State v. Klingenberger
| Decision Date | 27 October 1925 |
| Docket Number | 18983 |
| Parties | The State Of Ohio v. Klingenberger. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Criminal law - Minor waives objection to jurisdiction by not filing plea in abatement - Felony charge transferred from juvenile to common pleas court - Section 1651, General Code - Grand jury may indict upon different charge.
1. A minor charged with felony waives his right to object to the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas on the ground of his minority, by not filing a plea in abatement to an indictment in the court of common pleas.
2. When a felony charge against a minor is transferred from the juvenile court to the court of common pleas under the provisions of Section 1681, General Code, the grand jury is empowered to return any indictment proper under the facts submitted to it.
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Infants 31 C. J. § 216 (Anno.);
Grand Jury, 28 C.J. §90; Infants, 31 C. J. §214. ________________
The defendant in error was charged in the mayor's court of the city of Bucyrus, Ohio, with stealing and driving away a Ford automobile. Defendant in error was arrested, and when taken before the mayor of the city of Bucyrus, Ohio, it was discovered that he was under the age of 18 years. The case was thereupon transferred to the juvenile court of Crawford county, Ohio, the original papers filed in the case in the mayor's court being transferred to the juvenile court.
At the time set for trial in the juvenile court, defendant in error moved that court for an order certifying and transferring his case to the court of common pleads of Crawford county, Ohio. The juvenile court granted this motion and certified and transferred the cause to the court of common pleas. At the next session of the grand jury, after the defendant in error had his cause certified to the court of common pleas, the grand jury examined various witnesses concerning the clime alleged to have been committed by defendant in error and indicted defendant in error upon a charge that he "on the 9th day Of March * * * 1924, * * * did purposely feloniously, take, drive and operate and cause to be taken driven and operated, upon a public road" highway and public place a motor vehicle, to wit, an automobile, Ford coupe, * * * without the consent of * * * the owner thereof contrary to the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio."
At the trial of the case, the state produced seven witnesses who testified, and were all cross-examined by counsel for defendant in error. After the state rested, defendant in error moved to dismiss the case upon the ground that the evidence failed to show that the defendant in error was guilty under the indictment charged. The motion was overruled. Defendant in error next produced two witnesses and certain exhibits bearing upon his minority, and then for the first time made his motion to dismiss upon the following grounds:
The court overruled this motion, and the defendant in error proceeded to present his case. At the conclusion of all the testimony, the jury brought in a verdict of guilty. Upon error proceedings too the Court of Appeals of Crawford county, that court reversed the judgment of the court of common pleas and ordered defendant in error discharged for the reason that the court of common pleas of Crawford county had no jurisdiction to prosecute this action against defendant in error.
The case comes into this court upon allowance of motion for leave to file petition in error.
Mr. Clarence U. Uhl, prosecuting attorney, for plaintiff in error.
Miss Constance R. Keller, for defendant in error.
Throughout this opinion, the defendant in error will be called the defendant.
It is contended by the state that the reversal of judgment by the Court of Appeals was erroneous, first, because the defendant had waived his right to object to the proceedings by not filing a plea in abatement; second, because the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is not exclusive over minors charged with felony. We agree with the state in both of these contentions.
In the trial court, the defendant attacked the record on the ground of an alleged defect therein existing. This defect had to be shown by a fact extrinsic to the record, namely, the defendant's minority.
Under Section 13622, General Code, the proper method to raise this objection was by a plea in abatement. Instead of filing a plea in abatement the defendant pleaded not guilty. Section 13625, General Code, provides that the accused by demurring to an indictment, or pleading in bar, or the general issue, shall be Ben to have waived all defects which may be excepted to by a motion to quash or plea in abatement. This rule has been construed and upheld in a number of authorities with regard to the motion to quash, the latest of which is State v. Schultz, 96 Ohio St. 114, 117 N. E., 30, holding that by demurring, pleading in bar, or by pleading to the general issue, the defendant in a criminal cause is held to have waived the defects which might be taken advantage of by motion to quash. The reasoning in those authorities certainly applies to pleas in abatement. However, no case has been cited from this jurisdiction in which it has been held that this rule applies to a minor charged with crime, even though represent- ed, as in this case, by an attorney, and therefore defendant claims that the rule should not apply.
It is true that the general doctrine is broadly stated to be that a waiver made by an infant will be considered void. 40 Oyc., 267; Booth v. Goodwin, 29 Ark. 633. However, the authorities that we have found in favor of this rule arise only in civil actions. On the other hand, even in civil cases there is authority to the effect that an infant must object to the jurisdiction of the courts in the same way and at the same time as adults. 31 Corpus Juris, 1160. Boyd v. Martin, 9 Heisk. (56 Tenn.), 382. No decision has been cited to the effect that an infant cannot waive his procedural rights in the conduct of a criminal case.
No authority upon this precise point exists in the state of Ohio, and the question therefore is open here. The argument of the defendant is that, as waiver arises out of the intentional relinquishment of a known right, the infant, who it is claimed, cannot understand and appreciate to the same extent as an adult the meaning of legal steps taken or omitted in his behalf, cannot waive his rights in a criminal cause. However, some minors understand and appreciate better than some adults charged with crime, the meaning of legal procedure in their own cases. It is unsafe to depend upon such a generalization in deciding this point. Moreover, the criminal statutes in certain respects deal with the minor as if he were sui juris. For example, the right to waive defects...
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