State v. Kvasnicka
| Citation | 873 N.W.2d 705 |
| Decision Date | 06 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 27304.,27304. |
| Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Tammy Jean KVASNICKA, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Marty J. Jackley, Attorney General, Ann C. Meyer, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
Michelle Thomas of Minnehaha County Public Defender's Office, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellant.
[¶ 1.] In her second appeal to this Court,1 Tammy Jean Kvasnicka appeals the circuit court's denial of her motion to withdraw her plea of guilty to first-degree manslaughter and vehicular battery. According to Kvasnicka, she is unable to recall committing the crimes alleged and pleaded guilty out of fear. We affirm.
[¶ 2.] At approximately 2:00 a.m. on July 10, 2010, after an evening of consuming alcohol, Kvasnicka caused a fatal automobile accident by driving her vehicle southbound in the northbound lane of Interstate 229 near Sioux Falls. Although Kvasnicka was not seriously injured, one passenger in the car she struck died at the scene and another passenger suffered a serious injury to his arm. The alcohol content in Kvasnicka's blood was as high as 0.225 at 3:44 a.m. and still at least 0.200 at 4:47 a.m.
[¶ 3.] A jury convicted Kvasnicka of first-degree manslaughter by means of a dangerous weapon, vehicular homicide, vehicular battery, and driving under the influence. Kvasnicka admitted to two habitual-offender informations alleging that she had been previously convicted twice for driving under the influence and once for second-degree burglary. The circuit court sentenced Kvasnicka to 70 years in prison with 18 years suspended. Among other things, Kvasnicka appealed the circuit court's admission of expert testimony regarding the kinetic energy of Kvasnicka's vehicle. After determining the challenged testimony was prejudicial and not relevant, this Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
[¶ 4.] A second trial was scheduled for August 20, 2013. However, the State and Kvasnicka entered into a plea agreement. Under the agreement, Kvasnicka pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree manslaughter and one count of vehicular battery. In exchange for her plea, the State agreed to seek a sentence of 37.5 years and restitution in the amount of $199,111. The circuit court held a plea hearing on August 15, 2013. At the hearing, the circuit court explained Kvasnicka's constitutional rights, the charges against her, and the terms of the plea agreement. The court then had the following discussion with Kvasnicka:
Following this discussion, the court had the State recite the factual basis for the guilty plea, and Kvasnicka agreed with the State's rendition of the facts.
[¶ 5.] On February 26, 2014—the day before the scheduled sentencing—defense counsel informed the State that Kvasnicka might want to withdraw her plea. Kvasnicka did not file a motion to withdraw her plea until June 12, 2014. The court held a hearing on the motion on August 13, 2014. At the hearing, the State indicated it was unable to locate a witness, Christopher Jones, whom the State expected to testify that Kvasnicka used her automobile as a dangerous weapon on July 10, 2010, by driving the wrong way on the interstate at 80 miles per hour and that she did not attempt to avoid colliding with the other vehicle. Jones did not testify during the first trial because the State had lost contact with him prior to trial. However, subsequent to our decision in Kvasnicka's first appeal, the State located and subpoenaed Jones in order to secure his testimony during the anticipated second trial. After Kvasnicka pleaded guilty, the State informed Jones that his testimony was no longer needed. By the time Kvasnicka sought to withdraw her plea, Jones had changed addresses and phone numbers, and the State was once again unable to locate him.
[¶ 6.] Kvasnicka appeals, raising one issue: Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
[¶ 7.] "The decision to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is a matter solely within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Pentecost, 2015 S.D. 71, ¶ 9, 868 N.W.2d 590, 593 (quoting State v. Goodwin, 2004 S.D. 75, ¶ 4, 681 N.W.2d 847, 849 ). "An abuse of discretion ‘is a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable.’ " Gartner v. Temple, 2014 S.D. 74, ¶ 7, 855 N.W.2d 846, 850 (quoting Arneson v. Arneson, 2003 S.D. 125, ¶ 14, 670 N.W.2d 904, 910 ).
