State v. Koeln

• Decision Date: 21 May 1920
• Docket Number: No. 21990.,21990.
• Citation: 282 Mo. 438,222 S.W. 389
• Parties: STATE ex rel. MEYER BROS. DRUG CO. v. KOELN, Revenue Collector.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

222 S.W. 389

282 Mo. 438

STATE ex rel. MEYER BROS. DRUG CO. v. KOELN, Revenue Collector.

No. 21990.

Supreme Court of Missouri, In Banc.

May 21, 1920.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Charles B. Davis, Judge.

Petition by the State, on the relation of the Meyer Bros. Drug Company for a writ of mandamus against Edmond Koeln, Collector of " Revenue for the City of St. Louis, Mo. From a judgment for relator, respondent appeals. Reversed.

Frank W. McAllister, Atty. Gen., Charles H. Danes, City Counselor, and H. A. Hamilton, Asst. City Counselor, both of St. Louis, and John N. Gose, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Joseph W. Folk, Nelson Thomas, Abbott Fauntleroy, Cullen & Edwards, and John C. Vaughan, all of St. Louis, for respondent.

F. M. McDavid and S. C. Bates, both of Springfield, amici curiæ.

BLAIR, J.

Section 32 of the Income Tax Law as passed in 1917 (Laws 1917, p. 538) reads as follows:

"Any person, corporation, joint-stock company, association or insurance company who shall have paid a tax assessed upon his real or personal property to the state during any year shall be permitted to exhibit the receipt or receipts thereof to the assessor to the full amount in the payment of income taxes assessed against such person, corporation, joint-stock company, association or insurance company during said year."

Prior to March 1, 1919, respondent duly made return of its income for the year 1918, and a tax thereon of $1,138.94 was assessed as income tax for that year. By the act of May 26, 1916 (Laws 1919, pp. 721, 722), effective on that date, the Legislature repealed section 32 of the Income Tax Law of 1917.

It is alleged that thereafter, during 1919, respondent paid to appellant property taxes aggregating $1,024.38 and received receipts therefor. Subsequently, and on December 17, 1919, respondent exhibited these receipts to appellant and therewith tendered $114.91 and demanded that the amount of the property tax receipts be credited on the income tax bill of $1,138.94, and the property tax receipts and money tendered be accepted in full discharge thereof, and a receipt in full for the income tax be issued and delivered to respondent. Appellant refused to comply with this demand, and the present proceeding was begun to coerce compliance. From an adverse judgment the collector appeals.

Appellant contends that respondent had no right to the demanded credit because the section which gave that right had been repealed prior to respondent's payment of its property taxes and demand of credit therefor. The gist of respondent's contention is that a right to the credit had vested prior to the repeal of section 32 of the act of 1917, and that repeal could not destroy or affect such vested right.

In the act of May 8, 1919 (Laws 1919 p. 718, et seq.), which took effect in August, 1919, the Legislature specifically applies the increased tax and reduced exemptions to incomes for the year 1919 and thereafter. No such limitation appears in the act of May 26, 1919, which repealed section 32 of the act of 1917, but an emergency clause was appended which purports to put the repeal into immediate effect for the reason that section 32 "is confusing and misleading, and in practical results destructive of the end sought by said act," which is said to create "an emergency within the meaning of the Constitution." This gives some hint of what the Legislature had in mind, but does not reach the question whether respondent had acquired a vested right to deduct its property taxes, paid in 1919, from its income tax for 1918, payable in the fall of 1919, which was beyond the reach of legislative action.

Appellant agrees with respondent that the Legislature cannot destroy a vested right. He contends that respondent had acquired no vested right to the claimed deduction prior to the repeal of section 32. In State ex rel. v. Koeln, 211 S. W. 31 et seq., it was held that the property taxes deductible under section 32 were those which became due and payable in the same year in which the income tax from which they were deductible became due and payable. Respondent's income tax for 1918 was assessed prior to March 1, 1919. The assessment was then complete, and the mode and amount of that assessment was exactly the same as if respondent had owned no property subject to assessment and taxation on June 1, 1918. At the time respondent's income tax was assessed on income for 1918 (March, 1919) respondent, so far as it alleges, had paid no property taxes which were deductible under section 32, and, of course, had neither received nor presented any receipts therefor. The time therefor had not arrived, under the decision in State ex rel. Koeln, supra. The same thing was true at the time section 32 was repealed, May 26, 1919. What; then, was the right or privilege which had accrued to respondent on May 26, 1919, which is said to be beyond the reach of legislative interference? The income tax had been assessed for 1918, but would not become due until the fall of 1919...