State v. Lawrence

• Decision Date: 08 March 1913
• Citation: 130 P. 508,9 Okla.Crim. 16,1913 OK CR 65
• Parties: STATE v. LAWRENCE.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

130 P. 508

9 Okla.Crim. 16, 1913 OK CR 65

STATE v. LAWRENCE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

March 8, 1913

Syllabus by the Court.

(a) It is the exclusive province of the Legislature to declare what shall constitute a crime, but it is the duty of the courts to determine whether a particular act done or omitted is within the intendment of a general statute.

(b) The Legislature in creating an offense may define it by a particular description of the act or acts constituting it, or it may define it as any act which produces or is reasonably calculated to produce a certain defined or described result.

(c) Section 2782, Comp. Laws 1909, which provides that any person who willfully and wrongfully commits any act which grossly injures the person or property of another, or which grossly disturbs the public peace or health, or which openly outrages public decency, and is injurious to public morals, is guilty of a misdemeanor, is not void for uncertainty, but constitutes a valid provision of our law, and as such should be enforced.

(d) When the Legislature creates without defining an offense which was a crime under the common law, the definition of the crime given by the common law will be treated by the courts as though it were a part of the statute itself, and will render certain and definite that which might otherwise be uncertain and indefinite.

(e) Gaming has always been an offense at common law. A wager laid upon the result of any contest of chance, skill, or strength between men or beasts or men and beasts constitutes gaming.

(f) Bets publicly and openly made in the presence of and among an assembly of men, women, boys, and girls who are witnessing a game of baseball are prohibited by section 2782, Comp. Laws 1909.

(a) This court takes judicial notice of the fact that the game of baseball when properly conducted is an innocent public amusement, and constitutes the most entertaining and popular public pastime or sport of the American people.

(b) For an indictment held to be good which charged the offense of openly and publicly betting upon a game of baseball, see opinion.

Appeal from Bryan County Court; J. L. Rappolee, Judge.

R. J Lawrence was prosecuted for openly and publicly betting on a game of baseball, in violation of Comp. Laws 1909, § 2782. A demurrer to the information was sustained, and defendant discharged, and the State appeals. Reversed and remanded.

J. T McIntosh, Co. Atty., of Durant, for the State.

FURMAN J.

The information alleges that on the 27th day of April, 1911, in Bryan county, the defendant did "willfully and wrongfully commit an act which grossly disturbed the public peace, openly outraged public decency, and injured the public morals, by then and there, in the presence of and among divers and sundry persons assembled at a baseball game and consisting of men and women, boys and girls, bet the sum of five dollars with one Jake Sims on said game, and said betting and gambling was done publicly and openly in the presence of said persons so assembled." To this information the defendant filed a demurrer, upon the ground that the facts stated therein did not constitute a crime under the statutes of this state. The trial court sustained the demurrer, and ordered that the defendant be released from custody, to all of which the state excepted. The information in this case is based on section 2782, Comp. Laws 1909, which is as follows: "Every person who willfully and wrongfully commits any act which grossly injures the person or property of another, or which grossly disturbs the public peace or health, or which openly outrages public decency, and is injurious to public morals, although no punishment is expressly prescribed therefore by this code, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Two questions are presented by this appeal. The first is as to whether or not the statute upon which this information is based is void for uncertainty. The second is as to whether or not the information is bad for duplicity.

First. Our Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and have a copy thereof, and be confronted with the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his behalf, and that he shall have the right to be heard by himself and counsel. See Williams' Const. § 28. This provision of the Constitution would become nugatory if the Legislature could create a crime in such broad and indefinite language that a citizen charged with a violation of such statute would not know what he must prepare to defend against, and where the court and jury would be without a fixed standard to determine what acts would constitute such offense. Penal statutes ought not to be expressed in language so uncertain as to mislead or deceive the common mind. It may be stated as a general principle of criminal jurisprudence that penal statutes should be expressed in such language that every man of ordinary understanding may be able to know when he has committed a crime. If this be not true, then to a large extent the judicial would be substituted for the legislative department of the state. See Ex parte Hunnicutt, 7 Okl. Cr. 213, 123 P 179.

We are satisfied that in sustaining the demurrer to the information in this case the trial court acted upon the views which have just been expressed. While these views are correct, yet it is equally true that, when a statute uses words and terms which are of settled legal meaning or which indicate offenses known to and defined by the common law, the statute is sufficient and should be sustained. Greater certainty in describing an offense is never necessary than the nature of the subject-matter dealt with will reasonably admit. See State v. Coyle et al., 130 P. 316, decided at the present term. Reasonable certainty is all that is required. It is true that the language of section 2782 is general, yet the words and terms which it uses in describing the offenses therein created are of settled meaning and indicate offenses well known to and defined by the common law. As every man is charged with knowledge of the law, we cannot see how it can be said that a person of ordinary understanding could fail to know what offenses were intended to be created by the section in question. B...