State v. Lacourse
| Decision Date | 27 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Yor–16–160 |
| Citation | 159 A.3d 847 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Nathan J. LACOURSE |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Jamesa J. Drake, Esq. (orally), Drake Law, LLC, Auburn, for appellant Nathan J. Lacourse
Kathryn Loftus Slattery, District Attorney, and Thomas R. Miscio, Esq. (orally), Prosecutorial District # 1, Alfred, for appellee State of Maine
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
[¶ 1] Based on events occurring during his ten-year-long marriage to the victim, Nathan J. Lacourse was convicted after a jury trial of domestic violence assault, domestic violence stalking, and endangering the welfare of a child.
[¶ 2] Lacourse now appeals from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court (York County, O'Neil, J. ) as to the charge of domestic violence assault (Class D), 17–A M.R.S. § 207–A(1)(A) (2016). We conclude that the trial record contains insufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct forming the basis for that crime occurred within the applicable limitations period. We therefore must vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal on the domestic violence assault charge. We also remand for the court to determine whether resentencing is necessary as to the stalking and endangering the welfare of a child charges.
[¶ 3] Although, as noted above, Lacourse was also convicted of domestic violence stalking and endangering the welfare of a child, he challenges only the domestic violence assault conviction on appeal. We therefore do not discuss facts relevant only to his other convictions.
[¶ 4] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury rationally could have found the following relevant facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Fay , 2015 ME 160, ¶ 2, 130 A.3d 364. At some point during Lacourse's ten-year-long marriage with the victim, Lacourse hit the victim with a ruler on her lower back, causing her pain and leaving a welt.
[¶ 5] On June 6, 2013, a York County grand jury returned an eight-count indictment charging Lacourse, in Count VII, with domestic violence assault (Class D), 17–A M.R.S. § 207–A(1)(A).1 The portion of the indictment setting forth that charge stated:
On or about August 30, 2012, in Hollis, YORK County, Maine, NATHAN J LACOURSE , did intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause bodily injury or offensive physical contact to [the victim]. This conduct was committed against a family or household member as defined by 19–A M.R.S.A. § 4002(4).
As part of discovery, the State provided to Lacourse seventeen journals, or diaries, that the victim kept during the course of her relationship with Lacourse. One of the journals contained an entry dated "8/23/12"2 stating that Lacourse struck the victim with a ruler "the other day." The same journal also contained an entry "written 8/29/12" describing an incident in which Lacourse squeezed the victim's hand to the point of causing pain and would not let go.
[¶ 6] Lacourse moved for a bill of particulars pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 16(c)(1) (Tower 2012–2013),3 arguing that the indictment was too vague for him to prepare his defense and asking the court to order the State to "confirm" that the domestic violence assault charge "correspond[ed] to" the incident described in the journal in which Lacourse squeezed the victim's hand. The court (O'Neil, J. ) denied Lacourse's motion.
[¶ 7] A jury trial was held on December 10 through December 13, 2013. During the State's opening statement, the prosecutor referred to an "instance[ ] of physical abuse ... where [Lacourse] hit [the victim] with a ruler on her back, hard enough to leave a mark." In a chambers conference after opening statements, Lacourse argued that he had been unaware that the State would seek to introduce evidence of the "ruler" incident because the State had given him the impression, in an off-the-record conversation during the hearing on the motion for a bill of particulars, that the "hand squeeze" incident formed the factual basis for the domestic violence assault charge. After some discussion, the court required the State to "pick an event," and the prosecutor eventually indicated that the factual basis for the charge was "the slap with the ruler to her back."
[¶ 8] During trial, on direct examination, the victim testified that her marriage to Lacourse began in August 2003 and that she left the couple's home in March 2013. She described the "ruler incident" in response to the prosecutor's question, "During the course of your relationship was [Lacourse] ever physically abusive with you?" The victim testified that "he did hit me with a ruler once on my lower back," but the State did not ask when the incident occurred, and the victim did not testify as to a specific date or time period. None of the victim's journals or journal entries was admitted in evidence at trial.4
[¶ 9] After the State rested, Lacourse moved for a judgment of acquittal, see M.R. Crim. P. 29, arguing, as to the domestic violence assault charge, that the State presented insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty. The court denied the motion. The jury found Lacourse guilty of domestic violence assault.
