State v. Krotzer

• Decision Date: 23 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. C4-94-2604,C4-94-2604
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Billy Jim KROTZER, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 252

548 N.W.2d 252

STATE of Minnesota, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Billy Jim KROTZER, Respondent.

No. C4-94-2604.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 23, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A stay of adjudication of defendant's criminal charges before formal acceptance of defendant's guilty plea was within the district court's inherent judicial authority, was supported by the unique circumstances of defendant's case, and did not violate separation of powers principles.

2. The conditions of probation required by the district court upon stay of adjudication of defendant's criminal charge could include a term of imprisonment and fine.

Paul Scoggin, Special Asst. Carver County Atty., Chaska, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, St. Paul, for Appellant.

Susan Andrews, Asst. State Public Defender, St. Paul, for Respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

KEITH, Chief Justice.

The State of Minnesota requests review of a court of appeals decision upholding a Carver County District Court's stay of adjudication of criminal charges against Billy Jim Krotzer. Because we agree with Krotzer that the power to stay adjudication of Krotzer's case was within the district court's inherent judicial authority, we affirm. However, we reverse that portion of the court of appeals' opinion addressing the propriety of Krotzer's probation order, and hold that the trial court could require Krotzer to serve a term of incarceration as a condition of his probation.

I.

The facts of this case are undisputed. On three occasions in December 1993 and January 1994, Billy Jim Krotzer, aged 19 years, and his 14-year-old girlfriend, C.H.M., engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. Krotzer admits that he knew that C.H.M. was approximately 14 or 15 years old, but claims that he was "not sure" whether his actions were illegal. The couple ended their sexual relationship after C.H.M.'s mother, T.J.M., learned of their sexual activities, but they continued a nonsexual relationship with T.J.M.'s approval after she set forth strict dating guidelines.

Despite the parties' amicable resolution of the situation, an unnamed person notified the Chaska Police Department of the past sexual contact between Krotzer and C.H.M. A Chaska police detective interviewed all three individuals in May 1994, and both Krotzer and C.H.M. disclosed the extent of their past sexual relationship to the detective. According to T.J.M., the detective assured them that there was "nothing to worry about."

Despite this assurance, the Carver County Attorney's Office charged Krotzer with one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (1994). Unable to reach a plea agreement with the county prosecutor, Krotzer entered a guilty plea on July 28, 1994 but requested the court to stay adjudication of his criminal charge. The court did not formally accept Krotzer's plea, but ordered a presentence investigation, and informed Krotzer that if "this matter does not conclude as we expect it will, then you have a right to withdraw the plea and the State would then have to prove the case and you would be entitled to a jury trial." The Department of Corrections performed the presentence investigation, and recommended that Krotzer "be placed on District Court probation for 0--5 years with a stay of adjudication. If a stay of imposition of sentence is pronounced, the law would require that this individual be registered as a predatory sex offender. This would not appear to be appropriate in this case because there is no history of aggressiveness, or any aggressiveness in the present offense." ¹

At sentencing on September 30, 1994, the Carver County prosecutor voiced his opposition to the district court's intention to stay adjudication of Krotzer's charge: "We challenge [Krotzer's trial attorney] to cite any legal authority to support the Court granting a stay of adjudication over the State's objection." The prosecutor urged the court to accept Krotzer's guilty plea and follow the presumptive sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines: a stay of imposition of Krotzer's sentence. ² Although entering a guilty plea to third-degree criminal sexual conduct would cause Krotzer to be convicted of a felony, the felony would revert to a misdemeanor under Minn.Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (1994) if Krotzer successfully served his probationary term. Nevertheless, the court, without accepting Krotzer's guilty plea, stayed adjudication of his charge and placed Krotzer on probation for 60 months. As conditions of his probation, Krotzer was ordered to serve 60 days in jail, pay $200 to the public defender's fund and $415 in fines and surcharges, and have no unsupervised contact with any other female adolescents under the age of 16. The district court judge expressed his uncertainty as to the propriety of his sentencing decision, and invited the State to appeal "so maybe we'll get a decision on this and then we'll all know where we're going [but] I believe that in the context of this case, I have the authority to stay adjudication."

