State v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 26 May 1913
• Docket Number: 16,576
• Citation: 105 Miss. 58,61 So. 975
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. H. C. LAWRENCE

61 So. 975

105 Miss. 58

STATE v. H. C. LAWRENCE

No. 16,576

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 26, 1913

APPEAL from the circuit court of Hinds county, HON. W. A. HENRY Judge.

H. C Lawrence was convicted of violating the automobile law in a justice of the peace court and on appeal to the circuit court was acquitted and the state appeals.

The appellee was arrested upon a warrant made by a constable of Hinds county, charging a violation of chapter 108 of the Laws of 1912. He was convicted, and appealed to the circuit court where, on a trial de novo before the judge, sitting as judge and jury, he was acquitted, and the state appeals to the Supreme Court to settle the question of law.

The act in review provides that it shall be the duty of every owner of an "automobile, . . . or other four-wheeled vehicle propelled by gas, steam, or electricity, to report to the auditor of public accounts showing in said report the name or make of the vehicle owned by him, the motive power thereof the maximum horsepower capacity of the engine which operates such vehicle, the name of the owner of the vehicle, the postoffice address of such owner, the name of his county," and makes the failure to do so a misdemeanor. Upon receipt of said report, with the fee prescribed, the auditor is required to send the said owner two tags, with serial numbers, which the owner shall attach to his automobile, one in front and one in the rear, and it is made a misdemeanor to drive such automobile without said tags being attached thereto. A scale of registration fees is prescribed, varying according to horsepower from five dollars to twenty-five dollars, which fees are required to be paid annually to the auditor, and by him turned in to the state treasurer to the credit of the general fund. This fee is not in lieu of the ad valorem tax or privilege license for operating an automobile for hire.

The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts, hereinafter set out; it being the theory of the defendant that the act of the legislature was unconstitutional and void.

"AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS.

"It is agreed between the attorneys for the state and the defendant that this case shall be heard by the court sitting as both judge and jury on the agreed facts hereinafter set out, as there is only a question of law involved, to-wit, the constitutionality of chapter 108 of the Laws of 1912.

"It is agreed that H. C. Lawrence did on the second day of August, 1912, in the city of Jackson, first judicial district of Hinds county, Mississippi, in justice of the peace district number one of said county, drive on the public streets of said city a certain forty horsepower Haynes automobile, owned by him without first having procured from the auditor and having exposed on said automobile the tags required by chapter 108, Laws of Mississippi of 1912, and without having paid the auditor the fee required, though no was demand was made of him to do so.

"It is further agreed that these tags cost the state seventeen and one-half cents a pair, the express on same is 16 cents a pair, and the labor performed in registration consists in making nine entries on one line in a book kept by the auditor for that purpose, and requires not more than five minuets' time.

"It is further agreed that said automobile is a four-wheeled vehicle propelled by gasoline, and that all ad valorem taxes due the city, county, and state on same have been paid, and that a license to keep said automobile for hire to the public has been paid as required by chapter 96, Laws of 1910, and also a privilege tax paid for conducting a public garage; that said automobile has been duly registered and numbered by the proper authorities of the city of Jackson, and the uniform registration fee of two dollars paid said city; and that defendant is and was then a duly licensed chauffeur in said city and paid the sum of sixty cents for license."

Affirmed.

Frank Johnston, assistant attorney-general, for the state.

The questions which I presume will be raised, and according to my view of the case, the only ones that can be raised, I will state as follows:

1. The question as to the power and extent of the authority of the legislature under the police power of the state to regulate the use of the public highways of the state for the safety and convenience of the traveling public, involving as this question does, the regulation of the use on the public highways of any species of vehicle operating by steam or gasoline, which are dangerous to the traveling public.

2.The authority and power of the legislature to require such vehicles to be registered and numbered and licensed, and also including the authority of the legislature to require the payment of a fee for that purpose. This involves the entire question as to the power and authority of the legislature to regulate the use of the highways and to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which any and all vehicles, and especially those whose use is attended with unusual danger, as in the case of automobiles, may be operated.

