State v. Langdon

Citation110 S.W.3d 807
Decision Date29 July 2003
Docket NumberNo. SC 85086.,SC 85086.
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Michael C. LANGDON, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

William J. Ekiss, St. Louis, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Evan J. Buchheim, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Respondent.

LAURA DENVIR STITH, Judge.

Michael C. Langdon was convicted of the class C felony of receiving stolen property by retaining it, in violation of section 570.080,1 and was sentenced to 9 months in jail and fined $1,000.2 Mr. Langdon appeals, arguing the state failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he retained property knowing or believing it to be stolen, an essential element of the crime of which he was convicted. Because the evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Langdon retained stolen property, this Court reverses.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Fearing he would lose his savings in a Y2K computer glitch, Kevin Dunnerman withdrew approximately $4,500 from his bank in December 1999. He placed the money, along with three handguns, in a locked briefcase that he kept in his bedroom. One of the handguns was a 9-mm Smith and Wesson, for which Mr. Dunnerman had a permit. Mr. Dunnerman did not have a permit for the other two guns. On Christmas Eve 1999, Mr. Dunnerman discovered his briefcase was missing and contacted the authorities.

Mr. Dunnerman told the police that he had only discussed the withdrawal of his savings with one person prior to the burglary, Robert Peyton Coleman, a co-worker. Because Mr. Coleman had once given Mr. Dunnerman a ride to work, he was also familiar with where Mr. Dunnerman lived. The police contacted Mr. Coleman a few days after talking with Mr. Dunnerman about the burglary, but he denied any wrongdoing.

For reasons apparently unrelated to the burglary of Mr. Dunnerman's home, the police obtained a warrant to search Nathan Speaks' home on March 31, 2000. Nathan lived in the home of his stepfather, defendant Michael Langdon, along with Mr. Langdon's wife and teenage daughter. While conducting the search, police came upon one of Mr. Dunnerman's stolen handguns in the Langdon garage.

The police also searched the three bedrooms in the Langdon home. No witnesses at trial testified with certainty as to who lived in which bedroom, although a police witness indicated that, from the décor, police surmised that the downstairs bedroom belonged to a young man such as Nathan, an upstairs bedroom containing a twin bed belonged to Mr. Langdon's teenage daughter, and the master bedroom belonged to Mr. and Mrs. Langdon.

The master bedroom had two closets, one containing women's clothing and the other men's clothing. In the latter closet, police found several guns, including numerous rifles, shotguns, and pistols stored in a plastic case, as well as a cardboard box filled with different types of ammunition. They later determined that Mr. Langdon did not have a St. Charles County permit for any of these guns and that none of these guns were stolen.

The police also searched a nine-drawer dresser located in the master bedroom. In one of the drawers, they discovered Mr. Dunnerman's 9-mm Smith and Wesson partially covered by clothing, along with several containers of ammunition. Mr. Langdon did not have a St. Charles County permit for the gun; as a 20-year-old, Nathan was too young to have a permit for a gun.

There is no dispute that the gun found in the dresser drawer is in fact one of the guns that was stolen from Mr. Dunnerman. The issue is whether the state has shown that Mr. Langdon possessed the gun and did so knowing or believing it was stolen and with an intent to deprive the owner of it. The record shows that Nathan's friend, Mr. Coleman, admitted to police in April 2000, about a month after the search of the Langdon home, that he had passed on information about Mr. Dunnerman's withdrawal of money to Nathan and that a week after the burglary Nathan gave him $2,000 as his share of the spoils. Mr. Coleman later pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property based on that $2,000 payment from Nathan, received a jail sentence, and was ordered to pay Mr. Dunnerman $2,000 as restitution.

