State v. Fletcher

• Decision Date: 10 June 1971
• Docket Number: No. 70,70
• Citation: 181 S.E.2d 405,279 N.C. 85
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. William Dallas FLETCHER. STATE of North Carolina v. Wesley ST. ARNOLD.

Page 405

181 S.E.2d 405

279 N.C. 85

STATE of North Carolina v. William Dallas FLETCHER.

STATE of North Carolina v. Wesley ST. ARNOLD.

No. 70.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 10, 1971.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan and Staff Atty. Edward L. Eatman, Jr., Raleigh, for the State.

Jerry B. Grimes, Lexington, for defendant Fletcher.

William H. Steed, Thomasville, for defendant St. Arnold.

BRANCH, Justice:

APPEAL OF WESLEY ST. ARNOLD

Defendant St. Arnold contends that the trial court erred in admitting, over his objection, the custodial statement made by him to Myers while in a police officer's presence.

Major Kirkman of the Thomasville Police force, accompanied Myers to St. Arnold's cell about 7:00 p.m. on 28 February 1970. At that time the record shows that the following conversation occurred between Myers and St. Arnold:

'Q. Describe in your own words the conversation that took place between you and St. Arnold.

MR. GRIMES AND MR. STEED: Objection.

Objection overruled as to St. Arnold.

Objection sustained as to defendants Fletcher and Swamey (sic).

Defendants except. Defendants' exception No. 5.

'A. I asked St. Arnold what did they have against me to rob me; he answered, 'We have nothing against you. We were broke and needed some money.'

MR. BEEKER: Motion to strike the answer as to the defendant Swamey (sic).

MR. STEED: Motion to strike.

COURT: I sustained the answer at the outset as to Swamey (sic) and Fletcher.'

Defendants Except. Defendants' Exception No. 6.'

The statement made by defendant St. Arnold Amounted to a confession since it, in effect, admitted that he took part in the armed robbery. State v. Williford, 275 N.C. 575, 169 S.E.2d 851; State v. Hamer, 240 N.C. 85, 81 S.E.2d 193. Thus, the constitutional and evidentiary rules of law relative to confessions are applicable.

Voluntariness remains the test of admissibility of a confession. State v. McRae, 276 N.C. 308, 172 S.E.2d 37; State v. McCloud, 276 N.C. 518, 173 S.E.2d 753. The fact that a defendant is in jail and under arrest when he makes a confession does not, standing alone, render it involuntary. State v. Crawford, 260 N.C. 548, 133 S.E.2d 232.

In State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581, it is stated:

'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, lays down the governing principle that as a constitutional prerequisite to the admissibility of statements obtained from an accused during custodial police interrogation, the suspect must be advised in unequivocal terms (1) that he has a right to remain silent; (2) that anything he says can and will be used against him in court; (3) that he has a right to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer with him during interrogation; and (4) that if he is an indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. After having been so advised, a defendant may waive these constitutional rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.'

The so-called 'Miranda warnings' are only required where defendant is being subjected to custodial interrogation. State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 158 S.E.2d 638; State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245. Unquestionably, St. Arnold was in custody in a police dominated atmosphere. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. However, whether the question addressed to St. Arnold by Myers constituted interrogation within the meaning of Miranda poses a more serious question.

In 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 555, p. 610, it is stated:

'The court in the Miranda Case noted * * * that the fundamental import of the privilege against self-incrimination while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be Interrogated.' (Emphasis added.)

In People v. Morse, 70 Cal.App.2d 711, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607, the defendant, a prisoner, was accused of murdering one of the prison inmates. The prison guard found the victim outside defendant's cell, and the guard was permitted to testify that while he was trying to revive the victim he asked defendant, 'Joe, did you do this?' The defendant nodded his head in the affirmative, and said 'Yeah.' The Court, holding that the guard's questions were 'devoid of inquisitorial techniques' and that no process of interrogation had been undertaken, stated:

'* * * (A)ny determination as to whether or not a process of interrogations was undertaken must rest upon an objective test according to which we 'analyze the total situation which envelops the questioning by considering such factors as the length of the interrogation, the place and time of the interrogation, the nature of the questions, the conduct of the police and all other relevant circumstances.' (People v. Stewart, (1965), 62 Cal.2d 571, 579, 43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 206, 400 P.2d 97, 102, affd. sub. nom. California v. Stewart (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.)'

