State v. Laughlin

• Decision Date: 09 December 1887
• Citation: 35 N.W. 448,73 Iowa 351
• Parties: STATE v. LAUGHLIN.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

73 Iowa 351

35 N.W. 448

STATE

v.LAUGHLIN.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

December 9, 1887.

Appeal from district court, Madison county; O. B. AYRES, Judge.

This is a proceeding under the statute, the object of which is to charge the the defendant, Thomas Laughlin, with the support and maintenance of an illegitimate child of which it is alleged he is the father. The defendant, by a plea of not guilty, denied the parentage of the child. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict of guilty, and the defendant was, by order of the court, required to pay certain sums at stated periods for the support of the child. Defendant appeals.V. Wainwright, for appellant.

Ruby & Wilkins, for appellee.

ROTHROCK, J.

1. The first question presented in argument arises upon an allegal error in the selection of the jury. The following are the facts upon which the defendant bases his complaint. We quote from the bill of exceptions: “A jury composed of the same members as the present jury, with the exception of Thomas Kirkland, Jr., were duly impaneled and sworn, statement of counsel made to jury, when the court excused said Kirkland on account of dangerous sickness of juror's mother. The parties declining to call one more juror, the court discharged the panel, and reimpaneled a jury, allowing each party the full number of challenges. The new jury were composed of the same jurors as before, with the exception of John Gowin, who was not a member of the regular panel, the member of the regular panel presentbeing excused. To the action of the court in discharging said jury and reimpaneling, the defendant at the time duly excepted.” The defendant claims that a by-stander was “ injected” into the jury by the action of the court. No question is made in argument as to the power of the court to discharge the juror Kirkland. The parties then declined to call another juror. The court thereupon discharged the remaining jurors, and impaneled a new jury. It will be presumed that the jury was impaneled in the regular and lawful manner; that is, by first exhausting the regular panel, and then calling talesmen. There is nothing in this record showing the contrary.

2. The evidence shows that the child, the paternity of which is in question, was born on the eighth day of December, 1883. The complaining witness claimed that it was begotten on the twenty-eighth day of February, 1883. The prosecution was commenced on the twenty-eighth day of May, 1885. Defendant claims that the proceeding is barred by the statute of limitations, because it was not commenced within two years after the defendant became pregnant. The statute authorizing the proceeding is as follows: “Sec. 4715. When any woman residing in any county of the state is delivered of a bastard child, or is pregnant with a child, which, if born alive, will be a bastard, complaint may be made in writing by any person to the district court of the county where she resides, stating that fact, and charging the proper person with being the father thereof. The proceeding shall be entitled in the name of the state against the accused as defendant.” It will be observed that the complaint was filed within two years after the birth of the child. Defendant claims this is too late, because it might have been...