[¶ 10] Three days later, Lacourse filed a written motion for a judgment of acquittal, see M.R. Crim. P. 29(b), arguing principally that he was unfairly surprised at trial by the evidence about the "ruler" incident. He also stated that the jury "could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct took place within the statute of limitations" because "the jury was never presented with any testimony or evidence regarding the date of the ruler slapping incident." The court denied the motion. The court then entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Lacourse on the domestic violence assault conviction to 364 days in jail, with all but six months suspended, and two years of probation with conditions that included completion of a certified batterer's intervention program.5 Lacourse appealed.6
[¶ 11] The criminal code provides that "[i]t is a defense that prosecution was commenced after the expiration of the applicable period of limitations." 17–A M.R.S. § 8(1) (2016). "The State is not required to negate any facts expressly designated as a ‘defense[ ]’ ... unless the existence of the defense ... is in issue as a result of evidence admitted at the trial that is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue ...." 17–A M.R.S. § 101(1) (2012).7 Evidence that "make[s] the existence of all the facts constituting [a] defense a reasonable hypothesis for the fact-finder to entertain" is sufficient to place the defense "in issue" within the meaning of section 101(1). State v. Graham , 2004 ME 34, ¶ 12, 845 A.2d 558 (quotation marks omitted). If the evidence generates the defense, "the State must disprove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt." 17–A M.R.S. § 101(1).8 Thus, relevant to this case, if a statutory defense was "in issue" within the meaning of section 101(1), the State was required to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
[¶ 12] We review the record in the light most favorable to the defendant to determine whether the evidence generates a particular defense. State v. Gagnier , 2015 ME 115, ¶ 13, 123 A.3d 207. "[T]he State's burden to disprove a statutory defense generated by the evidence is the functional equivalent of the State's burden to prove all of the elements of the offense." State v. Hernandez , 1998 ME 73, ¶ 7, 708 A.2d 1022 (quotation marks omitted). To determine whether the State presented sufficient evidence to disprove a statutory defense that has been generated by the evidence, therefore, we view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether a jury could rationally have found [the nonexistence of the defense] proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Adams , 2015 ME 30, ¶ 19, 113 A.3d 583 (quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Upton , 559 F.3d 3, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2009) ().
[¶ 13] "A prosecution for a Class D or Class E crime must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed." 17–A M.R.S. § 8(2)(B) (2012).9 A prosecution is commenced when the relevant charging document is filed, 17–A M.R.S. § 8(6)(B) (2016), and "[a] crime is committed when every element thereof has occurred, or if the crime consists of a continuing course of conduct, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated," 17–A M.R.S. § 8(6)(A) (2016). Here, because Lacourse was charged with domestic violence assault as a Class D crime, see 17–A M.R.S. § 207–A(1)(A), the applicable limitations period was three years, see 17–A M.R.S. § 8(2)(B). The prosecution was commenced when the State filed the indictment on June 6, 2013. Criminal conduct occurring before June 6, 2010, was therefore outside the limitations period.
[¶ 14] Viewed in the light most favorable to Lacourse, see Gagnier , 2015 ME 115, ¶ 13, 123 A.3d 207, the victim's direct testimony was "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue" of whether the alleged criminal conduct occurred within the limitations period, 17–A M.R.S. § 101(1). The victim testified that she and Lacourse had been married since August 2003, but no evidence was admitted describing when the conduct forming the factual basis for the domestic violence assault charge occurred. To the contrary, the victim described the "ruler" incident in response to a question about whether Lacourse was physically abusive "[d]uring the course of [the] relationship."10
[¶ 15] The State was therefore required to present evidence sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the incident...
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