State v. Kunonga
| Decision Date | 29 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | WD 77357 |
| Parties | State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Tawanda Kunonga, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Daniel N. McPherson, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
Jeannette L. Wolpink, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.
Before Division Two: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge and Karen King Mitchell, Judge
Tawanda Kunonga (“Kunonga”) appeals his convictions of one count of first-degree murder and one count of armed criminal action following a jury trial. Kunonga argues that the trial court erred (1) by failing to sua sponte intervene and prevent the admission of alleged propensity evidence; (2) by failing to sua sponte intervene and prevent the admission of alleged hearsay testimony; (3) by failing to grant a mistrial after the State introduced evidence that Kunonga invoked his right to remain silent; and (4) in allowing him to represent himself at trial because the waiver of counsel form he signed prior to trial did not comply with section 600.051,1 depriving him of his constitutional right to counsel.
We affirm.
Kunonga does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions of murder in the first degree and armed criminal action. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 423 (Mo. banc 2015)
.
Latoya Hopkins (“Hopkins”) was found dead in her home on June 15, 2010. She had been brutally beaten and stabbed. An autopsy revealed multiple blunt force and stab wounds
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Hopkins was discovered by her sister, Aisha, and her sister's boyfriend. Aisha had become concerned when Hopkins missed an appointment to have her hair done on June 14, 2010, in preparation for a trip to New York planned for June 15, 2010. When Aisha and her boyfriend entered Hopkins's home through an open basement window, they discovered Hopkins's body on a bedroom floor. Investigators described the violent encounter that had occurred in the home. There was blood and blood spatter throughout the house on walls, furniture, floors, and other items. A car parked in the basement garage contained blood spatter. The car was parked directly below the spot where Hopkins's body was found. Hopkins's blood had dripped through the ceiling onto the floor by the car. There was a strong odor of a deceased body in the home. The investigation led to the discovery of a meat tenderizer and a steak knife as the likely murder weapons. DNA found on the handle of the meat tenderizer was matched to both Kunonga and Hopkins. DNA testing of tissue found on the mallet portion of the meat tenderizer showed Hopkins as a major contributor and Kunonga as a minor contributor. Blood found on the handle of a steak knife showed Hopkins as a major DNA contributor and Kunonga as a minor DNA contributor. A mixture of Kunonga's and Hopkins's DNA was found in several blood samples from throughout the house. Fingernail scrapings taken from Hopkins matched Kunonga as a minor contributor. Kunonga's palm print was found in the blood stains discovered on the outside of the car parked in the basement garage. It appeared to investigators that some effort had been made to clean portions of the crime scene.
Hopkins was last seen on June 13, 2010. A neighbor was walking her dog on that day and cut through Hopkins's yard. The neighbor saw Kunonga standing with Hopkins outside the house by the garage. Kunonga and Hopkins had been in an on-and-off relationship for about four years. By June 2010, the relationship had ended and Hopkins was in a new relationship. Hopkins's planned trip to New York on June 15, 2010, was to meet a man she had befriended online.
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on June 14, 2010, Kunonga showed up at a friend's house. The friend had last seen Kunonga about a week to two weeks prior and observed when Kunonga showed up on June 14, 2010, that he had shaved off his long dreadlocks. The friend noticed that Kunonga had injured his hand. Kunonga told the friend he had been bitten by a dog. Kunonga asked to take a shower and for a trash bag to get rid of some old clothes.
Near the same time frame, another acquaintance of Kunonga's saw him on a Metro bus and at first did not recognize him because his dreadlocks were gone. Kunonga's right hand and forearm were bleeding and he had cuts and scratches on his face, neck, and shoulders. When the acquaintance asked what had happened, Kunonga laughed and said, “The bitch wouldn't let go so I did what I had to do.” Kunonga told the acquaintance he was going to the hospital to get stitched up, then “going underground.”
Kunonga went to Research Medical Center shortly before 11:30 p.m. on June 14, 2010. He gave a false name to be treated and told hospital personnel he had been injured the previous night breaking up a fight.
On June 21, 2010, after Hopkins's body was found, Raytown detectives saw Kunonga walking down a street in downtown Kansas City. Kansas City police officers were dispatched to the scene. When Kunonga was stopped, his right hand was bandaged with gauze that was soaked in blood. Kunonga told authorities he had been involved in a robbery four or five days earlier. Kunonga initially gave officers a false name and date of birth. Kunonga was arrested and taken to the Raytown police station where he was given, and waived, the Miranda2
warnings. His interview was videotaped.
A public defender entered an appearance to represent Kunonga on July 1, 2010. In July 2011, the public defender filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, alleging that Kunonga had advised that he wanted to represent himself. Kunonga filed a motion to discharge counsel on August 26, 2011. Kunonga's motion raised numerous complaints, including that the public defender was unwilling to zealously defend Kunonga against the charges and that the public defender had not complied with Kunonga's requests to take certain actions.
The trial court held a hearing on Kunonga's motion on September 23, 2011. After Kunonga stated his complaints with the public defender, the trial court informed Kunonga that if he discharged his public defender, another one would not be appointed for him, leaving him the option of hiring an attorney or representing himself. Kunonga acknowledged that he understood his options and then stated:
After putting Kunonga under oath, the trial court explained to Kunonga that he had a right to an attorney, that the public defender's office assigns attorneys for defendants who need representation, and that Kunonga's only option if dissatisfied with his appointed attorney was to hire an attorney or represent himself. Kunonga responded that he understood and responded affirmatively when the trial court asked him if he was up to the challenge of representing himself. Kunonga denied that anyone had threatened or coerced him into making the decision to represent himself and said that he had thought long and hard about his decision.
The trial court explained the charges filed to Kunonga and the range of punishment for each charge. The trial court explained that if Kunonga was found guilty, then the trial court would likely impose a prison sentence. The trial court also extensively explained trial procedure to Kunonga, including the standard of proof at trial, how objections are lodged during trial, and how to preserve errors for appeal. The trial court noted that it would be harder for Kunonga to subpoena witnesses in preparation for trial and that it would be harder to testify at trial since he was representing himself. The trial court asked Kunonga if he could figure everything out on his own without the assistance of an attorney and Kunonga stated: “I believe I can.” Then the following exchange took place:
After Kunonga said that he understood the likelihood of a prison sentence if found guilty, that he was foreclosing the opportunity to later claim ineffective assistance of counsel, and that he understood a public defender has many more resources to mount a defense, the trial court again asked Kunonga whether he wanted to represent himself:
The trial court then presented Kunonga with a written waiver of counsel form which Kunonga signed.
Sometime later, Kunonga filed a motion for the appointment of hybrid counsel not associated with the public defender's office. During a hearing on the motion, Kunonga acknowledged his understanding that he was entitled as an indigent to have an attorney appointed for him but that he did not get to choose his attorney. Kunonga also acknowledged that he did not have a constitutional right to hybrid counsel. After the trial court again explained to Kunonga the charges against him and possible punishments, trial procedure, and that it was not a good decision to represent himself, the trial court asked Kunonga if he still wanted to represent himself. Kunonga replied:
Kunonga's case proceeded to a jury trial. An edited version of Kunonga's videotaped interview was played for the jury. Kunonga did not testify in his own defense but called numerous...
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