State v. King, C9-93-479
| Citation | 513 N.W.2d 245 |
| Decision Date | 11 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. C9-93-479,C9-93-479 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Scott Nolan KING, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Syllabus by the Court
Trial court did not commit prejudicial error in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) or in admitting relevant other-crime evidence.
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan K. Maki, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Atty., Linda M. Freyer, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.
Defendant, Scott Nolan King, was found guilty by a district court jury of first-degree murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(2) (1992), for killing and raping an acquaintance, Gwendolyn Lewis, in her apartment in north Minneapolis on or about February 6, 1992. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison. Seeking a new trial, defendant argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence on constitutional grounds and erred in admitting other-crime evidence. We affirm.
At 8:00 p.m. on the evening of February 8, 1992, the victim's son discovered her partially-clad body slumped over the bathtub, with her head and shoulders in the bloody water. She had been stabbed over 20 times and had lost over 10 pints of blood. The medical examiner concluded that the victim had been sexually assaulted around the time of her death, quite possibly shortly afterwards, and opined that death occurred between 18 and 48 hours before the body was discovered.
The state's theory was that she was killed late on the evening of February 6, shortly after a neighbor saw her. The state also theorized that she had used crack cocaine shortly before she was killed because the autopsy showed the presence of unmetabolized cocaine in her system. Based on interviews with neighbors and friends of the victim, police began to suspect defendant, who supplied crack to residents of the building and who had been seen in the building late on February 6.
On April 1 police obtained a warrant authorizing the removal of a sample of blood from defendant for DNA analysis and comparison with DNA in the semen found in and on the victim's body. Sergeant Don Wagenknecht, an experienced homicide investigator, based the warrant application on two key items of information. First, Donald Allen, once himself a suspect in the killing, told Wagenknecht that in December of 1991 defendant had threatened the victim. Second, Richard Davis, the father of the victim's son, told Wagenknecht that he had heard defendant, while high on crack, admit to another man, James Nunn, that he killed the victim. Davis added that defendant had later tried to reassure the victim's son that he had not meant what he had said. Wagenknecht did not know Davis but was assured by Russell Krueger, an investigator with the public defender's office who formerly worked as a homicide investigator in the Minneapolis Police Department, that Davis had provided him with reliable information in the past.
Police executed the warrant on the morning of April 2 by going to defendant's place of employment, presenting the warrant and asking him to accompany them to the Hennepin County Medical Center for the removal of a blood sample. Defendant was not given a Miranda warning, nor was he handcuffed or told he was under arrest. On the way to the hospital Wagenknecht told defendant that he felt defendant was involved in the killing of the victim and that the purpose of obtaining a blood sample was to compare defendant's DNA with the DNA in the semen left by the killer. Defendant replied that he knew all about DNA profiling and said that since he had never had sex with the victim he was more than glad to give a sample of his blood for analysis.
Analysis of the DNA in defendant's blood showed that it matched the DNA in the semen found in and on the victim's body. After obtaining the results of the analysis, police on April 22 returned to defendant's place of employment and arrested him, telling him that they had received the blood test results. One of the arresting officers testified defendant replied, Later, during five hours of interrogation, defendant finally said, "I done killed this woman." In his formal statement, he admitted that it was "possible" that he killed Gwendolyn Lewis "because there was no one there but her and me." At no time, however, did defendant say that he knew for sure that he had killed the victim. And he claimed that the sexual intercourse was in exchange for the crack he provided.
Defendant argued at the pretrial suppression hearing that the search warrant application contained an intentional or reckless misrepresentation of fact material to the determination of probable cause, that the warrant was therefore invalid, and that because his arrest resulted from the blood testing, performed pursuant to the warrant, the incriminating statements he made following his arrest should be suppressed as fruits of an unlawful search. He also argued that the statement he made when the search warrant was executed should be suppressed because it was made in response to custodial interrogation without his having been given a Miranda warning. The trial court denied the motion to suppress in its entirety.
Key evidence against defendant at trial included: (a) testimony that defendant supplied crack cocaine to the residents of the apartment building, including the victim, (b) testimony of several witnesses that placed defendant in the apartment across the hall from the victim's apartment earlier on the evening that the killing was believed to have occurred, (c) testimony by two people, Shawn Dillon and Randy Coleman, that several days after the murder they heard defendant admit he killed the victim, (d) defendant's various statements to the police, (e) expert testimony that the DNA in defendant's blood "matched" the DNA in the semen found in and on the victim's body, and (f) Spreigl or other-crime evidence that in December of 1987 defendant had brutally assaulted another female acquaintance, while threatening to kill her, and had dragged her partially clad body down a flight of stairs, leaving a trail of blood as he did so.
1. Defendant's first contention is that the search warrant application contained a reckless misrepresentation of fact material to the determination of probable cause, that the warrant was therefore invalid, and that because his arrest resulted from the blood testing, the incriminating statements he made following his arrest should be suppressed as fruits of an illegal search.
Defendant bases his argument on the fact that after the warrant was executed (a) Allen retracted his earlier statement that in December of 1991 defendant had threatened the victim and (b) Davis admitted that he had not personally heard defendant admit killing the victim, that instead, two others, Dillon and Coleman, had heard the admissions.
In State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101 (Minn.1989), we said:
A search warrant is void, and the fruits of the search must be excluded, if the application includes intentional or reckless misrepresentations of fact material to the findings of probable cause. A misrepresentation is "material" if when set aside there is no longer probable cause to issue the search warrant. If so, then the court must determine that the police deliberately or recklessly misrepresented facts, because innocent or negligent misrepresentations will not invalidate a warrant.
Id., at 105 (citations omitted); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).
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