State v. Kiraly

Decision Date14 April 2023
Docket Number125,190
PartiesState of Kansas, Appellant, v. Sheridan Kiraly, Appellee.
CourtKansas Court of Appeals

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Appeal from Reno District Court; Trish Rose.

Sierra M. Logan, assistant district attorney, Thomas Stanton district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.

Shannon S. Crane, of Hutchinson, for appellee.

Before Schroeder, P.J., Warner and Cline, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Per Curiam

The State brings this interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court's suppression of evidence found in Sheridan Kiraly's pants pocket. The district court found that the State did not have probable cause to arrest Kiraly and thus the search incident to that arrest was also invalid. After carefully reviewing the record and the parties' arguments, we agree with the district court that suppression was proper under these circumstances. We therefore affirm its ruling.

Factual and Procedural Background

Late at night on July 19, 2021, a man who lived across the street from an apartment building in Hutchinson called 911. He reported that he heard yelling and cursing-from both a man and a woman-and other noises coming from inside the building. The neighbor was outside on his porch when he heard the noises and decided to report the incident because he thought he heard somebody's body being thrown against a wall. The neighbor recalled the noises lasting for about 10 minutes.

A short time later, Officers Michael Ruebke and Taylor Grace arrived to investigate the disturbance. When they arrived at the two-story apartment building, they heard yelling coming from a top-floor unit. The officers entered the building and stood outside the door to the unit for several minutes, listening to a verbal argument between a man and a woman. The officers did not hear any threats of violence or any sounds indicating that any physical harm was being inflicted. The man was yelling, the woman was sobbing, and both were speaking in loud, upset voices. When they heard the man call the woman a "stupid bitch," Officer Grace knocked on the door.

The man, later identified as Kiraly, opened the door and came out of the apartment unit. Shortly thereafter, the woman, later identified as R.K., also came outside. Officer Grace talked with R.K., and Officer Ruebke talked with Kiraly. R.K. told Officer Grace that she and Kiraly were in a relationship. She explained that they had been arguing, but the argument never became violent. Kiraly had a cut on his hand, but neither he nor R.K. indicated that he suffered the cut during the argument. He admitted, however, that he had called R.K. a "stupid bitch."

The officers arrested Kiraly for disorderly conduct involving domestic violence. Both officers believed that Kansas law and Hutchinson Police Department policy required them to arrest Kiraly for calling R.K that name.

Once Kiraly was arrested, the officers searched him before leaving the apartment building. Officer Ruebke found two small, clear baggies in Kiraly's pants pocket, one filled with a white substance and the other with a leafy vegetation-methamphetamine and marijuana. Based on this evidence, the State charged Kiraly with possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, and disorderly conduct under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-6203(a)(3).

Kiraly moved to suppress the drugs. He argued that the search leading to the discovery of those drugs was illegal because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-6203(a)(3). More specifically, he asserted that using the phrase "stupid bitch" during an argument does not support an arrest for disorderly conduct based on "fighting words"-the sole basis for his arrest.

In response, the State pointed out that the crime of disorderly conduct includes "using fighting words" or by "engaging in noisy conduct tending to reasonably arouse alarm, anger or resentment in others." K.S.A 2021 Supp. 21-6203(a)(3). The State argued that the officers had probable cause to arrest Kiraly for committing both types of misconduct, asserting that Kiraly used fighting words when he called R.K. a "stupid bitch," and Kiraly engaged in noisy conduct by angering R.K. throughout the argument.

The district court held a hearing on Kiraly's suppression motion, where both arresting officers testified:

• Officer Ruebke stated that the arrest for disorderly conduct resulted from Kiraly calling R.K. a "stupid bitch." This explanation was consistent with his previous testimony during the preliminary hearing, where he explained the basis for the arrest was Kiraly's use of fighting words.
• Officer Grace testified that he believed the arrest was for disorderly conduct arising from fighting words or noisy conduct. He stated that while the arrest report did not mention noisy conduct, it did state that the argument could be heard from outside the residence. On cross-examination, Officer Grace admitted that if he had arrested Kiraly for noisy conduct, he also would have arrested R.K. because both were engaged in the loud argument. Officer Grace stated that he did not hear any sounds of actual or threatened physical violence.

After hearing this evidence, the district court suppressed the drugs. The court found that the State had no probable cause to arrest Kiraly, and therefore no basis to search him without obtaining a warrant. In particular, the court found that, while offensive and profane, using the phrase "stupid bitch" in this case-during a verbal argument with no physical violence-did not constitute using fighting words within the meaning of the disorderly conduct offense.

The order did not directly address the State's argument that the officers also had probable cause to arrest Kiraly for disorderly conduct based on noisy conduct tending to reasonably arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others. But the court ultimately ruled that the "totality of the circumstances" did not support probable cause for an arrest under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-6203(a)(3). The State then filed this interlocutory appeal of the district court's suppression ruling.

Discussion

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides this same protection. State v. Ellis, 57 Kan. App. 2D 477, 481, 453 P.3d 882 (2019) (citing State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490, 498, 242 P.3d 1186 [2010]), aff'd 311 Kan. 925, 469 P.3d 65 (2020).

Generally speaking, the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant before searching people or property. State v. Hillard, 315 Kan. 732, 747, 511 P.3d 883 (2022). There are some limited exceptions to this requirement, however. Relevant here, officers may conduct a warrantless search of a person and the immediate area surrounding a person incident to an arrest. State v. Abbott, 277 Kan. 161, 163, 83 P.3d 794 (2004). The State bears the burden to show that the arrest and the search incident to that arrest were lawful. See State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, 772, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007).

An officer must have probable cause to lawfully arrest a person. This means that the officer must have a reasonable belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime. K.S.A. 22-2401(c); Sloop v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 296 Kan. 13, 20, 290 P.3d 555 (2012). Courts determine whether an arrest was supported by probable cause by evaluating the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer. 296 Kan. at 20. This includes the information known to the officer at the time of the arrest, as well as fair inferences drawn from that information. 296 Kan. at 20. In other words, the assessment of probable cause surrounding an arrest involves "a practical, common-sense decision whether a crime has been or is being committed." State v. Hicks, 282 Kan. 599, 613-14, 147 P.3d 1076 (2006).

When a district court rules on a suppression motion after an evidentiary hearing, its ruling involves both factual and legal components. After hearing the witnesses' testimony and considering all the evidence presented, the court makes factual findings, often summarized in a written journal entry or order. The court then rules as a legal matter whether suppression is appropriate under those facts.

Because a district court's suppression ruling comprises both factual findings and legal analysis, appellate review of such a ruling involves mixed levels of deference. Because appellate judges were not present at the evidentiary hearing to hear the witnesses' testimony or observe their demeanor, we cannot reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence presented. Instead, we uphold the district court's factual findings if they are based on substantial competent evidence. See State v. Cleverly, 305 Kan. 598, 604, 385 P.3d 512 (2016). But we give no deference to a district court's ultimate legal conclusion-here, whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Kiraly under the totality of the circumstances. See 305 Kan. at 604. When the parties do not challenge the district court's factual findings, whether evidence should be suppressed is a question of law over which this court exercises unlimited review. 305 Kan. at 604; State v. Bickerstaff, 26 Kan.App.2d 423, 424, 988 P.2d 285, rev. denied 268 Kan. 889 (1999).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the crime that formed the basis of Kiraly's arrest-disorderly conduct. Kansas law provides multiple ways this...

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