In Howell v. State, 5 Md.App. 337, 247 A.2d 291, the defendant had been questioned initially and had terminated the questioning by stating he did not wish to be questioned further. An hour later, while the appellant was being 'processed' at the police station, he was told that his accomplice had made incriminating statements about him. He thereupon made a statement which he later attacked in court. It was held that the statement did not result from 'interrogation' but was more in the nature of volunteered information.

In State v. Perry, 276 N.C. 339, 172 S.E.2d 541, the defendant was confined to jail awaiting trial for murder. Upon his trial the court allowed his cellmate to testify that the defendant told him that he (the defendant) shot the deceased. Holding that the court need not conduct a voir dire hearing to determine the voluntariness of the admission, this Court, speaking through Higgins, J., stated:

'The defendant misinterprets the necessity for the voir dire examination to determine the voluntariness of his admissions to his jailmate Pierce. As a general rule, voluntary admissions of guilt are admissible in evidence in a trial. To render them inadmissible, incriminating statements must be made nder some sort of pressure. Here we quote from the Supreme Court of the United States in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374: 'Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it. * * * 'The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak. (A)ll have agreed that a necessary element of compulsory self-incrimination is some kind of compulsion.' * * *'

Accord: State v. Spence, 271 N.C. 23, 155 S.E.2d 802.

We do not think that the statement made to Myers by St. Arnold was a result of custodial interrogation as condemned by the line of authority represented by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977; Miranda v. Arizona, supra; and Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 16 L.Ed.2d 895, 86 S.Ct. 1761. Even had there been error in the admission of this statement, it would not have been prejudicial since there is no reasonable possibility that it would have contributed to St. Arnold's conviction. We believe that the admission of the statement, if erroneous, would have been harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.

THE APPEAL OF WILLIAM DALLAS FLETCHER

Defendant Fletcher assigns as error the admission of the above-quoted extra-judicial statement made by his codefendant St. Arnold to Myers.

The rules of law pertinent to decision of this question were enunciated and applied as they relate to the defendant in State v. Swaney, supra. In that case, this Court, relying particularly on State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E.2d 492, and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, held the admission of St. Arnold's statement to be erroneous; however, the error was declared 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' See also State v. Brinson, 277 N.C. 286, 177 S.E.2d 398, and Chapman v. California, supra. The principles upon which Swaney was decided are even more clearly applicable to Fletcher. Swaney was found sitting in an automobile near the scene of the crime, with the motor running. Fletcher was identified by the victim as one of the men who robbed him. Several police officers saw him emerge from the building where the alleged robbery occurred. He immediately fired at the officers and attempted to flee, but was wounded and arrested at the very scene of the robbery. This overwhelming evidence of his participation in the robbery demands an application of the rule declaring the admission of St. Arnold's statement to be 'harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.'

This assignment of error is overruled.

Defendant Fletcher contends that the trial judge erred by denying his motion to disclose the identity of an alleged informer.

Fletcher's motion was made in apt time. We must therefore consider whether the circumstances of this case require disclosure of the informer's identity. State v. Swaney, supra, differs factually from instant case, in that Swaney contended that he knew nothing about the robbery. However, both Swaney and Fletcher rely on the defense of entrapment to support this assignment of error.

We find in 76 A.L.R.2d, at p. 282, the following:

'The privilege of nondisclosure must give way and disclosure of the identity of an informer is required where disclosure is essential or relevant (material) and helpful to the defense of an accused, or lessens the risk of false testimony, or is...