State v. Little

• Decision Date: 13 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. A11–2319.,A11–2319.
• Citation: 851 N.W.2d 878
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Antoine Rumel LITTLE, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

851 N.W.2d 878

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,
v.
Antoine Rumel LITTLE, Appellant.

No. A11–2319.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 13, 2014.

[851 N.W.2d 879]

Syllabus by the Court

1. Existing case law plainly requires a court to obtain a renewed jury-trial waiver when the State amends its complaint to add an additional charge after the defendant has made an initial jury-trial waiver.

2. Defense counsel's statement regarding an earlier jury-trial waiver did not satisfy the personal waiver requirements of Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01.

[851 N.W.2d 880]

3. On the record presented, the district court committed plain error that affected appellant's substantial rights and which we must address to protect the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James P. Spencer, Assistant County Attorney, Rochester, MN, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

OPINION
PAGE, Justice.

This case presents the issue of whether a defendant who has waived his right to a jury trial must renew that waiver when the State subsequently amends the complaint to add a new charge. Appellant Antoine Rumel Little was found guilty of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2012), one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2012), and one count of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(b) (2012). As relevant to this appeal, Little argues that the district court committed reversible error when it failed to obtain his personal jury-trial waiver on the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge. The court of appeals affirmed Little's first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the court of appeals, vacate Little's conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In the winter of 2010 the victim, 14–year–old S.M.L., was introduced to Little. Sometime in early February, S.M.L., her sister, Little, and several others, were smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol in a Rochester apartment. Around 1 a.m., S.M.L. went to sleep in one of the apartment's two bedrooms. In the middle of the night, Little got into bed with S.M.L. and began groping her. When Little proposed that the two have sex, S.M.L. refused. Little then inserted his penis in S.M.L.'s anus. S.M.L. told Little to stop several times. After 5 to 10 minutes he finally stopped. After the encounter, S.M.L. went to the bathroom to check to see if she was okay and found blood on the toilet paper. Several days later, S.M.L. told a friend of her sister and her cousin about the encounter. This information made its way to S.M.L.'s mother, who confronted S.M.L. S.M.L. told her mother what had happened, and her mother reported the assault to the police.

On July 8, 2010, the State filed a complaint against Little charging him with third- and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. At a pretrial hearing on January 20, 2011, Little waived his right to a jury trial during the following colloquy:

THE COURT: Mr. Little, your attorney has indicated that you want to waive your right to have a trial by jury, is that correct?

LITTLE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you understand that if you have a trial by jury that—that under the law you're presumed innocent and that the State has the burden of proving you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

LITTLE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And that they have to convince twelve jurors that you are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and they have to convince them of that with

[851 N.W.2d 881]

respect to each and every element of the offense?

LITTLE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And that if you waive that right to have a jury trial, the—the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt remain in place but then the—the State only has to convince one person, that is the judge who will hear the case, that you're guilty, you understand that?

LITTLE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And it is your right to waive that and to have this tried to the Court, do you understand that?

LITTLE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And is that what you've decided to do?

LITTLE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you've consulted with your attorney about the wisdom of that and the consequences of doing it?

LITTLE: Yeah.

THE COURT: And you've weighed your options in terms of having the jury trial versus having a court trial?

LITTLE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And—And it's your own free and voluntary decision then to waive your right to a jury trial and ask that this be tried to the Court?

LITTLE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And no one's threatened you or coerced you or forced you to do that, have they?

LITTLE: No, sir.

THE COURT: And you're not doing this just because you're in custody and you think it might make things go faster, are you?

LITTLE: Yeah, in a way.

THE COURT: You're doing it because of that or you're not?

LITTLE: No, no, no.

THE COURT: All right. You just decided it's in your best interest to try this to the Court rather than to a jury, is that correct?

LITTLE: Yeah.

On February 1, 2011, the State filed an amended complaint adding the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge. Little never personally received a copy of the amended complaint. At a hearing on February 2, 2011, the court asked counsel whether a record had been made of Little's jury-trial waiver. Both defense counsel and the prosecutor indicated that a record had been made at an earlier pretrial hearing. Little did not personally, either in writing or on the record, waive his right to a jury trial on the amended charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct at the hearing on February 2 or at any other time. Indeed, during his presentence investigation, Little stated that he did not know the State had added the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge until he was found guilty. The trial took place on February 3, 2011, with the court serving as fact-finder. The State called four witnesses: S.M.L., two law enforcement officials who had interviewed S.M.L., and a physician assistant who had examined her. Little was the defense's only witness. At the conclusion of the trial on February 4, the district court found Little guilty of all three counts. Little filed a post-trial motion for a new trial. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Little to 153 months in prison.

On appeal to the court of appeals, Little argued that the district court erred when it failed to obtain a personal waiver of his right to a jury trial on the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. State v. Little, A11–2319, 2013 WL 599142, at *1 (Minn.App. Feb. 19, 2013). The court of appeals affirmed Little's first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction. Id. at *5. Reviewing Little's claim for plain error, the court held that the district court did

[851 N.W.2d 882]

not err because there is no “precedent that requires a district court to obtain a renewed jury waiver if the state amends the underlying complaint.” Id.

I.

Before our court, Little renews his argument that the district court erred when it failed to obtain a personal waiver of his right to a jury trial after the State amended the complaint to include the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. We agree. Under both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, a defendant is entitled to trial by jury. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. 1, §§ 4, 6. In Minnesota, the right to a jury trial attaches whenever a defendant is charged with an offense that has an authorized penalty of incarceration. Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(1)(a); see also State v. Weltzin, 630 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Minn.2001). Defendants may waive their right to a jury trial, but the waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644, 651 (Minn.2006) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). Absent such a waiver, a criminal defendant must be tried by a jury. See State v. Ross, 472 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Minn.1991). Whether a waiver of a constitutional right was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn.2012). Moreover, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require that a defendant personally waive the right to a jury trial, either in writing “or on the record in open court.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(a).

Little acknowledges that the district court obtained a personal waiver of his right to a jury trial at the January 20, 2011, pretrial hearing. Nevertheless, he contends that the January 20 waiver does not extend to the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct because the State added the charge after that date. More specifically, Little argues that a waiver cannot be knowing and intelligent if the defendant does not know the relevant circumstances and consequences of the waiver. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463 (“Waivers of constitutional rights ... must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”). According to Little, the relevant circumstances include the crimes with which he is charged.

The State argues that all a defendant needs to understand when waiving the right to a jury trial are the basic components of a jury trial. See Ross, 472 N.W.2d at 654. The State contends that because the amendment to the complaint adding the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge here did not affect Little's understanding of the components of a jury trial and thus his right to a jury trial, a...