State v. Komoto

• Decision Date: 08 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 13969-O-I,13969-O-I
• Citation: 697 P.2d 1025,40 Wn.App. 200
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Clifford Brian KOMOTO, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 200

40 Wn.App. 200

697 P.2d 1025

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Clifford Brian KOMOTO, Appellant.

No. 13969-O-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 1.

April 8, 1985.

[697 P.2d 1027] Shirley Bennington, Kirkland, for appellant.

Norman K. Maleng, King County Pros. Atty., R. Timothy Crandell, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

COLEMAN, Judge.

Clifford B. Komoto appeals his conviction for the crime of felony hit and run under RCW 46.52.020. He assigns error to the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress certain evidence and denial of his motion to dismiss for failure to establish a prima facie case. We affirm.

On August 27, 1982, Komoto was arrested in his residence without a warrant for felony hit and run and driving while under the influence of alcohol. He was subsequently charged by information with felony hit and run. On September 6 and 7, 1983, the King County Superior Court heard Komoto's motion to suppress his post-arrest statements, his blood test taken at Valley General Hospital, the impoundment of his car, and evidence seized from his car. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that probable cause existed for the felony arrest of Komoto, exigent circumstances justified a warrantless arrest in his residence, and all evidence was properly seized. Following a jury trial, he was convicted and this appeal followed.

FACTS

On August 27, 1982, at about 1 a.m. a motor vehicle Two witnesses reported to Trooper Johnson. The first witness, Teresa Johnson, was walking next to the victim when he was struck by a car, but the only detail she remembered about the car was that it was green. The second witness, John McQueen, was driving north on Highway 99 shortly after 1 a.m. when he observed the car in front of him slowly drift to the right off the road, then quickly swerve back to the left, hitting one of the two pedestrians. McQueen saw the pedestrian's body thrown into the air by the impact. McQueen was about 30 feet behind the car, and continued to follow it at about the same distance and at a speed of about 40-45 mph, until the car turned left at 154th Street. At that point McQueen was able to see the car's license plate number. He returned to the scene of the accident and reported what he had seen to Trooper Johnson, describing the vehicle as a green Datsun Z-type car and giving the license plate number. Trooper Johnson then ran a registration check of the green Datsun by radio. The broadcast came back with the information that the car was registered to Komoto and provided Komoto's address.

                traveling north struck a pedestrian who was walking in the same direction on the northbound shoulder of Highway 99 near 170th Street in King County.   Trooper Gary L. Johnson of the Washington State Patrol arrived at the scene of the accident shortly thereafter.   He observed that the victim had severe head injuries.   The medics attending to the victim advised Trooper Johnson that the victim would probably not survive
                

Another Washington State Patrol trooper, Peter Hanson, heard the broadcast and recognized the registered owner as a person he had stopped for erratic driving approximately 26 hours prior to the accident in the same vicinity. The trooper's reason for stopping Komoto on that occasion was that he had been traveling over the legal speed limit and had left his lane several times. Trooper Hanson administered physical sobriety tests and concluded that Komoto had been drinking more than was truly safe, but allowed him to drive home as the stop occurred approximately After Hanson heard the car registration broadcast on August 27, 1982, he proceeded to Komoto's residence and arrived there at about 2 a.m. He observed the green Datsun with the broadcasted license number in the parking lot of Komoto's apartment complex. Troopers McElroy and Lindgren arrived soon after Hanson. All three noticed that the front end and windshield of the car were damaged and that the car was still warm. The troopers observed no signs of forced entry into the locked vehicle.

                3 to 4 blocks from Komoto's residence.   Before permitting Komoto to drive home that night, Hanson issued a citation for improper lane travel.   The accident in the present case occurred approximately 16 to 18 blocks from Komoto's residence, not far from the previous stop
                

Troopers Hanson and McElroy went to Komoto's door, knocked loudly, and yelled. When no one responded, Hanson contacted the assistant manager of the apartment complex and verified that the apartment was Komoto's and that he was the sole occupant. By this time, Hanson had learned that it was likely that the accident victim would die. The other troopers had heard this information during Trooper Johnson's radio broadcast. Hanson placed a call to Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Lee Yates and repeated the facts of the accident and the investigation to Yates. He told Yates that he believed Komoto had been drinking on the night of August 25 when Hanson had cited and released him. Yates advised Hanson that, given the circumstances, probable cause existed to believe that Komoto was the driver of the hit and run vehicle, and that there were exigent circumstances to justify an immediate warrantless arrest of Komoto for the purpose of obtaining a blood sample. Yates testified at the pretrial hearing that he told the trooper to proceed with a warrantless arrest because he feared losing evidence of Komoto's blood alcohol level, which, if Komoto had been drinking that night, would be dissipating.