[¶ 8.] SDCL 23A–27–11 permits a defendant who has pleaded guilty to make a "motion to withdraw a plea of guilty ... before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended[.]" The grant or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the discretion of the circuit court. State v. Schmidt, 2012 S.D. 77, ¶ 15, 825 N.W.2d 889, 894. Although "a court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of withdrawal[,]" State v. Olson, 2012 S.D. 55, ¶ 18, 816 N.W.2d 830, 836, a defendant does not have "an automatic right to withdraw a guilty plea [,]"id. (quoting State v. Thielsen, 2004 S.D. 17, ¶ 15, 675 N.W.2d 429, 433 ); United States v. Heid, 651 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir.2011). After a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, she "may not withdraw [her] plea unless [she] shows a ‘fair and just reason’ " for doing so. United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 671, 117 S.Ct. 1630, 1631, 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997) ; Schmidt, 2012 S.D. 77, ¶ 16, 825 N.W.2d at 894.2
[¶ 9.] In determining whether a defendant has stated a fair and just reason for withdrawing a guilty plea, this Court and other jurisdictions have considered a number of factors including: whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty; United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir.2003) ; State v. Grosh, 387 N.W.2d 503, 506 (S.D.1986) ; whether the defendant asserts she is innocent; Heid, 651 F.3d at 853–54 ; Grosh, 387 N.W.2d at 506 ; delay between the defendant's plea and request for withdrawal of the plea; Heid, 651 F.3d at 854 ; whether the defendant received competent assistance of counsel in making the decision to plead guilty; Bowman, 348 F.3d at 414 ; whether withdrawing the plea will prejudice the prosecution of the defendant; Heid, 651 F.3d at 854 ; Schmidt, 2012 S.D. 77, ¶ 23, 825 N.W.2d at 896 ; and whether withdrawing the plea will waste judicial resources; Bowman, 348 F.3d at 414. However, this is hardly a checklist. The ultimate determination of whether a defendant has presented a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of the trial court; we will set aside such a determination only when it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Pentecost, 2015 S.D. 71, ¶ 9, 868 N.W.2d at 593.
[¶ 10.] Kvasnicka does not dispute that her plea was voluntary or that she understood her constitutional rights at the time she pleaded guilty. Instead, she asserts the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea because her "decision to plead guilty stemmed from her own fear of going forward to a jury trial" and because "she had no recollection as to how she was handling the vehicle she was driving on the night of July 10, 2010." Under the circumstances of this case, Kvasnicka has not presented a fair and just reason for withdrawing her plea.
[¶ 11.] Kvasnicka's assertion that she should have been allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because she was unable to recall the events of July 10, 2010, is meritless. At the August 15, 2013 plea hearing, the court asked the State to recite the factual basis for Kvasnicka's plea. Among other things, the State said:
After the State concluded its recitation of the facts, the court had the following discussion with Kvasnicka:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Uhre, 28279
...of permissible choices[.]" State v. Stanley , 2017 S.D. 32, ¶ 22, 896 N.W.2d 669, 678 (quoting State v. Kvasnicka , 2016 S.D. 2, ¶ 7, 873 N.W.2d 705, 708 ). We review the trial court’s findings of fact justifying a courtroom closure for clear error. State v. Rolfe (Rolfe II ), 2014 S.D. 47,......
- Smizer v. Drey, 27192.
-
State v. Stanley
...say the circuit court's decision was "a choice outside the range of permissible choices[.]" State v. Kvasnicka , 2016 S.D. 2, ¶ 7, 873 N.W.2d 705, 708 (quoting Gartner v. Temple , 2014 S.D. 74, ¶ 7, 855 N.W.2d 846, 850 ). Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stanley'......
-
State v. Pentecost
...is a valid reason to deny a defendant's request to withdraw a plea after sentencing. See State v. Kvasnicka, 2016 S.D. 2, ¶¶ 17–18, 873 N.W.2d 705, 712–13 (holding that prejudice to state prosecution is a factor weighing against withdrawal of a guilty plea).[¶ 28.] Our review of the record ......