The State did appeal the district court's order, arguing that there is no statutory justification or equal authority for the district court's action in Krotzer's case, and that the court violated separation of powers principles by overriding the prosecutor's charging decision. The State asserted that the district court had exercised exclusively legislative and executive powers by manufacturing a punishment for Krotzer's crime and by preventing prosecution of the felony charge. The court of appeals disagreed, and held that because a district court has the power to dismiss criminal charges at any time "in furtherance of justice," the court can also stay the adjudication of a charge, an action less severe than outright dismissal. State v. Krotzer, 531 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Minn.App.1995). See Minn.Stat. § 631.21 (1994). The court of appeals also rejected the State's separation of powers argument, stating that the "prosecution can recommend a sentence, but it cannot force the court to impose a sentence from a list the prosecution wants. Trial judges, not the prosecution, pronounce sentences." Id. at 866 (citing State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn.1982)).

II.

The State argues that the district court violated separation of powers principles. Specifically, the State maintains that the court's stay of adjudication amounted to the exercise of a power solely reserved to the executive branch under Article III, Section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution: the power to decide whom to prosecute and what charge to file. See State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618, 620 n. 3 (Minn.1980). See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668-69, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (decision whether or not to prosecute generally rests entirely with prosecutor); State v. Herme, 298 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn.1980). Under established separation of powers rules, absent evidence of selective or discriminatory prosecutorial intent, or an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, the judiciary is powerless to interfere with the prosecutor's charging authority. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364, 98 S.Ct. at 668-69 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 505-506, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)).

However, the prosecutor's power to file charges and prosecute an individual was not infringed upon here. As Krotzer states, the Carver County prosecutor investigated the allegations against Krotzer, filed criminal charges, obtained a guilty plea, and recommended a disposition and sentence to the court. The trial court then postponed acceptance of the plea and placed Krotzer on probation, but this did not affect the prosecutor's carefully defined role. See Olson, 325 N.W.2d at 18. The final disposition of a criminal case is ultimately a matter for the presiding judge. As we stated in Olson, once the legislature has defined the range of punishments for a particular offense, it cannot "condition the imposition of the sentence by the court upon the prior approval of the prosecutor." Id. See People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal.3d 59, 113 Cal.Rptr. 21, 26, 520 P.2d 405, 410 (1974) (prosecutor may not "veto" trial judge's decision to divert defendant into pretrial treatment program because "disposition is a function of the judicial power no matter what the outcome").

We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision in this case. The district court's determination that Krotzer's situation warranted unusual judicial measures is well-supported by the special circumstances of Krotzer's case. It appears that the court strongly disagreed with the prosecutor's decision to file charges against Krotzer, and felt that justice would not be served by giving Krotzer a criminal record as a predatory sex offender. Although the court did not act pursuant to any express Minnesota rule or statute, ³ its decision to stay adjudication of Krotzer's charge instead of accepting his guilty plea fell within the "inherent judicial power" we have repeatedly recognized, and was necessary to the furtherance of justice in Krotzer's case. See State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn.1981); State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn.1978); Clerk of Court's Compensation for Lyon County v. Lyon County Comm'rs, 308 Minn. 172, 180, 241 N.W.2d 781, 786 (1976); City of St. Paul v. Landreville, 301 Minn. 43, 47, 221 N.W.2d 532, 534 (1974).

In addition, as the court of appeals noted, the action undertaken by the district court in this case was akin to the dismissal "in furtherance of justice" permitted by Minn.Stat. § 631.21 (1994). ⁴ Under this statute, the power to dismiss criminal charges lies within the judiciary's authority to control the administration of justice. See, e.g., State v. Fleck, 269 N.W.2d 736, 737 (Minn.1978) (interests of justice were not served by trial court's dismissal of incest charges under section 631.21); In re Welfare of J.H.C., 384 N.W.2d 599, 601 (M...