While Mr. Coleman's confession implicated Nathan in the burglary, the police did not arrest Nathan for the burglary, although the record does not indicate whether this is because the evidence of his participation is equivocal, or for some other reason. Mr. Coleman did not implicate Mr. Langdon or indicate that the latter had any knowledge of the burglary. Mr. Langdon did not give any statement either admitting or denying that the room was his, that the gun was his, or that he knew about the existence of the gun or believed that it was stolen. Nonetheless, the police arrested Mr. Langdon and charged him with "retaining" the 9-mm Smith and Wesson found in the dresser, although the police did not charge him with retaining the weapon found in the garage. From these facts, it appears that his arrest was based on the fact police found the weapon in the dresser containing men's clothing in what appeared to be his bedroom.

At Mr. Langdon's trial, Mr. Dunnerman, Mr. Coleman, and an officer who searched the home (but not the officer who found the 9-mm handgun) testified to the above facts. The jury was also shown photographs of the master bedroom, the guns and ammunition in the closet, and the drawer where the 9-mm handgun and ammunition were found. The record is not clear as to what type of ammunition was in the drawer and which gun or guns it was for, although the photographs show that the drawer contained more than one type of ammunition.3 Finally, an employee of the St. Charles County sheriff's department testified that St. Charles County records did not indicate that Mr. Langdon had applied for a permit there for the 9-mm Smith and Wesson handgun or, indeed, for any of his other guns. She also testified that her records would not reflect whether he had applied for any permits or registered his guns elsewhere.

Mr. Langdon moved for acquittal at the close of the state's evidence, arguing that the above evidence was insufficient to show that he knowingly retained a stolen gun. The court overruled the motion. Mr. Langdon chose to rest on his motion for acquittal and presented no evidence. The jury convicted him of receiving stolen property. Mr. Langdon appealed. Following opinion by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court determines whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying this standard, the Court:

must look to the elements of the crime and consider each in turn.... [The Court is] required to take the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and to grant the State all reasonable inferences from the evidence. [The Court] disregard[s] contrary inferences, unless they are such a natural and logical extension of the evidence that a reasonable juror would be unable to disregard them. Taking the evidence in this light, [the Court] consider[s] whether a reasonable juror could find each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 411 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 997, 114 S.Ct. 562, 126 L.Ed.2d 462 (1993).

Courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and give the state the benefit of all reasonable inferences. But, in so doing, courts will not supply missing evidence or give the state the benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced inferences. State v. Whalen, 49 S.W.3d 181, 184 (Mo. banc 2001).

III. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF RETAINING STOLEN PROPERTY
A. Elements of Retaining Stolen Property Include Proof of Scienter

This Court agrees with Mr. Langdon that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense of retaining stolen property in violation of section 570.080. That statute states in relevant part that "[a] person commits the crime of receiving stolen property if for the purpose of depriving the owner of a lawful interest therein, he receives, retains or disposes of property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has been stolen." Sec. 570.080 (emphasis added).

In resolving this issue, it is important to keep in mind that Mr. Langdon is not charged with theft of the gun, but with retaining a stolen gun. The cases require that, to convict a person under section 570.080 for retaining stolen property, the state must show that: (1) defendant retained the property that was stolen; (2) defendant exercised dominion over the property by retaining it; (3) defendant knew or believed that the property was stolen; and (4) defendant intended to deprive the owner of a lawful interest in the property. Sec. 570.080; State v. Bird, 1 S.W.3d 62, 63-64 (Mo.App. E.D.1999).

Accordingly, the verdict director below stated:

If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that on or about March 31, 2000, in the County of St. Charles, State of Missouri, the defendant retained a Smith & Wesson Model 915 9mm Semi-Automatic pistol, serial # VCH1210, and

Second, that the Smith & Wesson Model 915 9mm Semi-Automatic pistol, serial # VCH1210 was the property of another, and

Third, that at the time defendant retained this property, he knew or believed it had been stolen, and

Fourth, that defendant retained the property for the purpose of withholding it from the owner permanently, and

Fifth, that the property had a value of at least one hundred fifty dollars,

then you will find the defendant guilty of receiving stolen property.

. . . .

Mr. Langdon did not contest the portions of the verdict...

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