State v. Klindt

• Decision Date: 18 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-243,85-243
• Citation: 389 N.W.2d 670
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James B. KLINDT, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 670

389 N.W.2d 670

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James B. KLINDT, Appellant.

No. 85-243.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 18, 1986.

Ann Fitzgibbons of Scalise, Scism, Sandre & Uhl, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Brent R. Appel, Deputy Atty. Gen., Thomas D. McGrane, Asst. Atty. Gen., and William E. Davis, Co. Atty., for appellee.

Considered en banc.

LARSON, Justice.

James B. Klindt was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his wife, Joyce. He contends (1) the court erred in allowing the State to use scientific and statistical evidence to show that a detached torso was Joyce's; (2) that a tape-recorded conversation between Klindt and his wife was improperly admitted; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We affirm.

Joyce Klindt disappeared from her Davenport, Iowa, home on March 18, 1983. On April 16, 1983, fishermen found a female torso lodged against a bank of the Mississippi River. The torso had been severed just above the navel and just below the hips. A pathologist testified that a mechanical saw, probably a chain saw, had been used to cut up the body.

I. The Expert Testimony.

Because the torso was not identifiable by conventional means, the State was put in the unusual position of having to devote a large part of its case to proving that the alleged victim was, in fact, dead. To do that, the State relied heavily on scientific evidence.

A. The Serologist's Testimony. Forensic serology is an identification process involving analysis of the genetic makeup of blood and tissues. In this process, the sample to be identified is analyzed for the presence of several specific enzymes, called phenotypes or "genetic markers."

Benita Harwood, a serologist, was one of the State's witnesses. She had analyzed bone and tissue samples from the torso to identify specific genetic markers present in it. Based upon information received from a recognized data bank, she testified that the likelihood of finding these specific markers in the population as a whole was approximately 27 out of 10,000 persons. She also analyzed blood samples from Joyce's parents, Eugene and Virginia Monahan, for the presence of these markers. She concluded the Monahans were 107.8 times more likely than a random couple to have produced an offspring with the genetic markers found in the torso.

Harwood also testified she had compared the genetic markers of the torso with those of the defendant and Bartley, the son of James and Joyce Klindt. She concluded the torso could, in fact, be that of Bartley's mother.

Klindt attacks Harwood's serology evidence on several grounds. Using other data in the computation, for example, he demonstrated through cross-examination that the Monahans might only be seventy times more likely than a random couple to have produced a child with the genetic markers matching those of the torso. The fact that different data could produce a probability factor of 70:1 rather than 107.8:1, we believe, does not mandate its total rejection as evidence. It could, of course, affect the weight of the evidence.

Klindt also claims that river bacteria could have affected the test results by altering the genetic markers of the torso. The State's experts, however, testified this would not be a significant problem, and it was not shown to have affected the reliability of the tests here.

The main thrust of Klindt's argument is that serology testing was not shown to be reasonably reliable or generally accepted in the scientific community. He cites the well-known case of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), which adopted a requirement of "general acceptance" of a scientific principle as a condition precedent to receiving evidence on it.

In State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 83-85 (Iowa 1980), we noted widespread criticism of the Frye standard, and we rejected it as a prerequisite to admission of scientific evidence "if the reliability of the evidence is otherwise established." If reliability is shown, we need not await approval by the scientific community. Hall, 297 N.W.2d at 85-86. See generally M. McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L.Rev. 879 (1982).

After Hall was decided, we adopted Iowa Rule of Evidence 702, which provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

The question, therefore, is whether the evidence would assist the trier of fact in resolving an issue. That determination necessarily involves a requirement of finding reliability, because unreliable evidence cannot assist a trier of fact. Considerable trial court discretion is allowed in making a determination of admissibility of expert testimony. See Hall, 297 N.W.2d at 86.

Serology is not new; testimony in this case showed that it has been regularly relied upon by pathologists. We have also approved the use of it in establishing paternity, following the lead of several other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State ex rel. Buechler v. Vinsand, 318 N.W.2d 208, 211-12 (Iowa 1982). See generally M. McCormick, supra, at 907-08; Joint AMA--ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 Fam.L.Q. 247 (1976).

In paternity cases, a serologist would presumably work with blood samples from all subjects to be tested: the known parent, the child, and the suspected father. In the present case, a blood sample was not available from the torso. In such a case, genetic identification is more complicated, according to the testimony. Blood typing and genetic identification can still be done, however, by analysis of bone and tissue samples. That was done here, and there is no claim that this affected the reliability of the test.

We believe the reliability of this procedure was established and that our general rule of admissibility in paternity cases should apply here as well. The trial court did not err in admitting this evidence.

B. The Anthropologist. Anthropologist Clyde Snow gave his opinion of the approximate size and age of the body from which the torso had been severed. He estimated the woman's height to be four foot seven inches to five foot ten inches, her weight to be 125 to 145 pounds, and her age at twenty-seven to forty-nine. (According to other evidence, Joyce Klindt fell within these ranges.)

Klindt does not question Snow's qualifications as an expert in the field but appears to contend that anthropologic evidence itself, like that of serology, was not shown to be sufficiently reliable. We disagree. Forensic anthropology is a recognized scientific discipline, according to the testimony. It is used in identifying burned and dismembered crash victims and to determine the time, cause, and manner of death of decomposed victims of homicides.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.

C. The Statistician. A statistician testified that the torso found in the river was more likely to be that of Joyce Klindt than any other person who had been reported missing in the area. Investigating officers developed a list of all the white females which had been reported missing in a four-state area around Davenport as of April 16, 1983, the date the torso was discovered. This list, originally showing the names of seventeen women, was narrowed by eliminating those who had obvious identifying characteristics such as scars. Four missing women remained on the list, including Joyce Klindt.

Dr. Russell Lenth testified that, as a statistical analyst, he takes data or facts which are known and attempts to determine what is likely to be true by applying the mathematical laws of probability. He testified that he was furnished with data on the torso, including race, sex, age range, and blood type. He also considered the fact that the torso had borne a child, had had an episiotomy (a surgical procedure in connection with childbirth), and that it had not been surgically sterilized. Evidence showed Joyce Klindt fell within all of these categories. From other sources, Lenth obtained information concerning some of these conditions with respect to the other three missing women and determined the frequency of certain of these conditions among the general female population. He also took into consideration the results of the "genetic markers" study by Benita Harwood, already discussed.

Based upon the likelihood of the concurrence of these factors among the missing women, Lenth testified that the probabilities were over ninety-nine percent that the torso was Joyce Klindt's rather than any of the other three.

The basis of Klindt's objection to the statistical probability testimony was basically that the underlying data was not sufficiently established. We disagree. First, the statistical analysis of genetic markers, as previously discussed in this opinion, was adequately established. Data on the frequency of certain conditions among the general population, moreover, came from the United States Department of Health and Human Services. All of this background evidence was of a type which could reasonably be relied upon by experts in the field.

Iowa Rule of Evidence 703 provides:

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the trial or hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.

In attacking the statistical probability evidence, Klindt cites several cases, including People v. Collins, 68 Cal.2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal.Rptr. 497 (1968). In Collins, a statistician testified that there was only a one in twelve million chance...