State v. Koppi

• Decision Date: 08 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. A09–136.,A09–136.
• Citation: 798 N.W.2d 358
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,v.John Allen KOPPI, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

798 N.W.2d 358

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.John Allen KOPPI, Appellant.

No. A09–136.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 8, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The district court's jury instruction for refusal to submit to chemical testing was erroneous because the instruction given to the jury articulated an incorrect, subjective standard of probable cause.

2. The appellant is entitled to a new trial because the erroneous jury instruction in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. The appellant waived his argument that the district court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that the court had concluded as a matter of law that appellant had a reasonable amount of time to contact an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and John J. Thames, Carson, Clelland & Schreder, Brooklyn Center, MN, for respondent.Mark D. Kelly, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

STRAS, Justice.

Appellant John Allen Koppi was convicted of second-degree refusal to submit to chemical testing (“test refusal”) under Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2010). Koppi first argues that the district court abused its discretion in giving the jury an erroneous instruction that articulated a purely subjective definition of probable cause. See 10A Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 29.28 (5th ed. Supp.2009). Koppi also contends that the district court erred when it instructed the jury that the court had decided as a matter of law that Koppi had a reasonable amount of time to contact an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing. Because the district court's instruction to the jury included an incorrect, purely subjective definition of probable cause and the instructional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse.

I.

At approximately 12:40 a.m. on July 4, 2008, Officer Joshua Hunter observed a pickup truck traveling at 66 miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour speed zone on County Road 30 in the City of Corcoran. Officer Hunter stopped the pickup truck, and then identified Koppi as the driver. According to Officer Hunter, Koppi's “eyes were a red, glossy, bloodshot color” and the officer “could also smell a slight odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from [Koppi's] person.” After Officer Hunter asked Koppi to exit the vehicle, Koppi swayed from “side to side a little bit” as he accompanied Officer Hunter to the rear of the truck. Koppi refused to perform any field sobriety tests, and according to Officer Hunter, became upset during the encounter. Officer Hunter responded affirmatively when asked at trial whether he believed, “based on [his] training and experience as a police officer and [his] personal experience and observations, and the defendant's refusal to complete any of the field sobriety tests ... as well as [his] observations of the defendant,” that Koppi was under the influence of alcohol. On cross-examination, however, Officer Hunter testified that he did not observe Koppi's truck cross the center or fog lines along the highway; that in 95% of arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol, the driver emits a moderate to strong odor of alcohol, rather than a slight odor; and that Koppi's speech was not slurred.

After taking Koppi into custody and transporting him to the police station, Officer Hunter gave Koppi the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory, which informs suspects that refusing to consent to chemical testing is a crime. In response, Koppi stated that he wished to contact an attorney. At 1:05 a.m., Officer Hunter provided Koppi with a telephone and 10 to 15 phone books. Koppi then requested his reading glasses, which another officer retrieved from Koppi's truck and delivered to him by 1:20 a.m. During the ensuing 45 minutes, Koppi left voicemails with two attorneys and his wife. When Officer Hunter returned at 2:05 a.m., he observed Koppi casually flipping through the phone books. Officer Hunter asked Koppi whether he would agree to a chemical test, but Koppi repeatedly requested additional time to contact an attorney. When Koppi failed to respond to three or four requests for a final decision regarding whether he would submit to chemical testing, Officer Hunter concluded that Koppi had refused the test.

The State charged Koppi with third-degree driving while impaired, Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), 169A.26 (2008), and second-degree test refusal, Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2 (2010), 169A.25 (2008). Before submitting the case to the jury, the district court provided the parties with copies of several jury instructions. Koppi objected to two of the proposed instructions. First, Koppi argued that the proposed jury instruction defining probable cause, based upon the 2008 version of CRIMJIG 29.28, improperly articulated a subjective definition of probable cause. The court overruled Koppi's objection and used CRIMJIG 29.28 to instruct the jury on probable cause. Second, Koppi objected to the court's instruction that it had decided as a matter of law that Koppi had a reasonable amount of time to contact an attorney. After overruling Koppi's objection, the court informed the jury: “As the judge in this case, I've already decided that defendant was provided with a reasonable amount of time to contact an attorney.”

The jury returned verdicts of guilty on the charge of test refusal and not guilty on the charge of driving while impaired. On the former count, the court sentenced Koppi to 365 days in the workhouse, with 320 days stayed, and a $300 fine. The court stayed the sentence to permit Koppi time to appeal his conviction, but placed him on probation with numerous conditions.

The court of appeals affirmed Koppi's conviction for test refusal, holding that although the 2008 version of CRIMJIG 29.28 erroneously articulated a subjective standard of probable cause, the error was harmless. State v. Koppi, 779 N.W.2d 562, 568 (Minn.App.2010). The court of appeals further concluded that the district court did not err when it decided as a matter of law that Officer Hunter gave Koppi a reasonable amount of time to contact an attorney. Id. at 570–71. We granted Koppi's petition for review.

II.

We first address Koppi's argument that the district court erred when, in instructing the jury on the charge of test refusal, the court defined probable cause as provided in the 2008 version of CRIMJIG 29.28. We review a district court's decision to give a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Hall, 722 N.W.2d 472, 477 (Minn.2006). Jury instructions, reviewed in their entirety, must fairly and adequately explain the law of the case. State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn.1988). A jury instruction is erroneous if it materially misstates the applicable law. State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn.2001).

A.

“It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test of the person's blood, breath, or urine under section 169A.51 (chemical tests for intoxication), or 169A.52 (test refusal or failure; revocation of license).” Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2. The plain language of section 169A.20, subdivision 2, in turn, incorporates the requirement from section 169A.51 that an officer may request that a person submit to a chemical test when the officer “has probable cause to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle” while impaired. ¹ Minn.Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b) (2010). Refusing a chemical test is not a crime, therefore, unless it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that an officer had “probable cause to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle” while impaired. Id.

Koppi argues that the instruction given to the jury at his trial on the element of probable cause was erroneous because it improperly articulated a purely subjective standard for probable cause. In evaluating whether the jury instruction in this case was erroneous, the threshold question is whether probable cause is a subjective or objective inquiry. Probable cause under section 169A.51, subdivision 1(b), exists “whenever there are facts and circumstances known to the officer which would warrant a prudent man in believing that the individual was driving or was operating” or was in physical control of a motor vehicle while impaired. State v. Harris, 295 Minn. 38, 42, 202 N.W.2d 878, 881 (1972), quoted in Knapp v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 610 N.W.2d 625, 628 n. 6 (Minn.2000). The existence of probable cause depends on “the particular circumstances, conditioned by [officers'] own observations and information and guided by the whole of their police experience.” State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Minn.1989), aff'd sub nom. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (citation omitted). We have recognized that the police may interpret circumstances in a way that differs from ordinary citizens. Appelgate v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn.1987) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). Accordingly, because an officer's training and experience is the lens through which the fact-finder must evaluate the reasonableness of an officer's determination of probable cause, probable cause incorporates the individual characteristics and intuitions of the officer to some extent. See Olson, 436 N.W.2d at 94 (stating that “the whole of police experience” is relevant in determining whether there was probable cause).

Nonetheless, “[t]he reasonableness of the officer's actions is an objective inquiry,” even if reasonableness is evaluated in light of an officer's training and experience. State v. Hardy, 577 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Minn.1998) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The actual, subjective beliefs of the officer are not the focus in evaluating reasonableness. See State v. Speak, 339...