Unwen v. State

• Decision Date: 26 June 1906
• Citation: 64 A. 163,73 N.J.L. 529
• Parties: UNWEN v. STATE.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

64 A. 163

73 N.J.L. 529

UNWEN

v. STATE.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 26, 1906.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certiorari by Harry Unwen to review a conviction before the criminal court of Jersey City. Affirmed.

Argued at February term, 1906, before FORT, PITNEY, and REED, JJ.

Frank H. Hall and Charles Thaddeus Terry, for plaintiff. Edward D. Duffield, for the State.

REED, J. The prosecutor was convicted before the first criminal court of Jersey City of violating the provisions of "A supplement to an act, entitled: 'An act defining motor vehicles and providing for the registration of the same and uniform rules regulating the use and speed thereof.'" P. L. 1905, p. 484. The specific charge was that the prosecutor drove an automobile along a public highway In Jersey City without having previously filed in the office of the Secretary of State a duly verified declaration, setting forth that he was competent to drive said automobile, and a written statement containing his name, address, a description of the character of his automobile, the name of the maker, manufacturer's number, and the horse power thereof; and without having previously paid to the Secretary of State the registry fee of $1. Also, that the prosecutor, when requested by a patrolman of the police department, did not state the number under which the automobile was registered under the said act. The conviction was affirmed by the court of common pleas of Hudson county. This writ brings up the last judgment.

On the trial it appeared that the prosecutor was a resident of the state of New York, and that his automobile had been registered in that state in compliance with its statute. It appeared that he had not conformed with those provisions of the New Jersey act, the violation of which is charged in the complaint. The single question presented now is whether these provisions are constitutional. It is assigned as a reason why the conviction should be reversed that these provisions are in contravention of the provisions of article 4, § 2, of the Constitution of the United States; that they are in contravention of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment of that Instrument, and that they contravene our state Constitution. It will first be inquired if these provisions are obnoxious to our state Constitution. Are they a legitimate exercise of the police power with which the state is invested? No one will question the right of the state to regulate the method by which the public shall use the public highways. Such regulation, either directly or by a body to which such power is delegated, is essential to the safety and comfort of those who use a road' or street. A simple and familiar instance of the exercise of this power is seen in the statutory direction that the drivers of vehicles meeting shall turn to the right or left, or, if one wishes to pass another, he shall do so to the right or left of the vehicle in front. Indeed, no affair has been more frequently the subject of direct legislative regulation or delegated control than the manner in which the manner in which the public streets shall be used. Dillon Mun. Corp. § 326. Perhaps the cases which bear most closely upon the question now presented are those dealing with regulations respecting the use of streets by street railroad companies. It is true that it requires a franchise before a street can be occupied by such a road. When, however, the franchise is once granted, the use by such road stands upon the same footing as any other use of the street, in respect to any subsequent regulation. North Hudson Co. Ry. v. Hoboken, 41 N. J. Law, 71. The Introduction of heavy cars propelled by electricity and capable of great speed, presented for the first time a new danger to pedestrians, and to the drivers and occupants of horse drawn vehicles using the same streets. For the purpose of protecting these users of the highway, a number of regulations limiting the speed of these cars, requiring a license fee for each car, requiring that certain lights and signals at night should be displayed, and that adequate brakes should be employed, have received judicial sanction. In Trenton Horse R. R. Co. v. Trenton, 53 N. J. Law, 132, 20 Atl. 1076, 11 L. R. A. 410, an ordinance requiring the company to employ an agent in addition to the driver to assist in the control of the car and to prevent accidents, was held to be valid. In Traction Co. v. Elizabeth, 58 N. J. Law, 619, 34 Atl. 146, an ordinance prohibiting the placing of salt on any street was upheld. In Cape May R. R. v. Cape May, 59 N. J. Law, 393, 36 Atl. 679, 36 L. R. A. 656, an ordinance limiting the rate of speed of trolley cars was sustained. In Cape...