State v. Laramore

• Decision Date: 30 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 33041.,33041.
• Citation: 179 P.3d 1084,145 Idaho 428
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jerry Wayne LARAMORE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

179 P.3d 1084

145 Idaho 428

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jerry Wayne LARAMORE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 33041.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

November 30, 2007.

Review Denied March 26, 2008.

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant. Michael J. Bartlett argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorello argued.

LANSING, Judge.

In this appeal from a judgment of conviction for attempted strangulation, we are called upon to determine whether the statute under which the defendant was convicted was facially void for vagueness and whether the jury instruction defining "reasonable doubt" lessened the State's burden of proof and thereby violated the defendant's right to due process.

Jerry Wayne Laramore was charged with attempted strangulation in violation of Idaho Code § 18-923. The information alleged that he committed the crime against a woman with whom Laramore was in a dating relationship. Laramore filed a motion to dismiss the charge on multiple constitutional grounds, including a contention that section 18-923 is unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied the motion and the matter proceeded to trial. At a jury instruction conference, Laramore objected to the district court's proposed jury instruction defining "reasonable doubt." He asserted that the instruction understated the State's burden of proof and therefore did not meet constitutional standards. The district court disagreed and gave the instruction. The jury returned a guilty verdict. Laramore appeals, challenging the district court's decisions on his dismissal motion and his objection to the jury instruction.

I. ANALYSIS

A. Void-for-Vagueness Challenge

The statute that Laramore was convicted of violating, I.C. § 18-923, defines the offense of attempted strangulation as follows:

(1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully chokes or attempts to strangle a household member, or a person with whom he or she has or had a dating relationship, is guilty of a felony punishable by incarceration for up to fifteen (15) years in the state prison.

(2) No injuries are required to prove attempted strangulation.

(3) The prosecution is not required to show that the defendant intended to kill or injure the victim. The only intent required is the intent to choke or attempt to strangle.

. . . .

(5) "Dating relationship" assumes the same definition as set forth in section 39-6303(2), Idaho Code.

As incorporated by reference in I.C. § 18-923(5), the definition of "dating relationship" in I.C. § 39-6303(2) is "a social relationship of a romantic nature." Laramore contends that the charge against him should have been dismissed on the ground that section 18-923 is facially void for vagueness with respect to this definition of "dating relationship" and also with respect to the mental element of the offense.

Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we review the lower court's determination de novo. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). The party attacking a statute on constitutional grounds must overcome a strong presumption of validity. Id. Appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. Id.

The vagueness doctrine is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹ "As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983). See also Gonzales v. Carhart, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1628, 167 L.Ed.2d 480, 504 (2007); Posters `N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 525, 114 S.Ct. 1747, 1754, 128 L.Ed.2d 539, 552 (1994). That is, due process requires that the statute inform citizens of what the state commands or forbids such that persons of common intelligence are not forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998). "A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1972) (footnote omitted).

A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to the defendant's specific conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. Here, Laramore asserts only a facial challenge to the statute. "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, 707 (1987); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. See also State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 12 n. 11, 696 P.2d 856, 863 n. 11 (1985). Stated differently, in a "facial vagueness" challenge, "the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371 (1982); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132.

Because a defendant "who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others . . . [a] court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495, 102 S.Ct. at 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d at 369. The reason for this suggested analytical starting point is readily apparent, for if a statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant's conduct, it necessarily is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. In evaluating Laramore's assertion that the term "dating relationship" is facially vague, however, we are unable to conduct the initial "as applied" analysis suggested in Hoffman Estates because the appellate record contains no trial transcript and thus no evidence describing the relationship between Laramore and the alleged victim.

In his brief to this Court, Laramore posits a number of hypothetical types of social relationships and argues that ordinary people would have to guess whether these hypotheticals would constitute a "dating relationship" under the statute. He asks, for example:

Is it a dating relationship if there has been only one date, whatever date means, or must there be repeated dates? How many? Is the relationship of a romantic nature if it is based only on physical intimacy but no emotional intimacy? . . . Is a relationship romantic if only one party to the relationship feels emotional or physical attraction to the other? . . . Is it a romantic relationship if it is a meaningless one night stand?

This is not a proper analysis for a facial vagueness challenge, and such an approach was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Hoffman Estates. The Court there criticized the Circuit Court of Appeals' determination that the city ordinance at issue was void for vagueness because it was unclear in some of its applications, including hypothetical circumstances. Id. at 495, 102 S.Ct. at 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d at 369. Instead of dreaming up hypotheticals in which application of the statute might be in doubt, Laramore must show that "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d at 707. That is, he must demonstrate that there is no type of relationship that plainly falls within the statutory definition of "dating relationship."

This Court can envision many circumstances that would easily fall within that definition. Only one need be identified here. See generally Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132. The statutory definition clearly applies where the perpetrator and the victim mutually share romantic interest and have gone on many public dates, as that term is commonly employed, over a protracted period of time. Therefore, Laramore's argument that the term "dating relationship" is unconstitutionally vague on its face is without merit.

Laramore also asserts that the statutory definition of the mental element of the offense is internally contradictory and therefore facially vague. Laramore argues that one cannot commit the prohibited act, "choke or attempt to strangle" another, without an intent to injure, yet in subsection (3) the statute provides that no intent to injure is required.

Laramore's claim of internal contradiction may have some merit with respect to the "attempt to strangle" component of the statute, for the most commonly understood meaning of strangle is "to compress the windpipe . . . until death results from the stoppage of respiration" or "choke to death by compressing the throat" or, at the least, "to interfere with or obstruct seriously or fatally the normal breathing" of the victim. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 2256 (1976). One cannot "attempt" to commit a crime without intending to commit the crime. See State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 558, 873 P.2d 800, 812 (1993). It would seem, therefore, that one could not attempt to strangle an individual without intending to injure. The same is not true of the "choke" component of the offense, however. Commonly, choke means "to make normal breathing difficult or impossible . . . by compressing the throat with strong external pressure." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 396. With this meaning, choking an individual generally would entail an intent to at least make the person temporarily...