3. Whether this license tax or registration tax, more properly speaking, is a tax laid by the legislature, which is in effect an ad valorem or specific property tax, and laid by the legislature under the mask and guise and pretense of its being a registration or license tax or regulation tax.

4. Is the Act of 1912 to be classed as discriminating class legislation under the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution?

5. Is this registration fee to be regarded as a double tax, and if it is double taxation, is it illegal and invalid as such?

I will discuss these propositions in the order in which they are stated.

1. Proposition: The question as to the power and extent of the authority of the legislature under the police power of the state to regulate the use of the public highways of the state for the safety and convenience of the traveling public, involving as this question does, the regulation of the use on the public highways of any species of vehicle operating by steam or gasoline, which is dangerous to the traveling public. The first proposition that I will submit to the court is that the act March 16, 1912, Acts of 1912, page 89, is an act passed in pursuance of the police power of the state; that it is purely and simply an act regulating the use of automobiles on the public highways, and it can only be classed as a regulation statute, and as such, enacted by the legislature under its police power. Huddy on Automobiles, sec. 53; Ibid., sec. 57, p. 60; Dudley v. Street Ry. Co., 202 Mass. 443, 89 N.E. 225; Chae v. Railroad Co., (Mass. 1911), 94 N.E. 377; Cechi v. Lindley (Del. Sup. 1910), 75 A. 376; Feely v. City of Melrose, 205 Mass. 329, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1156; Bourne v. Whitman (Mass. 1911), 95 N.E. 404; Emerson Troy Granite Co. v. Pearson, 74 N.H. 22, 64 A. 562; People v. Schnider, 139 Mich. 673, 103 N.W. 172, 69 L. R. A. 345.

This same author says that the power of the legislature to require a license and registration and a fee in the state is absolutely unquestionable, and the same power may be exercised by a municipality when authorized by statute. Huddy on Automobiles, sec. 61, p. 67; Commonwealth v. Boyd, 188 Mass. 79, 74 N.E. ; People v. Schnider, 139 Mich. 673, 103 N.W. 172; Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 14 Pa. Dist. 592; Commonwealth v. Densmore, 29 Pa. Co. 217; Christy v. Elliott, 215 Ill. 31, 74 N.E. 1035; Union v. State, 73 N. J. L. 529, 64 A. 163; Claerly v. Johnston, 79 N. J. L. 49, 74 A. 538; Kane v. Titus (N. J. L. 1911), 80 A. 145; Unwin v. State (N. J.), 64 A. 163, affirmed in 75 N. J. L. 500, 68 A. 1110.

"Besides a general power of regulation, the state has power to impose burdens in the nature of taxation upon special occupations or special kinds of property with a view rather to regulate than for revenue, under the power of police." Black's Constitutional Law, 348; Babbitt on Motor Vehicles, 141; Storage Company v. Chicago, 235 Ill. 58, 85; Guardside Case, 43 Ill. 47; Bank v. Aptrorpe, 12 Mass. 252-256.

2 and 3. Propositions: 2. The authority and power of the legislature to require such vehicles to be registered and numbered and licensed, and also including the authority of the legislature to require the payment of the fee for that purpose. 3. Whether this license tax or registration tax is a tax laid by the legislature, which is in effect an ad valorem or specific property tax, and laid by the legislature under the guise and pretence of its being registration or license tax or regulation tax.

It is conceded that the use of the public highways is for the public, and that everybody has in a restricted manner, the right to use the public highways of the commonwealth, but while this is true, it is equally true and sound as a doctrine of legislative authority that the control and regulation of the public highways of the state comes legitimately and properly within the police power of the legislature. Mr. Babbitt says that the legislative control over the highways grows out of its duty to administer the police power which has for its primary object the public safety, order and government. People v. Walsh, 96 Ill. 232; Fletcher v. Dixon (1908) 107 Md. 420, 426.

4. Proposition: Is the Act of 1912 to be classed as discriminating class legislation under the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution? The Act of 1912 is constitutional, and it is not illegal class discrimination and it is not class discrimination at all. It is not class discrimination or class regulation that is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment, but it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjust class discrimination or race discrimination that is condemned by this amendment to the Federal Constitution. Huddy on Automobiles, sec. 63, p. 75 and sec....