State v. Lane

• Decision Date: 24 October 2022
• Docket Number: 1-21-33
• Citation: 202 N.E.3d 45
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daysha N. LANE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

202 N.E.3d 45

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Daysha N. LANE, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 1-21-33

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Allen County.

Date of Decision: October 24, 2022

Gregory Scott Robey, Maple Heights, for Appellant.

Jana E. Emerick, Lima, for Appellee.

MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Daysha N. Lane, appeals the August 5, 2021 judgment of sentence of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} On November 14, 2019, the Allen County Grand Jury indicted Lane on two counts: Count One of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(4)(e), a first-degree felony, and Count Two of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(6)(b), a fourth-degree felony. Each count also contained a firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.141(A), a specification for forfeiture of a gun in a drug case pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417(A), and a specification for forfeiture of money in a drug case in violation of R.C. 2941.1417(A). Lane appeared for arraignment on November 22, 2019 and pleaded not guilty to the counts and specifications in the indictment. The trial court also appointed Lane trial counsel.

{¶3} A jury trial was held on June 7-8, 2021. On June 8, 2021, the jury found Lane guilty as charged in the indictment.

{¶4} Lane's sentencing hearing was held on July 21, 2021. At the hearing, the trial court determined that Count One, possession of cocaine, and Count Two, possession of heroin, did not merge for sentencing. However, the trial court found that the firearm specifications merged, and the State elected to have the trial court sentence Lane on the firearm specification associated with Count One. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Lane to a mandatory term of six years in prison for Count and an additional one-year-mandatory prison term for the firearm specification associated with that charge. With respect to Count Two, the trial court sentenced Lane to a nonmandatory term of 12 months. The trial court ordered the sentence for Count Two to be served concurrently to the sentence for Count One making for an aggregate prison term of 7 to 10 years. The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on the August 5, 2021.

{¶5} On August 11, 2021, Lane filed her notice of appeal. She raises nine assignments of error. For ease of discussion, we will address several of her assignments of error together and out of order.

Assignment of Error No. I

The State failed to present sufficient evidence to support criminal convictions of Appellant, resulting in substantive and procedural due process violations.

Assignment of Error No. II

The convictions of Appellant are against the manifest weight of the evidence presented, and said convictions must be vacated.

Assignment of Error No. IV

The trial court erred when it denied Appellant's Rule 29 Motion, with regard to Counts One, and the firearm specifications.

{¶6} We elect to address Lane's first, second, and fourth assignments of error together as they concern related issues. In Lane's first assignment of error, she argues her convictions for each count and the related firearm specifications are not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, in her first assignment of error, Lane contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence that she possessed the firearms and drugs giving rise to the offenses. In her second assignment of error, Lane argues that her convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In her fourth assignment of error, Lane alleges that the trial court erred by denying her Crim.R. 29 motion with respect to Count One and the firearm specifications.

Standards for Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence and Manifest-Weight Review

{¶7} Manifest "weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are clearly different legal concepts." State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Accordingly, we address each legal concept individually.

{¶8} "An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds , State v. Smith , 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). Consequently, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. "In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact." State v. Jones , 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, 2013 WL 5864591, ¶ 33.

{¶9} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, " ‘weight[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ " Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin , 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass , 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). When applying the manifest weight standard, "[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court's judgment." State v. Haller , 3d Dist. Allen, 2012-Ohio-5233, 982 N.E.2d 111, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter , 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119, 960 N.E.2d 955.

Lane's Offenses

{¶10} We first review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Lane's convictions. Lane was found guilty of possession of cocaine and possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(4)(e) and R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(6)(b), respectively. Lane was also found guilty of the firearm specifications associated with both counts.

{¶11} Possession of drugs under R.C. 2925.11(A) provides, "No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog."

{¶12} The firearm specification attached to each of the possession offenses pursuant to R.C. 2941.141(A) requires that "the offender had a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control while committing the offense." R.C. 2941.141(A).

{¶13} On appeal, Lane argues only that there is insufficient evidence that she possessed the drugs and firearm. Because possession is the only element Lane challenges on appeal, our review will be limited to determining whether sufficient evidence was presented that Lane possessed the cocaine, heroin, and firearm. Compare State v. Watts , 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-12-34, 2016-Ohio-257, 2016 WL 363480, ¶ 43.

{¶14} " ‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found." R.C. 2925.01(K). "The issue of whether a person charged with drug possession knowingly possessed a controlled substance ‘is to be determined from all the attendant facts and circumstances available.’ " State v. Brooks , 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-11-11, 2012-Ohio-5235, 2012 WL 5507092, ¶ 45, quoting State v. Teamer , 82 Ohio St.3d 490, 492, 696 N.E.2d 1049 (1998).

{¶15} "Possession of drugs can be either actual or constructive." State v. Bustamante , 3d Dist. Seneca Nos. 13-12-26 and 13-13-04, 2013-Ohio-4975, 2013 WL 6034715, ¶ 25, citing State v. Cooper , 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-06-49, 2007-Ohio-4937, 2007 WL 2757632, ¶ 25, citing State v. Wolery , 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 329, 348 N.E.2d 351 (1976) and State v. Haynes , 25 Ohio St.2d 264, 267 N.E.2d 787 (1971). " ‘A person has ‘constructive possession’ if he is able to exercise dominion and control over an item, even if the individual does not have immediate physical possession of it." Id. , citing State v. Hankerson , 70 Ohio St.2d 87, 434 N.E.2d 1362 (1982), syllabus and Wolery at 329, 348 N.E.2d 351. "For constructive possession to exist, ‘[i]t must also be shown that the person was conscious of the presence of the object.’ " Id. , quoting Hankerson at 91, 434 N.E.2d 1362. "Finally, the State may prove the existence of the various elements of constructive possession of contraband by circumstantial evidence alone." Id. , citing State v. Stewart , 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-08-18, 2009-Ohio-3411, 2009 WL 2005360, ¶ 51. See also Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d at 272-273, 574 N.E.2d 492. "Absent a defendant's admission, the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the defendant's actions, are evidence that the trier of fact can consider in determining whether the defendant had constructive possession." State v. Voll , 3d Dist. Union No. 14-12-04, 2012-Ohio-3900, 2012 WL 3679556, ¶ 19, citing State v. Norman , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-298, 2003-Ohio-7038, 2003 WL 22999499, ¶ 31 and State v. Baker , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-627, 2003-Ohio-633, 2003 WL 283176, ¶ 23. "Although a defendant's mere proximity to drugs is in itself insufficient to establish constructive possession, proximity to the drugs may constitute some evidence of constructive possession." State v. Brown , 4th Dist. Athens No. 09CA3, 2009-Ohio-5390, 2009 WL 3236206, ¶ 20, citing State v. Fry , 4th Dist. Jackson No. 03CA26, 2004-Ohio-5747, 2004...