City of St. Paul v. Landreville

• Decision Date: 16 August 1974
• Docket Number: No. 44583,44583
• Citation: 301 Minn. 43,221 N.W.2d 532
• Parties: CITY OF ST. PAUL, Appellant, v. Alden E. LANDREVILLE, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 532

221 N.W.2d 532

301 Minn. 43

CITY OF ST. PAUL, Appellant, v. Alden E. LANDREVILLE, Respondent.

No. 44583.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 16, 1974.

R. Scott Davies, City Atty., A. Keith Hanzel and Philip B. Byrne, Asst. City Attys., St. Paul, for appellant.

Wayne T. Belisle, St. Paul, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the city of St. Paul from an order of the municipal court dismissing a charge of simple assault under the St. Paul city ordinance. Appeal dismissed.

The procedure followed in this case is particularly relevant to this appeal. A police officer was allegedly assaulted on November 22, 1972. Respondent, charged with the assault, first appeared in the St Paul municipal court on that same date, and a plea of not guilty was entered on December 19, 1972. On January 24, 1973, the date set for trial, a pretrial chamber conference was held by the court, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel. As a result of this discussion, the court ordered that the case be continued for a period of 6 months without plea. Further, it was the court's stated intention to dismiss the matter at the conclusion of that 6-month period if respondent had not engaged in any unlawful or criminal activity resulting in charges during that time period.

Subsequently, on June 1, 1973, a different assistant city attorney filed a notice of motion and motion to be heard on June 20, 1973, requesting that the case against respondent be set for trial. In an attached affidavit it was stated that the court's disposition of the matter had come to his attention only recently and that he believed this disposition to be improper. The court, after hearing arguments, denied this motion. Finally, on August 13, 1973, the court ordered the prosecution dismissed and stated that a formal written order would follow. The following day the court filed the formal written order, stating in part that, 'THE COURT HEREBY DISMISSES the matter without plea Permanently at this time.' (Italics supplied.) Whether or not appellant tacitly agreed to the original disposition is in dispute.

The appellant's argument is that a judge has no inherent power to dismiss a criminal complaint over the objection of the prosecutor, except as permitted by statute or to protect specific constitutional rights. The appellant further contends that even if the dismissal was authorized, it operates without prejudice to the rights of the prosecution to institute further proceedings by way of a complaint. The respondent contends, on the other hand, that a municipality has no right to appeal and that the municipal court did not abuse its discretion in permanently dismissing this charge.

We disposed of the issue of a right of a municipality to appeal in a prosecution involving a city ordinance in the case of City of St. Paul v. Hurd, Minn., 216 N.W.2d 259, 261 (1974), by stating:

'This court has already applied much of the Minnesota criminal procedure to prosecutions for ordinance violations as well as sections of the very statutes with which we are here concerned. It is therefore consistent that we apply all the provisions of Minn.St. 632.11 to 632.13 to municipalities in cases of ordinance violations.'

However, the fact that this court has extended the right to appeal to municipalities is not itself conclusive as to the appealability of the order considered here under the facts presented. Rather, we must go further and reiterate our interpretive statement in City of St. Paul v. Hurd, Supra. There we stated (216 N.W.2d 261):

'In extending this right to appeal to municipalities, it is imperative that the limitations imposed by statute upon state appeals also become applicable to municipal bodies.'

Since the state has no right to appeal unless it is expressly allowed by statute, we must look to the statute. Minn.St. 632.11, subd. 1(1), allows appeals in criminal cases 'from an order, The substantive effect of which is to dismiss an indictment, information or complaint.' (Italics supplied.) Also, Minn.St. 632.13(1) seems to express the intention of the legislature further in stating, 'Upon oral notice that the state intends to appeal, the court shall order a further stay of proceedings * * *.' Upon a complete dismissal of a criminal case, there are no further proceedings to 'stay'. Clearly, this language exemplifies the legislative intent to enact some limitation upon this right to appeal. This court has interpreted this provision and stated in State v. Maki, 291 Minn. 427, 428, 192 N.W.2d 811, 812 (1971):

'* * * As we comprehend the uses of this provision, it is intended to give the state the right to appeal under circumstances where the order appealed from effectively defeats or prevents successful prosecutive action against the defendant. In this case, the magistrate's dismissal of a complaint does not necessarily defeat or terminate the prosecution. The prosecutive authorities may, by further appropriate proceedings, pursue the matter, either by presenting it to another magistrate or by presenting facts relating to the...