Gibbs v. Mayo
| Decision Date | 20 July 1955 |
| Citation | 81 So.2d 739 |
| Parties | Nesby Lawrence GIBBS, Petitioner, v. Nathan MAYO, as Prison Custodian of the State of Florida, Respondent. . En Banc |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Nesby Lawrence Gibbs, petitioner, in pro. per.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
The defendant pleaded guilty to an information which charged that he did unlawfully break and enter 'a motor vehicle, the property of J. Edwin Baker, located at Sears parking lot at Bay and Jackson Streets, Fort Myers, Florida, with the intent then and there to commit a felony, to-wit: Grand Larceny', whereupon the court adjudged him 'to be guilty of the offense of breaking and entering a motor vehicle' and sentenced him to the State prison for a period of five years. This constitutes the entire record of proceedings in the trial court. At the instance of the petitioner, a writ of habeas corpus was issued, to which the State has filed a return.
The information charges that the defendant unlawfully did break and enter a motor vehicle but no statute in this State makes it a crime, in those words, to break and enter a motor vehicle. In Chapter 810 on burglary, breaking and entering is made a crime under various circumstances with reference to 'any ship or vessel' in Section 810.02, 'any railroad car' in Section 810.04, and 'any building, ship, vessel, or railroad car' in Section 810.05. Section 860.12 refers to breaking and entering 'any automobile, truck, trailer, semitrailer, or housecar'. We must determine whether the language of the information is sufficient to charge a crime under any statute of this State.
It has long been settled in this State that to charge one with an offense defined by statute, the offense must be charged 'in the very language of the statute, or in language of equivalent import' and 'nothing can be taken by intendment'. (Italics added.) Humphreys v. State, 17 Fla. 381, 385. The accused must be 'plainly and unmistakably' within a criminal statute, and all doubts are resolved in his favor. Watson v. Stone, 148 Fla. 516, 4 So.2d 700, 701. And when a word is substituted for that used in the statute, the substituted word must necessarily be within the terms of the statute in order to charge an offense. Wood v. State, 18 Fla. 967. In accordance with this rule, we have held that an indictment for the breaking and entering of a corn-crib charges no offense because a corn-crib 'is not necessarily a 'building, ship or vessel. " (Emphasis supplied.) Wood v. State, supra, at page 969. And 'from the allegation that the defendant misrepresented the chemical content of '10 sacks of commercial fertilizers shipped by the' defendant 'to one W. R. Hardee,' it is not necessarily to be inferred that the fertilizers were in fact sold to the consignee.' (Emphasis supplied.) Coe-Mortimer Co. v. State, 81 Fla. 701, 88 So, 475, 476. Nor does proof of breaking and entering a gin house sustain a charge of breaking and entering a storehouse. Givens v. State, 40 Fla. 200, 23 So. 850. Likewise, where substituted words are broader in meaning than statutory language, so that the words used may or may not constitute a crime under a statute, no offense is stated. State v. Willis, 130 Tenn. 412, 170 S.W. 1032, where there was use of the word 'corporation' instead of 'bank or banking institution', as required by statute; People v. Allen, 5 Denio, N.Y., 76, use of the word 'agent' instead of the statutory language 'clerk or servant'; Boyd v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 52, use of the word 'unlawfully' instead of the statutory language 'corrupt conduct'; Lantznester v. State, 19 Tex.App. 320, use of the word 'father' to negative parental consent, instead of the statutory language 'parent.'
Our own statutory definitions of motor vehicles vary, compare Sec. 317.01(11) with Sec. 320.01(1) F.S.1951, F.S.A., and are of no help here. Moreover, if the Legislature intended to make it a crime to break and enter a motor vehicle, as those words are defined by one of our statutes, it would so have stated. We must resort to the ordinary definition of motor vehicle. A vehicle is 'that in or on which a person or thing is or may be carried.' Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, (5th ed. 1941) p. 1109. A motor vehicle is such a vehicle which is self-propelled. Under this definition undoubtedly all automobiles or trucks are motor vehicles, but it is just as clear that all motor vehicles are not automobiles or trucks. For example, farm tractors, bulldozers, motorcycles, motor scooters, electric street cars, and road rollers are within the definition of a motor vehicle. In its broadest sense, an airplane, a self-propelled boat, and even an elevator may be a motor vehicle. But clearly none of these kinds of motor vehicles, in the common usage and ordinary meaning of the words, in a vehicle within the terms of those described in our statutes and particularly not either an automobile or a truck as those words are used in Section 860.12, supra.
The State urges that Section 860.12, supra, referring to automobile, truck, trailer, semi-trailer, or housecar, is the 'only applicable statute' and asserts that the information was drawn under this section so that by pleading guilty, the defendant 'admitted that he broke and entered into either an automobile or a truck.' We do not agree. First, as has been pointed out, the words 'motor vehicle' used in the information are not the equivalent of and are not necessarily within the meaning of any of the words describing the various vehicles mentioned in this statute. Further, a plea of guilty 'admits only the acts charged, and does not preclude the defendant from claiming that such facts charged do not constitute a crime.' Ex parte Stirrup, 155 Fla. 173, 19 So.2d 712 713; Sellers v. Bridges, 153 Fla. 586, 15 So.2d 293, 148 A.L.R. 1240. If it be true (and nothing in the record so indicates) that the defendant broke and entered an automobile or a truck, or any other of the kinds of motor vehicles described in our statutes, it would have been a simple matter to allege that fact in the information, describing...
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