State v. Lanphar
| Decision Date | 14 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 30518-6-II.,30518-6-II. |
| Citation | 102 P.3d 864,124 Wash. App. 669 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Tim James LANPHAR, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
David Schultz, R.A. Lewis, Attorneys at Law, Camas, WA, for Appellant.
Thomas C. Duffy, Attorney at Law, Vancouver, WA, for Respondent.
PART PUBLISHED OPINION
Tim James Lanphar appeals from his conviction of bail jumping for failing to appear before a supervised release officer and in court. He argues that RCW 9A.76.170, the bail jumping statute, is unconstitutional and the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. He also argues, pro se, that the trial court erred in admitting evidence and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
On December 26, 2002, the court released Lanphar from custody after the police arrested him for taking a motor vehicle without permission. The court conditioned Lanphar's release on his posting a $5,000 bail bond. And the court ordered that Lanphar be "released on conditional supervision ... to be placed in the custody of the Supervised Release Officer." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 1. The court directed Lanphar to appear in court at 9:00 A.M. on January 14, 2002, to answer the charges.
Lanphar failed to report to the supervised release officer as ordered. He also failed to appear in court on January 14, 2003, as ordered.
By second amended information, the State charged Lanphar with taking a motor vehicle without permission in the second degree (count I), a violation of RCW 9A.56.070(2), and bail jumping (count II), in violation of RCW 9A.76.170.
The matter was tried to a jury. During rebuttal argument and relying on evidence not adduced at trial, the prosecutor referred to varying dates when Lanphar should have appeared. The trial court sustained defense counsel's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the remarks.
The jury found Lanphar not guilty of count I and guilty of count II. Lanphar appeals.
Former RCW 9A.76.170(1) (2000) (emphasis added); State v. Pope, 100 Wash.App. 624, 627, 999 P.2d 51, review denied, 141 Wash.2d 1018, 10 P.3d 1074 (2000).
Lanphar first contends that the 2001 amendment unconstitutionally violates the Washington Constitution, article II, section 19. Under that constitutional provision, "[n]o bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." He argues that the new statutory language expanded beyond the bill's restrictive title relating to "escaping from custody," rendering the provision unconstitutional and void. Appellant's Br. at 7. Therefore, he asserts, the elements of the pre-July 1, 2001 bail jumping crime apply to his case and because the State did not prove that he "knowingly" failed to appear, his conviction must be reversed and dismissed.1
We presume the constitutionality of statutes. State v. Simmons, 117 Wash.App. 682, 688, 73 P.3d 380 (2003), aff'd, 152 Wash.2d 450, 98 P.3d 789 (2004) (citing State v. Blank, 131 Wash.2d 230, 235, 930 P.2d 1213 (1997)). Lanphar bears the heavy burden of proving the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Simmons, 117 Wash.App. at 688, 73 P.3d 380 (citing Blank, 131 Wash.2d at 235, 930 P.2d 1213).
Lanphar takes issue with the title, suggesting that it only comprises escape from a "custody." In our review under the article 2, section 19 analysis, we construe the title with reference to the language used in it. State v. Thomas, 103 Wash.App. 800, 807, 14 P.3d 854 (2000), review denied, 143 Wash.2d 1022, 29 P.3d 719 (2001). In doing so, we examine the body of the act in determining whether the title reflects the act's subject matter. Thomas, 103 Wash.App. at 807, 14 P.3d 854.
Titles may be general or restrictive. Thomas, 103 Wash.App. at 807, 14 P.3d 854. A general title is one which is broad rather than narrow. Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 149 Wash.2d 622, 632-33, 71 P.3d 644 (2003) (citing Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183, 207, 11 P.3d 762 (2000)). In assessing whether a title is general, it is not necessary that the title contain a general statement of the subject of an act; a few well-chosen words, suggestive of the general subject stated, is all that is necessary. Responsible Wildlife, 149 Wash.2d at 632-33, 71 P.3d 644 (citing Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 209, 11 P.3d 762).
A general title broadly allows subjects that are "reasonably germane" to its title to be contained in the bill's body and even "incidental subjects or subdivisions" may be allowed. Responsible Wildlife,149 Wash.2d at 632-33,71 P.3d 644. "[A] title complies with the constitution if it gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act, or indicate to an inquiring mind the scope and purpose of the law." Wash. Fed'n, 127 Wash.2d at 555, 901 P.2d 1028.
We give general titles liberal construction. Responsible Wildlife, 149 Wash.2d at 633, 71 P.3d 644. The title need not be an index to the bill's contents or detail the bill's provisions. Retired Pub. Employees, 148 Wash.2d at 628, 62 P.3d 470; Wash. Fed'n, 127 Wash.2d at 556, 901 P.2d 1028. "`All that is required is that there be some "rational unity" between the general subject and the incidental subdivisions.'" Wash. Fed'n, 127 Wash.2d at 556, 901 P.2d 1028 (quoting State v. Grisby, 97 Wash.2d 493, 498, 647 P.2d 6 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1205, 75 L.Ed.2d 446 (1983)).
A restrictive title encompasses "a particular part or branch of a subject ... carved out and selected as the subject of the legislation." Responsible Wildlife, 149 Wash.2d at 633, 71 P.3d 644. A restrictive title limits the act's scope to that in the title. Responsible Wildlife, 149 Wash.2d at 633, 71 P.3d 644. We do not accord restrictive titles liberal construction, and we are more likely to find unconstitutional violations of the single-subject rule in a restrictively titled bill. Responsible Wildlife, 149 Wash.2d at 633, 71 P.3d 644.
The title of Laws of 2001, ch. 264, "Escaping From Custody," broadly identifies what crimes comprise an escape from custody. As such it is general. Construing it liberally, we note that custody is a "restraint pursuant to a lawful arrest or an order of a court, or any period of service on a work crew." RCW 9A.76.010(1). Here, the court ordered Lanphar to do two things, report to a supervised release officer and return to court on January 14. Thus, he was subject to a court order restraining him from acting otherwise. Bail jumping is a form of escape. Lanphar's constitutional argument fails.2
A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Schmitt v. Langenour
... ... See State v. Schmitt, 124 Wash.App. 662, 665, 102 P.3d 856 (2004). The trial court agreed and also disqualified the entire prosecutor's office because Forbes ... ...
-
State v. White, No. 56562-1-I (Wash. App. 9/18/2006)
... ... 18. RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) ... 19. See State v. Humphrey, 139 Wn. 2d 53, 58, 983 P.2d 1118 (1999) (discussing difference between `whenever' and `when' in analyzing prior version of RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) to determine the statute's triggering event for retroactivity purposes) ... 20. State v. Lanphar ... ...
- Coleman v. STATE, DSHS