler, Jr., and Michael J. Lewis, Winston-Salem, for defendant appellant.
The sole question brought forward on defendant's appeal to this Court is whether the prosecution is privileged to refuse disclosure of the informer's identity. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative and defendant urges reversal of that decision.
The general rule, subject to certain exceptions and limitations, recognizes the prosecution's privilege to withhold the identity of an informer. State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. 191, 195 S.E.2d 481 (1973); State v. Fletcher and State v. St. Arnold, 279 N.C. 85, 181 S.E.2d 405 (1971); State v. Swaney, 277 N.C. 602, 178 S.E.2d 399, appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 1006, 91 S.Ct. 2199, 29 L.Ed.2d 428 (1971); Annotation, Accused's Right To, And Prosecution's Privilege Against, Disclosure Of Identity Of Informer, 76 A.L.R.2d 262 (1961). The privilege is founded upon public interest in effective law enforcement and its application turns on the facts of each particular case. State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E.2d 476 (1957). These principles were articulated by Justice Burton in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), as follows:
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Roviaro makes two things clear: (1) There is a distinct need for an informer's privilege but the general rule of nondisclosure is not absolute, and (2) disclosure is required where the informer directly participates in the alleged crime so as to make him a material witness on the issue of guilt or innocence.
The issue here concerns probable cause for an arrest and search without a warrant, not guilt or innocence; hence, Roviaro is not controlling on the facts in this case. Instead, we are guided by McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), which dealt with disclosure of an informer's identity on a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless arrest and search. In that case the Court held that defendant had no constitutional right to disclosure of the informer's identity even though the information furnished by him was essential to a finding that the officers had probable cause to make the arrest and search.
In McCray the informant told police officers that defendant would be on a street corner at a particular time and that he would be in possession of narcotics. McCray appeared on the corner at the designated time and the informant pointed him out to the officers who arrested McCray without a warrant and discovered the narcotics on his person. Relying upon Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), the United States Supreme Court held there was probable cause on those facts to sustain the arrest and incidental search. In reviewing defendant's argument that he was entitled to know the identity of the informant, the Court sustained an established principle in Illinois law that '(w)hen the issue is not guilt or innocence, but . . . the question of probable cause for an arrest or search . . . police officers need not invariably be required to disclose an informant's identity if the trial judge is convinced, by evidence submitted in open court and subject to cross-examination, that the officers did rely in good faith upon credible information supplied by a reliable informant.'
In Draper v. United States, supra, a case dealing with probable cause for arrest, a particular informant named Hereford told police that Draper had gone to Chicago by train on September 6 and would bring back three ounces of heroin, returning to Denver by train either on the morning of September 8 or the morning of September 9. Hereford gave the police a detailed description of Draper and of the clothing he was wearing and said Draper would be carrying a tan zipper bag and that he habitually 'walked real fast.' Draper was arrested without a warrant on September 9 after leaving an incoming Chicago train. He had the exact physical attributes and was wearing the precise clothing described by the informant. A search incident to the arrest uncovered two envelopes of heroin. The informant had previously given reliable information to the police. On these facts the Court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant possessed heroin, once the officer had verified by personal observation every facet of the information. Speaking of the officer, the Court said:
'And when, in pursuing that information, he saw a man, having the exact physical attributes and wearing the precise clothing and carrying the tan zipper bag that Hereford had described, alight from one of the very trains from the very place stated by Hereford and start to walk...
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