State v. Lassiter, 34,478
Decision Date | 28 June 2016 |
Docket Number | NO. 34,478,34,478 |
Citation | 382 P.3d 918 |
Parties | State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Jennifer Lassiter, a/k/a Jennifer Russell, Defendant–Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Kenneth H. Stalter, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
Arlon L. Stoker, Farmington, NM, for Appellee.
{1} Defendant Jennifer Lassiter entered a plea of no contest to drug trafficking, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30–31–20 (2006), and she was sentenced by the district court. The State appeals, arguing that the district court erred in sentencing Defendant for second degree drug trafficking instead of first degree drug trafficking for a second or subsequent offense. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{2} In 2009 Defendant was charged with trafficking methamphetamine. Defendant entered a guilty plea to a first-offense drug trafficking charge and received a conditional discharge order, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 31–20–13(A) (1994). Without entering an adjudication of guilt, the district court ordered that Defendant be placed on probation for a period of three years. In 2010, Defendant was granted early release from probation. The district court entered an order of conditional discharge dismissing the drug trafficking charge.
{3} In 2013 Defendant was arrested and charged with trafficking methamphetamine and tampering with evidence. Defendant entered a plea of no contest to the drug trafficking charge. The State argued that the conviction was a second offense punishable as a first degree felony under Section 30–31–20(B)(2). Defendant argued that she should be sentenced as a first time offender since the previous charge was dismissed after she completed the terms of the conditional discharge. The district court did not consider the prior conditional discharge as a prior drug trafficking offense and sentenced Defendant for a first offense under Section 30–31–20(B)(2). This appeal followed.
{4} Whether the conduct underlying Defendant's conditional discharge in the 2009 drug trafficking case constitutes an “offense” under the enhancement provision of the trafficking statute, Section 30–31–20(B), is a question of statutory interpretation we review de novo. See State v. Holt , 2016–NMSC–011, ¶ 9, 368 P.3d 409. In interpreting statutory language, “our main goal ... is to give effect to the Legislature's intent.” State v. Hall , 2013–NMSC–001, ¶ 9, 294 P.3d 1235. “To discern the Legislature's intent, [this] Court looks first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.” State v. Almanzar , 2014–NMSC–001, ¶ 14, 316 P.3d 183 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). However, “[i]f the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” State v. Chavez , 2016–NMCA–016, ¶ 7, 365 P.3d 61 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. granted , 2016–NMCERT–001, 370 P.3d 474. Where “the relevant statutory language is unclear, ambiguous, or reasonably subject to multiple interpretations, then [this] Court should proceed with further statutory analysis.” Almanzar , 2014–NMSC–001, ¶ 15, 316 P.3d 183.
{5} In 2009 Defendant entered a guilty plea to a drug trafficking charge and received a conditional discharge pursuant to Section 31–20–13. Section 31–20–13(A) provides that:
When a person who has not been previously convicted of a felony offense is found guilty of a crime for which a deferred or suspended sentence is authorized, the court may, without entering an adjudication of guilt, enter a conditional discharge order and place the person on probation on terms and conditions authorized by [NMSA 1978,] Section[ ] 31–20–5 [ (2003) ] and [NMSA 1978, Section] 31–20–6 [ (2007) ]. A conditional discharge order may only be made available once with respect to any person.
{6} Under Section 31–20–13(A), a court entering an order of conditional discharge must also place the defendant on probation. Upon successful completion of probation, the charges against the defendant must be dismissed without an adjudication of guilt. See, e.g. , State v. C.L. , 2010–NMCA–050, ¶ 8, 148 N.M. 837, 242 P.3d 404 ( ). A conditional discharge entered without an adjudication of guilt is not considered a conviction. See State v. Harris , 2013–NMCA–031, ¶ 3, 297 P.3d 374 ( ); see also State v. Herbstman , 1999–NMCA–014, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 683, 974 P.2d 177 ( ).
{7} The State acknowledges that a conditional discharge is not considered a conviction under New Mexico law. However, the drug trafficking statute does not prescribe an enhanced sentence after a defendant's first conviction, but rather after the first offense . See § 30–31–20(B) (). Therefore, the State argues that the conditional discharge entered in Defendant's 2009 drug trafficking case should be considered a first offense for the purpose of enhancing her current drug trafficking sentence.
{8} Section 30–31–20 does not define the term “offense” as it is used in that section. The State asserts that an offense is simply an illegal act, whereas a conviction is a legal judgment that a person is guilty of a crime. This view is oversimplified. In its most basic form, an “offense” is defined as “[a] violation of the law[ or] a crime.” Black's Law Dictionary 1250 (10th ed. 2014). However, the term “offense” carries many connotations. See id. The State's blurred distinctions between an illegal act and a criminal offense and these broad connotations do not provide much guidance in determining whether the conduct underlying the conditional discharge constitutes an offense.
{9} As the State noted, a conditional discharge has legal and practical consequences. The language of Section 31–20–13 indicates that a conditional discharge is a punishment for underlying criminal conduct. A conditional discharge may not be entered unless there is an initial finding of guilt on the underlying conduct. Id. Upon a finding of guilt on the underlying criminal conduct, the defendant is placed on probation, which New Mexico courts have long recognized as a form of punishment. See State v. Villalobos , 1998–NMSC–036, ¶ 12, 126 N.M. 255, 968 P.2d 766 (); State v. Baca , 2004–NMCA–049, ¶ 17, 135 N.M. 490, 90 P.3d 509 ; State v. Donaldson , 1983–NMCA–064, ¶ 33, 100 N.M. 111, 666 P.2d 1258 . Accordingly, New Mexico courts have consistently recognized a conditional discharge under Section 31–20–13 as punishment for criminal conduct. See In re Treinen , 2006–NMSC–013, ¶ 3, 139 N.M. 318, 131 P.3d 1282 ( ); Harris , 2013–NMCA–031, ¶ 7, 297 P.3d 374 ( ); Vives v. Verzino , 2009–NMCA–083, ¶ 15, 146 N.M. 673, 213 P.3d 823 ( ); Herbstman , 1999–NMCA–014, ¶ 11, 126 N.M. 683, 974 P.2d 177 ( ).
{10} Moreover, a defendant who receives a conditional discharge will face some long-term consequences. The entry of a conditional discharge order precludes the defendant from receiving a conditional discharge for subsequent charges. See § 31–20–13. The criminal charges and conditional discharge order will remain part of the defendant's criminal record, even after the completion of probation. See C.L. , 2010–NMCA–050, ¶¶ 7, 15, 148 N.M. 837, 242 P.3d 404 (...
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