State v. Law, VV-241

• Decision Date: 23 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. VV-241,VV-241
• Citation: 400 So.2d 1260
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Fred C. LAW, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1260

400 So.2d 1260

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Fred C. LAW, Appellee.

No. VV-241.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

June 23, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 4, 1981.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellant.

Harry L. Shorstein, Jacksonville, for appellee.

OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr. (Retired), Associate Judge.

Fred C. Law was charged by information with four counts of grand theft of the second degree. Following a jury verdict of guilty as to the first three counts, the trial court granted Mr. Law's motion in arrest of judgment on the grounds that the information upon which Mr. Law was tried is so defective that it will not support a judgment of conviction. We reverse.

In Martinez v. State, 368 So.2d 338 (Fla.1978), the court was faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the charging information. Succinctly setting forth the standards by which the sufficiency of a charging information is weighed, the court stated, at page 339:

"An information will be quashed only if it is 'so vague, indistinct, and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense or expose him after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same offense.' Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.140(o). See also, Brown v. State, 135 Fla. 30, 184 So. 518 (1938); Williams v. State, 92 Fla. 648, 109 So. 805 (1926); and Machin v. State, 270 So.2d 464 (Fla.3d DCA 1972). Generally, an information is sufficient if it follows the language of the statute, Major v. State, 180 So.2d 335 (Fla.1965); Gibbs v. Mayo, 81 So.2d 739 (Fla.1955); and Harrell v. State, 79 Fla. 220, 83 So. 922 (1920), and need not set forth proof with which the state intends to establish its case. State v. Cauley, 213 So.2d 521 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)."

Here, each count of the charging information not only tracked the statutory language of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1977), but in addition, each count stated with particularity that the theft occurred by the use of a check (or checks) in a designated amount, made payable to a named person, and each such check being described as drawn "on the account of the Skills Development Uplift Program at the Century National Bank, Jacksonville, Florida, Account No. 10 0469 9." The information as a whole and each count thereof was sufficient to inform Mr. Law of the nature of the offense charged, and could not mislead or embarrass him in the preparation of his defense nor subject him to double jeopardy, which is the acceptable test of legal sufficiency. See State v. Dilworth, 397 So.2d 292 (Fla.1981).

Appellee had relied heavily upon this Court's...