State v. Langdon

• Decision Date: 24 July 2020
• Docket Number: NO. CAAP-19-0000002,CAAP-19-0000002
• Citation: 472 P.3d 31
• Parties: STATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David R. LANGDON, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Hawaii Court of Appeals

472 P.3d 31

STATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.David R. LANGDON, Defendant-Appellant

NO. CAAP-19-0000002

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai‘i.

JULY 24, 2020

On the briefs:

Sonja P. McCullen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, City and County of Honolulu, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David R. Langdon, Self-Represented, Defendant-Appellant.

GINOZA, CHIEF JUDGE, LEONARD and CHAN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHAN, J.

Defendant-Appellant David R. Langdon (Langdon), self-represented, appeals from the Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment, filed on December 19, 2018, in the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu Division (District Court).¹ Langdon was found to have violated Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 286-25 (Supp. 2017),² Operation of a vehicle or moped without a certificate of inspection, and HRS § 249-14.1 (Supp. 2017),³ Number plates for mopeds. On appeal, as he did below, Langdon challenges the legality of Act 200 of the 2016 Session Laws of Hawai‘i, which enacted HRS § 249-14.1 and amended HRS § 286-25. 2016 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 200, §§ 1, 10 at 612, 615. As explained below, we affirm the District Court's ruling that Langdon violated HRS § 286-25 and reverse the ruling that Langdon violated HRS § 249-14.1.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 23, 2018, Langdon was issued a citation for operating a moped without a certificate of inspection and a moped license plate, in violation of HRS §§ 286-25 and 249-14.1. The "Officer's Observations" section of the citation stated: "Observed moped traveling W on Malia St approaching [ ] Kilauea Ave - no license plate or safety decal on moped - only decal [illegible] he didn't believe he should have to register moped b/c he should be ‘grandfathered in.’ "

On August 9, 2018, Langdon filed a written statement contesting the citation. Langdon admitted that he did not have a new certificate of inspection or a new moped plate, but challenged the legality of the underlying law as applied.

After the District Court initially entered judgment in favor of the State and against Langdon for both violations, Langdon filed a Request for Trial.

On December 19, 2018, the District Court held a trial de novo and vacated the prior judgment. Langdon was "arraigned" as follows:

[MS. PROSECUTOR:] As to Count 1, on or about July 23rd, 2018, in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawai‘i, you, David Roy Langdon, operated, permitted the operation of, caused the operation of, or parked a vehicle or moped on a public highway without a current official certificate of inspection, thereby violating section 286-25 of the Hawai‘i Revised Statutes.

As to Count 2, on or about Sep -- July 23rd, 2018, in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawai‘i, you, David Roy Langdon, failed to securely fasten the number plate on the rear of the moped at a location provided by the manufacturer or in the absence of such a location upon the bumper of the moped as in conformance with section 291-31 in such a manner as to prevent the plate from swinging and defendant failed to display the number plate entirely unobscured and be kept reasonably clean in violation of section 249-14.1 of the Hawai‘i Revised Statutes.

The State introduced Exhibit 1, a document by the City and County of Honolulu, Department of Customer Service Motor Vehicle Registration, certifying Langdon was the registered owner of a moped with license plate Z26629. The exhibit was admitted without objection.

After Langdon offered his own exhibit and commented on it, the District Court apparently construed his comments and the statements made in his document as a motion to dismiss. The District Court denied the motion. Langdon's document was admitted into evidence as Exhibit A. Exhibit A included a letter dated July 25, 2018, in which Langdon asserted that Act 200 of the 2016 Session Laws of Hawai‘i was illegally applied because: (1) it was a bill of attainder and/or ex post facto law and an abridgment of constitutional protections; (2) it violated due process because it requires mopeds to obtain a safety inspection; (3) the City and County of Honolulu committed "fraud of issuance" when it previously issued to Langdon a "permanent license"; and (4) a proper interpretation of Act 200 reflects that it did not invalidate all current permanent moped registrations. Exhibit A also included a letter dated August 14, 2017, from the City and County of Honolulu, Department of Customer Services, informing Langdon that Act 200 required annual moped registration and safety inspections and "will also invalidate all current permanent moped registrations."

Officer Jenna Lynn Shimabuku (Officer Shimabuku) testified that she is a police officer and was on duty on July 23, 2018, when she cited Langdon for not having a license plate and safety check for a moped. She observed him on Malia Street, which is a public way, street, or highway in the City and County of Honolulu. Langdon drew her attention because he did not have a larger license plate that was supposed to be issued by the end of 2017. When she informed Langdon of his violations, Langdon stated that he did not believe he should have to get a license plate or safety check because he should be "grandfathered in." The license decal on his moped was Z26629. The District Court approved the State's request for the record to reflect that Exhibit 1 was proof that Langdon's moped license was Z26629 and that he was the registered owner.

During his testimony, Langdon stated his various arguments challenging the legality of Act 200, as asserted in his Exhibit A. However, Langdon again admitted he did not have a new moped license plate or safety inspection.

The District Court ultimately concluded as to Count 1 that Langdon had no current safety check and as to Count 2 had not secured a new moped registration as required. On December 19, 2018, the District Court filed its Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment, finding that Langdon violated HRS §§ 286-25 and 249-14.1.

II. POINTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Langdon reasserts his arguments below challenging the legality of Act 200 of the 2016 Session Laws of Hawai‘i. 2016 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 200, §§ 1, 10 at 612, 615. Langdon argues that Act 200 was illegal as applied and violated his rights because: (1) it was a bill of attainder and/or ex post facto law and an abridgment of constitutional protections; (2) it violated due process because it automatically deems mopeds without a safety inspection sticker to be unsafe; (3) its requirements rendered the City and County of Honolulu's previous issuance of a "permanent license" to be "fraud of issuance"; and (4) a proper interpretation of Act 200 reflects that it did not invalidate all current permanent moped registrations.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

"Statutory interpretation ‘is a question of law reviewable de novo .’ " Citizens Against Reckless Dev. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 114 Hawai‘i 184, 193, 159 P.3d 143, 152 (2007) (quoting State v. Levi, 102 Hawai‘i 282, 285, 75 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2003) ). When construing statutes, this court is governed by the following rules:

First, the fundamental starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Second, where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of statutory construction is our foremost obligation to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists.

When there is ambiguity in a statute, "the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning." Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent, such as legislative history, or the reason and spirit of the law.

Id. at 193-94, 159 P.3d at 152-53 (citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Act 200 is not a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law.

Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution states: "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility." "A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial." Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866). "However expansive the prohibition against bills of attainder, it surely was not intended to serve as a variant of the equal protection doctrine, invalidating every Act of Congress or the States that legislatively burdens some persons or groups but not all other plausible individuals." Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977) (footnotes omitted).

With respect to the Ex Post Facto Clause, the United States Supreme Court has stated:

By an ex post facto law is meant one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required.

Cummings, 71 U.S. at 325-26.

We must ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish civil proceedings. If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State's intentions to deem it civil.

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has stated:

The "i

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