State v. Lanier, 8022SC687
| Decision Date | 20 January 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 8022SC687,8022SC687 |
| Citation | 273 S.E.2d 746,50 N.C.App. 383 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Bobby George LANIER. |
Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Asst. Atty. Gen. George W. Lennon, Raleigh, for the State.
Leonard & Snyder by James E. Snyder, Jr., Lexington, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the State's witness as to the actions of the bloodhound and in refusing to grant his motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. We agree with both contentions.
In State v. McLeod, 196 N.C. 542, 545, 146 S.E. 409, 411 (1929), our Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Stacy, set forth the rule on admission of evidence regarding actions of bloodhounds as follows:
It is fully recognized in this jurisdiction that the action of bloodhounds may be received in evidence when it is properly shown: (1) that they are of pure blood, and of a stock characterized by acuteness of scent and power of discrimination; (2) that they possess these qualities, and have been accustomed and trained to pursue the human track; (3) that they have been found by experience reliable in such pursuit; (4) and that in the particular case they were put on the trail of the guilty party, which was pursued and followed under such circumstances and in such way as to afford substantial assurance, or permit a reasonable inference, of identification.
This rule has been quoted with approval in recent opinions of the Supreme Court. See State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 495-497, 231 S.E.2d 833, 843-844 (1977); State v. Rowland, 263 N.C. 353, 358-361, 139 S.E.2d 661, 665-666 (1965).
We do not consider whether the evidence here met the first three McLeod requirements, for we find that it clearly failed to meet the fourth requirement. For bloodhound evidence "(t)o be considered by the jury, it is necessary for the State to show that the dog was put on the trail of the guilty party under such circumstances as to afford substantial assurance that the person trailed was, in fact, the person suspected." State v. Marze, 22 N.C.App. 628, 630, 207 S.E.2d 359, 361 (1974). Nothing in this record tends to establish that the defendant was ever at the Hartman residence. The witness Bates testified that he saw two men at the residence, but he was unable to identify them. There was no evidence whatsoever that the defendant was at the place from which the dog was released to track the thieves. There was evidence that a .22 rifle and a .12 gauge shotgun were missing from the Hartman residence, and that they were found "on the far side of the fence from the house;" but there was no evidence whatsoever placing them or other stolen items in defendant's possession or placing defendant closer than "about a mile and a half or two miles" from where they were located. There was evidence of footprints being found in the vicinity of the Hartman residence, but no evidence whatsoever indicating they were defendant's footprints. There was no evidence whatsoever that defendant was fleeing to avoid capture.
The evidence tending to "afford substantial assurance ... of identification" in McLeod was considerably greater than that here; yet, the Supreme Court in McLeod held that it should have been excluded. A fortiori, the evidence here should have been excluded. Likewise, there was...
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State v. Edwards
...were ever at the position where the dogs were released, and no physical evidence linked the defendant to the crime). Unlike the tracks in Lanier and Marze, corroborating evidence in this case supports the conclusion that Defendant was the suspect Hanzel was tracking on 14 October 2019. See ......
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Dulaney, Matter of
...to withstand the motion to dismiss." State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 383, 93 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1956); see also State v. Lanier, 50 N.C.App. 383, 388, 273 S.E.2d 746, 749-50 (1981). Viewed by these standards, we find the evidence insufficient to withstand the motions to dismiss. It tended to......
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State v. Davis, 8126SC513
...on the trail under such circumstances as to permit a reasonable inference of identification, the defendant relies on State v. Lanier, 50 N.C.App. 383, 273 S.E.2d 746 (1981) and State v. Marze, 22 N.C.App. 628, 207 S.E.2d 359 (1974). In Lanier this Court held that the testimony as to the act......
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Meaut, Matter of
...to withstand the motion to dismiss." State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 383, 93 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1956); see also, State v. Lanier, --- N.C.App. ---, 273 S.E.2d 746 (1981); State v. Smith, 40 N.C.App. 72, 252 S.E.2d 535 (1979). The adjudication and disposition orders are therefore vacated, and......
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Shakespeare in the Law
...J.). 134 Measure for Measure, III, ii, 103. 135 Measure for Measure, III, ii, 168. 136 Measure f or Measure, II, i, 19. State v. Lanier, 273 S. E.2d 746, 749 (N. C. App. 1981)(Whichard, J.) . See also State v. Serra, 529 So.2d 1262, 1263 n. I (Fla. Ct. App. 11 per curiam) an arresting offic......