State v. Kibbee
| Decision Date | 02 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-3098,86-3098 |
| Citation | 513 So.2d 256,12 Fla. L. Weekly 2360 |
| Parties | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2360 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Kevin KIBBEE, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Paul C. Helm, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellee.
The state appeals a trial court order granting a motion to suppress evidence seized in connection with the arrest of the appellee, Kevin Kibbee. We reverse.
Kibbee was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance in violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1985), and possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of section 893.147, Florida Statutes (1985). Kibbee alleged in his motion to suppress that he had been illegally detained and that, therefore, the evidence discovered as a result of his detention was unlawfully seized.
Officer Robert Colburn of the Winter Haven Police Department was the only witness who testified at the suppression hearing. According to Colburn's testimony, he was on patrol at approximately 1:40 a.m. on August 18, 1986, when he noticed two people sitting inside an automobile parked on a used car lot which was closed for business. Both the occupants of the automobile were slouched down so that just their heads were visible. Officer Colburn knew that there had been automobile thefts and automobile burglaries in the area during the preceding year. The officer continued driving in the same direction until he reached a point about a block away where he could turn around.
Upon returning to the car lot, Officer Colburn noticed that the two occupants of the parked automobile were still in a slouched position. He approached the car and asked the occupants for identification. Officer Colburn testified that he intended to detain the occupants at that point until he ascertained who owned the vehicle and their reason for being on the property. Kibbee, who was in the driver's seat, exited the car and gave Officer Colburn his driver's license. The person occupying the passenger's seat, Duane Drawdy, passed his identification across the seat to the officer.
Officer Colburn's subsequent computer check on the vehicle and on the occupants revealed that the vehicle was registered to Kibbee and that Drawdy was wanted on a fugitive warrant. Upon obtaining this information, Officer Colburn proceeded to the passenger side of the vehicle and asked Drawdy to exit the vehicle. When Drawdy exited the vehicle, Officer Colburn observed in plain view a cocaine rock and various drug paraphernalia. The officer arrested Drawdy and Kibbee and seized the drugs and paraphernalia. The trial court granted Kibbee's motion to suppress the evidence, and the state filed a timely notice of appeal.
We recognize that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to this court with a presumption of correctness and that the evidence and the inferences capable of being drawn therefrom must be viewed in a light most favorable to the appellee. Codie v. State, 406 So.2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). In this case, however, we find that the state overcame this presumption and that the trial court erred in granting Kibbee's motion to suppress the evidence.
The Florida Stop and Frisk Law, Section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1985), provides in part:
(2) Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state or the criminal ordinances of any municipality or county, he may temporarily detain such person for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person temporarily detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which led the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.
(3) No person shall be temporarily detained under the provisions of subsection (2) longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that subsection. Such temporary detention shall not extend beyond the place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof.
To justify a temporary detention under section 901.151,...
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