Following his conversation with Yates, Trooper Hanson obtained a passkey from the assistant manager and

                returned to Komoto's apartment with Trooper McElroy.   The troopers entered the apartment and found Komoto lying on his bed.   They eventually aroused Komoto, advised him of his rights, and then transported him to Valley General Hospital.   At the hospital, the troopers again advised Komoto of his rights and told him that because he was [697 P.2d 1029] under arrest for a hit and run accident involving the likelihood of death, a blood sample would be taken.   The sample showed a blood alcohol reading of 0.19 percent.   The troopers then took Komoto to the south office of the Washington State Patrol where he was advised of his rights a third time.   In response to questioning, Komoto stated that he had been driving his vehicle that evening on Highway 99 in the vicinity of the accident and might have hit a pedestrian
                

ISSUES

1. Did the State establish the corpus delicti of the offense of felony hit and run?

2. Was the information provided by McQueen and Trooper Hanson, coupled with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that information, sufficient to establish probable cause for Komoto's arrest, and if so, did exigent circumstances justify the warrantless nonconsensual entry and arrest and the subsequent taking of a blood sample?

CORPUS DELICTI

Komoto contends that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of felony hit and run. He argues that proof of the corpus delicti of felony hit and run, as in the crime of driving while under the influence, must include evidence on the element of identity. Komoto contends that the State presented no direct or circumstantial evidence that he was the person who committed the crime, apart from his own statements; therefore, the State did not meet the requirements for corpus delicti. In response, the State argues that it established the "slight" proof necessary to establish the corpus delicti prior to admission of Komoto's statements. See State v. Hamrick, 19 Wash.App. 417, 420, 576 P.2d 912 (1978). The State notes that Komoto's admissions were corroborated by testimony from McQueen and the troopers, indicating that the admissions were reliable.

State v. Meyer, 37 Wash.2d 759, 763, 226 P.2d 204 (1951), and State v. Goranson, 67 Wash.2d 456, 459, 408 P.2d 7 (1965) (quoting Meyer, 37 Wash.2d at 763, 226 P.2d 204) establish that the identity of the person who has committed the crime is not normally material in establishing the corpus delicti; however, identity must be proven to sustain a conviction of the crime charged. State v. Hamrick, supra, relied upon by Komoto, holds that while the corpus delicti of most crimes does not involve identity, the offense of driving while under the influence in that case did require evidence of the defendant's identity. No Washington case has addressed the issue in the context of felony hit and run.

To prove that someone has committed the offense of driving while under the influence, the State must show that the defendant operated or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while he was under the influence. Evidence that the defendant was under the influence may be proven by one of three alternative methods. RCW 46.61.502; State v. Franco, 96 Wash.2d 816, 823, 639 P.2d 1320 (1982). The defendant's physical condition is by definition a critical element of the crime. In contrast, felony hit and run does not require any showing of the defendant's physical state; rather, it requires proof that the driver did not perform the duties specified in the statute. RCW 46.52.020. Thus, proof of the condition of the driver is not necessary to establish the existence of a criminal agency in felony hit and run.

Moreover, the facts in Hamrick also distinguish that case from the present one. In Hamrick, no one testified that they observed the defendant driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle while intoxicated. The officer arrived after the accident and spoke with the defendant, who was present and admitted that he had been driving the car involved in the accident. The only evidence connecting the defendant with control of the car in Hamrick was his own admission. Washington cases clearly and consistently hold that a conviction cannot be sustained on a confession alone some corroborative evidence establishing the corpus delicti is necessary to convict when a confession is part...